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This dissertation explores philosophically the subject 
of individual liberty and the conditions of its justifiable 
restriction. The subject is examined both generally and with 
particular reference to children, their education and educational 
institutions in an attempt to ascertain whether the same value 
should be placed on the liberty of adults and children and 
the same criteria accepted for its restriction. 
In the Introduction the shape of the dissertation is 
mapped out and a distinction drawn between political liberty 
and freedom. The distinction between negative and positive 
liberty is explored in Chapter 2, and the question of what 
counts as a restriction of freedom is addressed in Chapter 3, 
as the relationship between liberty and power is examined, and 
the traditional liberal view criticised. The claim that 
restrictions of freedom are justified when or because we form 
a contract with the government exchanging freedom for security 
and other benefits is criticised in Chapter 4, and the theme 
of consent is continued in Chapter 5 when the relationship 
between democracy and liberty is examined. 
The place of liberty in the human rights arguments is 
considered in Chapters 6 and 7, in an examination of the 
claim that firstly adults and secondly children have a right 
to liberty. The comparison between the value placed on adults' 
liberty and that of children is continued in Chapters 8 and 9 
when the subject of paternalism is discussed. This leads to a 
consideration, in Chapter 109 of whether restricting children's 
liberty by compulsory education is justified, and the dilemma 
posed by the ideas that education is a key to freedom while 
compulsory education is a restriction of it is discussed. 
Finally, after considering the limits to the legitimate 
restriction of children's freedom in schools in Chapter 11, an 
account of the inter-relationship between freedom, education and 






The liberty of individuals living in a society with 
other individuals cannot be absolute and must be restricted, 
but how are we to decide under what circumstances limitations 
of liberty are justified? This is the central problem I 
address in this dissertation as I consider the relationship of 
power to the freedom of the individual, both in general terms 
and with particular reference to children and their education. 
The problem of deciding under what circumstances it is 
justifiable to use power to restrict the freedom of others is 
particularly pertinent to the question of how we should raise 
and educate our children because of their relative 
powerlessness. I investigated the relationship of power and 
freedom because I believe that there are certain omissions, 
inconsistencies and contradictions in the received wisdom of 
liberalism on this subject. When discussions about the 
legitimate use of power or the right to liberty take place 
children are most frequently not considered at all, or else 
dismissed in an asidei I am concerned to include children as 
members of our society and not to ignore them altogether or 
to assume, without examining the reasons for it, that they are 
quite different from adults. 
The words 'freedom' and 'liberty' are generally used 
interchangeably, and I shall follow common usage in this, but 
there are some slight differences in emphasis between the terms 
which I would like to consider at this early stage. Firstly, 
the range of circumstances in which we use 'liberty' is 
narrower than that which is appropriate for 'freedom' and 
'free'. For example 'freedom' may refer to freedom of the will 
as opposed to determinism, but there is no comparable use of 
'liberty'. Secondly, I suggest that 'liberty' has a stronger 
association than has 'freedom' with what we are allowed to do, 
rather than just what we can do. So, with the word 'liberty' 
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holds that only overt and deliberate coercion restricts freedom. 
In Chapter 2I consider the distinction between 
negative and positive liberty, and argue that 'liberty' should 
not be interpreted so widely that it includes freedom from 
personal imperfections and limitations. We are the people that 
we are, I claim, and not the imperfect and unfree shadow of 
some ideal free self. However, although I do not accept the 
widest interpretation of positive or higher liberty, I argue 
for a broader interpretation of negative liberty. In Chapter 3 
I argue that although only humanly-imposed restrictions limit 
freedom, this does not apply only to restrictions that result 
from intentional or individual actions, nor does it rule out 
restrictions resulting from uses of power of which the person 
whose freedom is limited is unaware. I find no reason to 
support the claim that only deliberate coercion and 
intentionally placed obstructions should count as restrictive of 
liberty, and I suggest that this proposed limitation reduces 
the number of cases in which freedom may be said to be 
restricted for a purpose other than that of clarity. If we 
say we value freedom, but manage to show that various social 
and economic restrictions suffered by some members of our 
society should not be thought of as restrictions of their 
liberty because they arise as unintentional consequences of 
other actions, then we may feel less of a moral obligation 
to 
make any change in our social arrangements. However, if we 
are to be consistent, then believing that it is basically good 
and right that individuals should be able to make choices 
about their own lives, we should not be satisfied when the 
unintended consequences of some other actions make this 
impossible. The view that restrictions must be deliberately 
imposed if they are to count as restrictions of liberty, (1) 
serves to limit the occasions on which freedom may be said to 
be restricted, and thus, possibly, to perpetuate the restricted 
circumstances of many people's lives by reducing 
the 
determination and sense of obligation to promote change. 
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In my attempt to discover the conditions under which 
restrictions of liberty are Justified, I criticise the 
individualistic liberal view of liberty also for its assumption 
that individuals are logically prior to society, and have only 
the obligations they choose to accept. This criticism arises 
first in Chapter 4 in relation to liberal views of social 
contract according to which restrictions of liberty are 
legitimate because (or when) they have been agreed freely, and 
it recurs throughout the dissertation. I claim that the 
pre-social obligationless individual is a fiction and an 
impossibility, and that as social beings we have some 
non-contractual obligations to other members of our society 
whether we choose them or not. Thus we do not start with 
liberty, tout court, and freely agree to the obligations which 
restrict it, but rather we take part in the social process of 
defining and delineating both our obligations and our 
liberties. This process of participation is investigated most 
fully in Chapter 51 'Liberty and democracy", in which I argue 
that participation in the creation of a just society is one 
of our non-contractual obligations and that a large measure of 
personal liberty is necessary for us to be able to discharge 
it properly. 
In Chapters 6 and 7I consider the question of 
whether we, adults and children, have the right to liberty. If 
adults but not children are said to have this right, then 
there must be some relevant difference between them which 
justifies their different treatment, and this is the case also 
with paternalism, which I examine in Chapters 8 and 9. It is 
generally accepted that restraining people's liberty for their 
own good as opposed to preventing harm to others) is 
illiberal and justified only rarely if at all. However, most 
of what has traditionally been written about paternalism just 
assumes that children form an exception to the libertarian 
rule, (2) while the more modern radical critique tends to 
minimise the vulnerablity of the young and their need for 
protection and guidance. (3) When I consider whether we have a 
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right to liberty or whether compulsion should ever be used in 
the interests of the person who is compelled, my conclusions 
refer to children as well as adults, and the grounds for any 
differences in their treatment are examined. 
Following the investigation of whether paternalism is 
justified and if so under what circumstances, I consider the 
problem of whether children should be compelled to attend 
school. The question of compulsory education is sometimes seen 
as a matter of infringing the parents' right to educate their 
children as they wish, free from interference of the state. 
However, 'I do not tackle it from the angle of parental 
freedom, and am critical of the claim that bringing children 
up to be aware of certain values and ideas is right when 
done by parents, who, it is said, have the right to determine 
what their children should believe, yet wrong when. done by 
the wider community to which children and parents belong. I 
look at the question from the point of view of the freedom 
of children, not their parents, and am interested in the 
dilemma posed' by the ideas that knowledge is essential for 
liberty and that education, particularly compulsory education, is 
a restriction of it. It is interesting that both the 
traditionally-minded opponents of compulsory schooling and the 
radical deschoolers stress the responsibility of the family for 
the child's education. (4) I argue that children are neither 
simply individuals or members of a family, nor possessions of 
their parents but members of a wider society, and therefore 
that society has an interest in and responsibility for their 
education. It should not be thought of a matter of concern 
only for children and their parents. 
However, despite my acceptance of the need for all 
children to be educated, and my lack of faith in various 
suggested alternatives to compulsion, I as concerned that the 
limits to justified adult direction of children should be 
clearly drawn, and kept to the necessary minimum. In Chapter 
it I consider the freedom children should be allowed in school 
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in academic and social matters, and this leads on, in 
Chapter 12, to a discussion of children's political liberty, 
political education and democracy in school. The main subject 
of this chapter is the inter-relationship between liberty, 
democracy and education. In it I refer back to the arguments 
on the relationship between democracy and liberty, made in 
Chapter 5, and consider the implications for our schools and 
education system of an acceptance of the principle of 
democratic participation. 
The views on liberty which are held in any society 
will have important implications for the way children should be 
educated, and for their relationship with adults. However, in 
liberal democratic societies, such as our own, the relationship 
between what is claimed about the value of liberty and what 
goes on in our schools, homes and communities is less close 
than it might be. This is due, I suggest, to the neglect of 
children, their exclusion from membership of our society, and 
the arbitrary distinction commonly drawn between what is thought 
to be right for them and what is claimed to be right for 
adults. I do not refer to their physical neglect and 
exclusion, of course, but to the fact that in discussions on 
how we should live, what people should be allowed to do, and 
what are the values that should govern our dealings with each 
other, children are largely forgotten. We can sustain a false 
view of ourselves as a society of independent individualists, 
owing little or nothing to anyone else and having only the 
obligations we have chosen for ourselves, only because we do 
not include children as part of that society. Little attempt 
is made to create a value-system which takes account of the 
dependence and particular needs of many children (and some 
adults) and also of the desire and capacity for 
self-determination and autonomy of many adults (and some 
children. ) In this dissertation I try to begin to remedy this. 
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NEGATIVE AND POSITIVE LIBERTY 
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Negative and positive Liberty 
The traditional liberal view of liberty or freedom 
is that it is the absence of restraints deliberately imposed 
by human action. (1) According to this view, if we are not 
subject to intentional coercion then we are free regardless 
of other impediments which may prevent us from doing what we 
wish, or what we might have wished had we known of the 
alternative possibilities. This concept of liberty is an 
extention of the basic, minimal interpretation described by 
Hobbes: that freedom is the absence of impediment to motion 
(2), and it itself has been extended further in several 
different ways, until as Gibbs says 
To investigate freedom is to enter a labyrinth of concepts 
and principles and face problems as complicated and 
intractable as any in philosophy" (3) 
There is the idea that to view freedom as a sere absence 
is too negative a way of looking at something as precious 
as human freedom, and so it has been claimed that freedom 
must be positive, active or, as Joyce Cary put it, "Not an 
absence but a power". (4) Then it has been argued that if 
external restrictions to human action count as limitations to 
liberty, so should 'internal' restrictions to self-fulfilment, 
for these are restrictions to the realisation of what a 
rational person would most desire. (5) No two accounts of 
freedom appear to view its boundaries, its problems and 
dilemmas in the same way, but much of the debate centres 
on, or at least starts with, the idea that there are two 
concepts of liberty - negative and positive liberty, and so 
that is where I shall start also. 
The difference between negative and positive liberty 
has often been conceived as the difference between 'freedom 
from' and 'freedom to'. However, MacCullum argues that this 
distinction is false because freedom is always one and the 
same triadic relations freedom of an agent or agents, from 
something, to do (or not do) something (6), and that 
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"anyone who argues that freedom from is the 'only' freedom, 
or that freedom to is the 'truest' freedom, or that one is 
more important than' the other, cannot be taken as having 
said anything both straightforward and sensible about two 
distinct kinds of freedom. He can, at most, be said to be 
attendinq to or emphasizing the importance of only one part 
of what is always present in any case of freedom. " (7) 
Thus far I believe MacCullum is right. It is mistaken to 
look on a traditional negative liberty such as being allowed 
to dig your own garden or choose your spouse as simply 
'freedom from' and therefore a different kind of freedom from 
the positive 'freedom to' stand for Parliament or run your 
own business. Both are freedom from certain restrictions to 
perform certain actions, (and the fact that the first are 
seen as private and the second as public or political acts 
is irrelevant. ) Berlin says that people could enjoy a large 
measure of negative liberty under the rule of a 
liberal-minded despot, (8) but if this means that he merely 
leaves them alone as long as they do nothing which upsets 
him then they have freedom only as long as their plans of 
what they want to do are modest or the despot is in a 
good moods and if it means that they are allowed to choose 
what they do, then at once they are exercising positive 
liberty, because in the particular sphere in which they are 
acting and choosing they are "doers, deciding not decided 
for. (9) 
However, MacCullum goes further than saying simply 
that all freedoms are both from and to. He claims that as 
the distinction between negative and positive freedom is 
simply the difference between freedom from and freedom to -a 
difference which does not exist - there is, therefore, no 
distinction to be made between negative and postive freedom, 
and all that has previously been said on the subject is 
based on error. (10) MacCullum is mistaken, however, in his 
premise that there is no more to the negative/positive 
distinction than the difference between from and to. It is 
true that Berlin sometimes refers to the difference in this 
way, (11) but, as Baldwin points out (12) closer examination 
reveals that neither Berlin, nor others who make use of the 
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distinction consistently equate 'freedom from' with negative 
liberty, nor 'freedom to' with positive liberty. The terms 
are also used to refer to so-called 'lower' and 'higher' 
freedoms. Despite some confusion, it would appear that the 
difference between negative and positive freedom is generally 
taken to be more than the from/to distinction, and it is 
also accepted (if only spasmodically) that, as Bosanquet put 
it 
'The higher sense of liberty like the lower, involves 
freedom fron some things as weil as freedom to others' (13) 
If both higher and lower, positive and negative, freedoms 
involve freedom from as well as freedom to, then clearly the 
difference between them is not that higher positive freedom 
is 'freedom to' while the lower, negative freedom is merely 
'freedom from'. It may be that there is no 'freedom from' 
that is not also a 'freedom to' (and vice versa) and yet 
there still could be a distinction between negative and 
positive freedom, (or between different kinds of freedom) 
rather than simply different things we are free from and 
different things we are free to do. In order to discover if 
this is the case it is necessary to look more closely at 
various interpretations of 'freedom' and see what are 
considered to be 'higher' and 'lower' as well as negative 
and positive freedoms. 
T. H. Green distinguished between juristic and moral 
freedom, both of which are both freedom from and freedom to. 
Juristic freedom is the power to act according to choice or 
preference in the absence of constraints imposed by other 
people, while moral freedom is the power to realise the 
moral ideals to which one is committed, unimpeded by 
conflicting desires. (14) As the conflict which is envisaged 
is not between two equally worthy desires, but between 
long-standing moral ideals and short-term or unworthy impulses, 
the conquering of the urge to give way to such passing 
whims or low desires is seen as increasing moral freedom. 
The extension of 'freedom' to cover 'internal' constraints as 
well as 'external' ones is justified on the grounds that 
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disabilities and defects of character can prevent people from 
attaining their desires as certainly as can external 
constraints. This is true, but there are problems in 
extending 'freedom' to cover freedom from our personal 
inadequacies as well as external constraints, for it raises 
questions about what we mean by a self. It might seem 
reasonable to talk about a person addicted to drugs or 
alcohol being freed from his addiction, and, once free, 
becoming his 'old self' again. Similarly one could be freed 
from an obsession to continually wash one's hands or check 
ten times each night that the electric fires are turned off 
before going to bed. These are disabilities, however, which 
not only are felt as obstructions which would prevent people 
from achieving their purposes, but are seen also as 
deviations from a norm of human behaviour. It is thought, 
therefore, that if the addiction or the obsession could be 
overcome the person would be both freer to do what s/he 
wanted, and nearer (or restored to) his or her real self or 
true nature. I would argue, however, that this does not 
apply to other less extreme or non-pathological personal 
defects and disabilities. 
I may be handicapped in the advancement of my 
career because I suffer from nerves to an extent that 
prevents of from speaking well in public. I might like to 
be able to hold forth and sway audiences with my eloquence, 
and if I managed to overcome my nervousness my freedom to 
do various other things I wished to do might thereby be 
increased. However, I would not be realising my real self or 
true nature by overcoming my nerves, but changing into a 
less nervous person who enjoyed public speaking. It is not 
the case that I as naturally a bold orator who is held 
back by some defect which, once shed, would reveal me in my 
true light as a speaker in the Churchillian mould. My 
nervousness when faced with an audience is part of my self 
-a great deal more real than any imaginary orator. To 
assume otherwise is to postulate that we have a 'self' which 
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is quite different from the person our friends know, 
different from the person revealed in our speech and actions, 
or the person we know ourselves to be, yet is in some way 
more real and more truly ourselves. It is to suggest that, 
say, Oscar Wilde or Dorothy Parker without the spice of 
malice would be more truly Wilde and Parker, instead of, as 
I would claim, less so. Our ordinary, normal defects, 
inadequacies and disabilities are part of ourselvesi indeed 
the very fact that they are called 'internal' obstacles to 
freedom suggests that this is the case. The internal 
constraints which I have accepted might be thought of as 
restrictions to freedom - addictions and neuroses - have 
something more of externality about them. This is partly 
because we can imagine them being removed and leaving our 
selves in tact, but partly because they seem to have been 
imposed from without, and are contrary to normal healthy 
human nature. Laziness, timidity and other personality defects 
are not, and so it does not seem to me to be right to 
equate our virtues with freedom and our vices with 
constraints. 
If we struggle to overcome a personality defect or 
conflicting desires in order to achieve an important purpose 
I claim it is more accurate to describe this as the 
development of a self (with the struggle being part of the 
development) rather than the removal of internal obstacles to 
freedom. I cannot stipulate against the broad use of 
'freedom' for the absence of character defects, however, and 
must note that it is often used in this way. Green's moral 
freedom is similar to what Gibbs calls 'natural freedom', the 
'freedom to develop one's higher potentialities, to satisfy 
ones nobler desires, to become a mature and happy person, to 
prosper and flourish as a human being' (15) 
but, I would argue, being noble, mature, happy, prosperous 
and flourishing is not the same as being free. Indeed 
sometimes it is our virtues which prevent us from doing what 
we want, and so, if our less desirable personality traits 
are thought to be constraints on- our freedom, then our 
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virtues would have to be considered in that way as well. 
Although Gibbs' 'natural' freedom is similar to 
Green's moral freedom, Gibbs divides 'lower' freedom into six 
categories. Firstly there is prescriptive freedom, which is 
akin to Hobbes' "silence of the law", and is freedom from 
servitude within certain limits. Then there is civil liberty 
which is a form of prescriptive freedom but is more than 
simply being left alone to do what one wants within certain 
limits. Civil liberty, according to Gibbs, is roughly 
"that form of prescriptive freedom whereby private welfare 
is secured against the arbitrary encroachments of public 
power" (16) 
This is the traditional liberal interpretation of civil 
liberty according to which we are not only free to act as 
long as there is no law against what we want to do, but 
which guarantees and protects certain basic freedoms. 
Gibbs then defines four types of non-prescriptive 
freedom. First there is optative freedom which we have when 
we are not prevented from doing something. However, Gibbs' 
interpretation of 'prevention' is very strict, for a person 
walking along with a gun in his back and a dagger at his 
throat would have optative freedom as long as he was moving 
his legs himself and not being pushed. A person with 
optative freedom enjoys (though 'enjoys' is perhaps not the 
right word) Hobbes' basic freedom of absence of impediment to 
motion but nothing more. To have conative freedom on the 
other hand requires that there should be some degree of 
choice, although it is not necessary to have a selection of 
agreeable alternatives from which to choose, as it is for 
elective freedom. Force and violence destroy both conative and 
elective freedom, but to have conative freedom is not to 
able to do as one wants but simply to have some choice 
beyond that of merely acting. Finally, beyond elective freedom 
Gibbs distinguishes the natural freedom mentioned above, which 
is 'natural' not because it is either inalienable or 
exercised by all people naturally, but because when someone 
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has that freedom s/he is acting according to human nature as 
it should be. As I argued earlier, to be virtuous is not 
the same as being free. It might be the case that when we 
develop fully the potential of our human nature we are free, 
(because it is in our nature to value freedom, and so 
freedom and the mature, autonomous person go together)e but 
the view that becoming good will make us free carries the 
dangerous implication that by making people do what is right 
we make them free. This is not so. 
Gibbs' list of types of freedom, though extensive, 
still does not exhaust the possibilities, as he misses out 
an important traditional conception of higher or positive 
freedom - that freedom is to be found in determining the 
conditions of the life of one's community by participating 
with others in public and political life. (17) Gibbs' concept 
of natural freedom is largely individualistics it is achieved 
by individuals who overcome their own internal conflicts or 
defects and thereby realise their own true natures. He 
neglects the tradition, expressed by Rousseau and Marx, which, 
though it also views positive freedom in terms of 
self-determination, holds that this is achieved through 
collective control over the conditions of life in a 
community. This is the tradition of positive liberty which 
was criticised by Berlin on the grounds that it could lead 
to totalitarianism and the paradox of forcing people to be 
free. Its caricature is well knowni an oppressive society in 
which individual liberty is despised by those in power, and 
coercion is thought to be justified in order to force people 
to do what is in their 'real' interests or what accords 
with their 'true' natures, however much this may be at odds 
with what they say they want. However, the idea does not 
have to be taken to extremes or caricatured, and there is a 
real sense in which freedom as self-determination or having 
control over the circumstances of one's life should not be 
seen in purely individualistic terms. Our lives are influenced 
not only by our decisions and those of other individuals 
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but by joint decisions and the rules of our society. 
Self-determination therefore requires participation in the 
making of those decisions, and so if self-determination is 
one kind of freedom, participation in public affairs must be 
also. 
Faced with so many different kinds of freedom, it 
is hard not to feel drawn to the simplicity of MacCullum's 
thesis that all freedom is just from something and to 
somethings and that what makes the difference is not that 
there are different types of freedom but simply that there 
are different 'somethings' that we may be free from and free 
to do. Thus the optative freedom to walk down a corridor 
with a gun in one's back is not a different type of 
freedom from the elective freedom to choose whether to go to 
the cinema, the theatre, the pub, or stay homer it is 
simply that the former is freedom from impediments to moving 
one's legs to walk down the corridor, and the latter is 
freedom from various constraints to choose what to on a 
Saturday night. Having said that, the next point to make is 
that of the many different things we may be free to do, 
some are generally considered to be more important and more 
valuable than othersi and of the many things we may be free 
from, some are generally considered to be more oppressive or 
disagreeable than others. Freedom to write with our left 
hands if we prefer, or the restriction of having to drive 
on the left of the road are real freedoms and real 
restrictions, but they are not important ones, and so we do 
not give much time to considering them. The freedom to move 
one's legs despite having a gun in one's back is not a 
freedom that normally we would value highly (except, of 
course, when contrasted with being shot or forcibly thrown 
down the corridor)i nor is the freedom to choose between six 
washing powders with different names but essentially similar 
cleansing properties. Plain freedom is not of great value, 
but certain freedoms are, and the questions which arise then 
are what are the things we should be free from and free to 
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dos what, in other words, are the significant actions that 
humans do value and should value? Although I would maintain 
that, strictly, freedom is the absence of constraints to 
action, the freedom which concerns us and which we strive to 
maximise is the absence of constraints to do the things 
that matter to us and achieve the purposes we consider 
important. 
However, even if all freedoms are both from and to, 
and what matters is which actions we are free to perform, 
the claim that there is some type of higher freedom of a 
different order from other freedoms has still to be looked 
at more closely. One basic difference is said to be that 
all negative freedoms are what Charles Taylor calls 
opportunity-concepts (18) because, in the absence of certain 
external constraints the agent has the opportunity to act if 
s/he so wishes, and not if s/he does not. With positive, 
higher or moral freedom, on the other hand, it is sometimes 
claimed that persons are not only free to realise their 
human potentialities if they wish, but are not free unless 
they do. Freedom as self-realisation, then, is said to be 
an exercise-concept. 
Clearly it is not necessary actually to do something 
in order to have the basic negative liberty to do it. On 
the contrary, if we are free to choose between alternative 
courses of action the possibility must be open for us to 
choose not to do it. If I am free to go to the cinema, 
then I must be free not to go, for if this were not the 
case, then I would not go to the cinema freely, and would 
not be free to go, but constrained to go. If we are free 
to choose what we do, but do not have to do it, then we 
do not have to be active and enterprising in order to be 
free. We can choose to opt out rather than join in, and to 
drift with the tide rather than steer our own course. It 
may be true (I believe it is) that a person who never makes 
use of the opportunities for choice wastes his or her 
freedoms it may be the case that continued refusal to make 
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some choices and act on them will result in the 
opportunities disappearing and the freedom withering away 
(although this is not always the case); but if we are free 
we must surely be free not to take opportunities. The 
unmolested drop-out or total conformist are as much part of 
a free society as the Hyde Park orator, the business 
entrepreneur or the initiator of a pressure group, and if we 
feel that what they are doing is undesirable or socially 
harmful, we do not have to conclude that they are not free, 
but that their particular exercises of freedom are 
undesirable. Freedom is still freedom even when it is 
undesirable. 
However, Taylor argues that as freedom is concerned 
with our ability to achieve our more significant purposes, it 
requires that we actually exercise self-determination, and not 
merely that we could if we chose to, but could equally well 
choose not to. 
'Freedom.. involves my being able to recognise adequately my 
more important purposes and my being able to overcome or at 
least neutralise my motivational fetters, as well as my way 
being free of external obstacles. But clearly the first 
condition (and, I would argue the second) require me to have 
become something, to have achieved a certain condition of 
self-clairvoyance and self-understanding. I must be 
actually exercising self-understanding in order to be truly 
or fully free. I can no longer understand freedom just as 
an opportunity-concept' (19) 
The distinction between freedom as an opportunity-concept and 
freedom as an exercise-concept was first used to explicate 
the differnece between negative freedoms which were simply the 
absence of constraints, and the higher, positive or moral 
freedom of self-determination which cannot exist unexercised. 
However, Taylor's comment in parenthasis indicates his belief 
that even the negative freedoms require more than the absence 
of external constraints. As I shall explain, I believe he 
is right to say this, but wrong to conclude that therefore 
freedom cannot be simply an opportunity-concept. 
Freedom and liberty are concepts which we apply to 
human beings. We do speak, it is true, of animals in 
captivity being unfree and their counterparts in the jungle 
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or on the plains as being free, but when we speak of 
freedom in the sense of the opportunity to choose between 
different courses of action we are using a concept applicable 
only to rational beings, because choice requires rational 
thought. Now there can be different degrees of freedom, and 
there are differences also in the quantity and quality of 
deliberation required for a rational choice to be made (and a 
rational decision does not have to be a reasonable 
decision). I as not claiming that people who do not ponder 
lengthily about what they should or will do are unfree, or 
even that they are less free than the thinker. However, they 
may be less free with respect to certain actions, just as 
those with little knowledge of the possibilities that are 
open to them will be less free with respect to certain 
actions than those with more knowledge, and those with little 
self-knowledge will be less free in certain respects than 
those who know what their important purposes are, what are 
the personal inadequacies which impede the achievement of 
their purposes, and how they might overcome them. My point 
(and Taylor's) is that the -rationality and self-knowledge 
which, it is said, must be exercised for higher moral 
freedom must also be exercised in varying degrees for the 
lower, negative freedoms as well. 
However, I do not conclude from this that neither 
higher nor lower, positive nor negative freedoms should be 
thought of as opportunity-concepts, and that therefore both 
(or all) are exercise-concepts. I believe that freedom is an 
opportunity-concept, but that the necessity for human 
rationality is built into the concept of freedom at all but 
the most basic Hobbesian level. Indeed, rationality is built 
into the concept of an opportunity also, as for an 
opportunity to exist there must be someone who can recognise 
that there is a possible course of action which might be 
taken or might not. I would not claim, of course, that 
there are no such things as missed opportunities or 
opportunities that we did not recognise until too late. It 
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is simply that the idea of an opportunity requires a 
rational being who could recognise it. Non-rational beings 
may have different things they could do, but they do not 
have opportunities or choice, and they do not have any but 
the most basic freedom either. The frogs in my garden can 
hop up the path or into the pond, but to talk of them 
'choosing' or having freedom of choice as to which action 
they perform is anthropomorphism. Freedom in all but the most 
basic sense cannot be exercised without rationality, but that 
does not make it more than the absence of constraints, or 
rather it makes it the absence of constraints to the 
possible actions of rational beings. The actions are still 
only possible, however, and not inevitable. 
To make full use of our freedom and opportunities 
for choice we require amongst other things rationality, 
understanding and self-knowledge, but freedom is not the 
exercise of these qualities, it is the absence of constraints 
to our achievement of our purposes. Because we value freedom 
so highly, there is, as I said earlier, a feeling that it 
must be more important than a mere absence. However, it is 
not simply freedom that is valuable, but certain freedoms to 
achieve the purposes we think most important. Being the 
absence of constraint makes it no less valuable than it 
would be if it were defined as power, action, or the act 
of making choices. If it is the absence of undesirable 
constraints and is necessary to achieve other valued ends 
then it is still precious, but being precious does not make 
it rationality, or self-knowledge, or goodness, nor does it 
make it an activity or a power. 
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CHAPTER 3 
LIBERTY AND THE RESTRICTION OF LIBERTY 
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Liberty and the restriction of liberty 
Freedom is not power, I have argued, but it is 
related to power, nonetheless, for not only is having the 
power to do something akin to being free to do it, but 
having power over others limits their own freedom to do what 
they choose. The point where we often begin to question the 
desirablity of certain freedoms is where they conflict with 
the freedom of others and where one person's freedom is 
another's restriction. The distinction between 'power to' and 
'power over' is a useful one, but there are some exercises 
of power which do not fall neatly into one category or the 
other. On the one hand there is, say, the person who 
votes, marries or sells his house - things he has the power 
and freedom to do - and on the other is the dictator who 
has power over other to restrict their freedom and make them 
do what he orders. However, what would we say about the 
farmer or developer who fells trees against the wishes of 
local conservationists? In one sense he is just exercising 
his own power to do something, for he is not forcing others 
to do anything, but in another sense he does have power 
over the others, and power to restrict their freedom, because 
his wishes prevail over theirs, and they are forced, if not 
to do what he tells them, at least to put up with what 
he does. However, despite the grey area in the middle, it 
is a useful distinction and I shall use, it as I examine 
some of the ways in which freedom is restricted, and argue 
that much more is encompassed by the notion of a 
restriction of freedom than the liberal notion of deliberate 
human action. 
The clearest example of one person having power to 
restrict another's freedom is when physical force is used. If 
X frog-marches Y out of town then, Y is not free to stay, 
and there can be no disputing that X's power over Y 
diminished -Y's freedom. Moving away from that extreme example, 
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we come to the situation in which X does not use force 
but threatens Y with unpleasant consequences unless he leaves 
town. It is sometimes argued that threats do not diminish 
freedom because freedom is doing what you wish or choose, 
and once a threat is made then what you wish changes to 
take account of the new circumstances. According to this 
argument, Y may want to stay in town, but when offered the 
choice of staying and being strung up from the highest tree 
with his wife and family while his farm is burnt to the 
ground he changes his mind and wants to go. He makes a 
choice in the new circumstances and is, therefore, free. 
Leaving aside the question of whether freedom should be 
defined as 'doing what you want' this is clearly nonsense 
anyway. If Y is given the choice between staying and being 
hanged or going he may reasonably choose to go, but what he 
wants to do is stay in town, unhung, with his family alive 
and his farm intact. This he is not free to do, and it 
is because of X's threat (and Y's belief that X will carry 
it out) that his freedom is restricted. 
Michael Taylor claims that pure negative freedom is 
not affected by threats being made, or even carried out (1), 
but he sustains this argument only by having a 'very strict 
definition of pure negative freedom 'according to which freedom 
is restricted' only when an ' action is made impossible. He 
argues that sanctions such as disapproval or shame, even when 
carried out, do not render an action impossible, and so 
"If the implementation of a threat does not necessarily make' 
an individual unfree, the making the threat does not 
necessarily make an individual 'about to be' unfree. " (2) 
However, firstly I believe Taylor is mistaken to define even 
'pure negative' freedom'' so strictly, - and not admit that there 
can be degrees of freedom. Secondly he appears to consider 
the things that a person may do as isolated acts, so that 
if a person is still able, at whatever cost, to carry out 
a certain action then he is not unfree to do sol and if 
he is not unfree `to carry out that one action then his 
freedom has not been restricted. For example, if someone 
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threatens to break my arm if I do not pay him £20 I would 
not, according to Taylor's account, be made unfree (or less 
free). I do not have to pay the £20. I can keep it, and 
have my arm broken. However, what I cannot do, if the 
threat is carried out, is have both my £20 and two healthy 
arms, and so I am not free to do this. And even if the 
person who threatens me does not really intend to implement 
the threat, I am still not able to keep my £20 and feel 
secure. Even if a strict definition of 'free' entails I am 
free to do one particular thing (keep my £20) it does not 
entail that my freedom has not been restricted at all, for 
the combination of two states that I desired would have been 
rendered impossible. Therefore to offer someone a restricted 
choice in place of an unrestricted (or less restricted) one 
is to diminish their freedom. When X offers Y the choice of 
leaving town or being hanged, or of paying £20 or having 
an arm broken X's power over Y, or to put it another way, 
X's power to restrict the range of options open to Y, 
restricts Y's freedom. 
This would still be the case if, unknown to X, Y 
was planning to leave town anyway, and therefore leaves 
happily, for acting willingly is not the same as acting 
freely. (3) If what we desire coincides with the only course 
of action open to us we are lucky, perhaps, and may be 
happy, but this does not make us free. If it did then we 
would need only to learn to want to do whatever it is that 
we have to do in order to be free. If -Y persuaded himself 
that he wanted to leave town anyway, or even if he really 
did want to leave, the power which X has over Y still 
diminishes his freedom, for X closes certain options to Y. 
Thus threats, which close options, decrease freedom, but 
offers do not. After an offer, perhaps of a new horse if 
he leaves town, Y can either stay, leave and take the 
horse, or leave and decline the offer of the horse. The 
offer has increased the possible course of action open to 
him and so has not decreased his freedom. 
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In all my examples so far, X and Y know each 
other, and in most of them, knowing that their wishes 
conflict, X uses his power' directly to restrict Y's freedom. 
However the relationship between power and freedom is not 
limited to such a narrow range of cases. There are, as I 
have mentioned, situations in which individuals or groups who 
have mutually incompatible objectives struggle to achieve 
their ends, and thereby may frustrate the intentions of the 
others. These may be examples of one person (or group) 
restricting the. freedom of others, even if the loser does 
not have to do anything except put up with being the loser, 
and even if the person who achieves his/her ends is unaware 
of the conflict of interests. For example, if X has the 
power to close a railway line or bus route through a 
village then he restricts the freedom of the people who would 
have travelled that way had they been able to, whether or 
not he is aware of their existence. They may form an action 
group to fight the line closure and lose, or they may 
recognise that they have no hope and either move to the 
town or become more isolated in their village. It is not 
their choice of action that determines whether X has power 
over their lives and is able to restrict their freedoms X 
may have that power whether or not there is overt conflict, 
whether or not his actions were intended to restrict the 
freedom of others, and even if X is not an individual but 
a group. As is suggested by Day in an interpretation of 
power somewhat broader than the traditional liberal one, X 
has power over Y not only if X can make Y do what he 
wants, but also if Y is dependent on X for the satisfaction 
of his desires and if X has power with respect to issues 
that affect Y's welfare. (4) 
If, as I have claimed, restricting the range of 
options open to people restricts their freedom, then I can 
find no good reason to deny that the unintentional 
consequences of actions can restrict freedom also. If the 
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caretaker locks me in the library unintentionally, then I am 
just as locked in as if he had done it on purpose, and if 
my friends claim to value my freedom of movement, then I 
would expect them to take some steps to let me out. If 
they did not, on the grounds that I had been locked in 
unintentionally, I would suspect their concern for my freedom 
was not as great as they claimed. Similarly, if for example, 
despite having the legal freedom to vote, people were unable 
to use their vote because perhaps they could not afford the 
time off work or the fares to go to the polling station 
to vote, they suffer from obstructions in the way of their 
doing what they are legally entitled to do. If we think 
that the legal freedom to vote is important we must, to be 
consistent, also be concerned when this legal freedom is 
useless. Therefore, having passed a law to introduce full 
adult suffrage, if we see that social or economic 
circumstances, that we could alter still prevent people from 
voting, then we should alter them, and, in doing so, 
recognise that we are extending freedom. The question we need 
to answer in order to ascertain whether freedom is being 
restricted is not 'Did someone fix things that way? ' but 
'Seeing that there are obstructions to free choice, could we 
arrange things differently and remove the obstructions? " If 
the answer to the second question is 'yes' and individuals 
or groups choose , not to alter arrangements then freedom is 
being restricted just as surely as if that were the 
intention. 
In his essay on the two concepts of liberty Berlin 
sometimes seems to accept the traditional liberal view that 
freedom can only be restricted intentionally. He says 
"Coercion implies the deliberate interference of other human 
beings within the area in which I could otherwise act. You 
lack political liberty or freedom only if you are prevented 
from attaining a goal by human beings' (5) 
At other times, however, he inclines to the view that 
freedom is restricted if removable obstructions are not 
eliminated. He speaks, for example, of the phrases 'freedom 
from fear or want' and says they imply that these conditions 
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can be removed by human action even if they were not 
deliberately created by people who intend to restrict the 
freedom of others. Berlin does not minimise the importance of 
removing unintended restrictions on choice, even if he does 
not call them restrictions of freedom. He says 
"Useless freedoms should be made useable, but they are not 
identical with the conditions indispensible for their 
utility. This is not merely a pedantic distinction, for if 
it is ignored, the meaning and value of freedom of choice is 
apt to be downgraded. In their zeal to create social and 
economic conditions in which alone freedom is of genuine 
value, men tend to forget freedom itselfN(6) 
However, this is just as likely to be true of legal freedom 
as of economic and social freedoms. Certainly, by itself, 
being able to afford to travel is not the same as being 
free to travel, but then neither, by itself, is being legally 
entitled to travel the same as being free to travel. To 
mistake legal entitlement for freedom is as much a mistake 
as is confusing freedom with wealth. 
It is wrong to equate liberty with power, wealth or 
knowledge, and a mistake to confuse freedom with the 
conditions necessary for freedom. However, it does not follow 
from this that people are free regardless of how poor or 
ignorant they are, unless they are subject to intentional 
coercion. It may be true, as Hayek claims (7) that a rich 
courtier living in luxury could be less free than a poor 
farmer. What this example shows, however, - is not that there 
is no connection between wealth and freedom, or that a 
society which distributed wealth more equally would not find 
freedom more equally distributed also, but only that wealth 
is not freedom, and not the only factor contributing to the 
enjoyment of freedom. 
Like Berlin, Hayek points out that people may be 
freer under an autocrat than a democratic government, but he 
goes further and says 
"It can scarcely be contended that .... resident aliens in the U. S. or persons too young to be entitled to vote do not enjoy full personal liberty because they do not share in political liberty" (8) 
It is true that voting does not ensure perfect freedom, nor 
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is voting or participation in government identical with 
freedom or all there is to freedom. Nevertheless, it 
certainly can be contended that a person who is not allowed 
to vote or stand for Parliament is less free, in that 
respect, than one who is. Perhaps, sometimes, the person who 
is not allowed to vote has so much freedom in other areas 
that we would conclude that on balance s/he is freer than 
another person who is allowed to take part in politics, but 
clearly s/he would be freer still if not debarred from 
joining in the political life of the country. Gardening is 
not freedom; nor is travelling, nor choosing a job or 
spouse, but a person who was not allowed to do any of 
those things could complain of a restriction of his or her 
liberty, and so could anyone who was not allowed to vote. 
Indeed, restrictions on voting or standing for election count 
as restrictions of freedom even under a narrow liberal 
definition of restrictions of freedom, for whether people are 
allowed to take part in political decisions or not is not a 
fact of life which drops fully formed from the sky, or 
even the unintended consequence of other actionsi it is the 
result of a decision taken by the person or people already 
in power. While it is true that the lack of freedom to 
participate in government would not be felt as coercive by 
those who did not want to be involved in politics, this is 
the case with other restrictions of liberty as well. The 
person who never wants to drive above 30 mph, criticise the 
government of the day or march with a plackard will not feel 
coerced by restrictions on speeding, free speech or 
demonstrations either, but they are restrictions of freedom 
nonetheless. 
So far I have argued that we may have power to 
restrict the freedom of others even if we do not force them 
or threaten them to do what we wish, simply by the 
unintended consequences of actions which prevent them from 
attaining their objectives or restrict the range of options 
open to them. It might appear that if this is true we 
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would be unable to stir from our beds without restricting 
someone's freedom, for everything we do might have unforeseen 
results which would diminish someone's freedom of choice, and 
the concept of restricting freedom would be extended beyond 
any useful limit. However, firstly, it is not the case that 
in every instance of mutually incompatible objectives one 
person achieves his/her ends by restricting the freedom of 
the other. If they both want to win the same race or buy 
the same second-hand car, then the one who runs the faster 
or answers the newspaper advertisement the sooner has not 
used power to restrict the freedom of the other. They were 
both equally free to attempt to do what they wanted, but 
only one (either one) could actually do it. In many 
circumstances one person does use power to prevent another 
person getting what they both want, but when this is not 
the case neither one is under a moral obligation to let 
other people do whatever they want, any more than they have 
an obligation to let us have our way all the time. 
Secondly, it is important to note that there is a 
difference between unforeseen and unintended consequences. If 
we do not know that our actions restrict the freedom of 
others we are in a different position morally than if we do 
know, but argue that restricting their freedom was not the 
purpose of our actions - just an unfortunate by-product. There 
is an argument on the subject of just and unjust actions 
that injustice cannot arise from acts that are themselves 
just. Speaking of distributive justice, Nozick says that 
"whatever arises from a just situation by just steps is 
itself just. " (9) 
Although Nozick's main argument, that the result of a just 
entitlement passed on by just means must itself be just, 
seems obvious, it is a mistake to consider actions to be 
either just or unjust, right or wrong, without paying any 
regard to the consequences of the action. It is as if there 
were thought to be only two classes of actions firstly the 
deliberately malicious, unjust or wrong ones, and secondly 
all the others which because they are not deliberately 
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malicious must be morally unexceptionable whatever their 
consequences. What seems to have been forgotten is that the 
consequence of the "same" act in different circumstances may be 
very different. An action cannot be considered good or bad, 
just or unjust, or restrictive of freedom or not, solely with 
reference to the actors and their intentions and disregarding 
the consequences for other people. The owner of a well or 
barn of grain who refuses to let others onto his land is not 
doing the same thing if i)they can use their own water or 
grain, or ii) they are dying of thirst and hunger. It makes 
no difference whether the owner of the land inherited it 
according to just principles from his father who bought it at 
a fair price, the consequences of his keeping everyone else 
away are such that they must be taken into account when a 
decision is made about the justice of his action. 
It is the same with freedom. If the caretaker locks 
the library not knowing I am still in there, then I am not 
free to leave, and though I would not blame him I am no 
less locked in than if he had done it on purpose. However, 
if I then shout out of the window to him, I would not think 
he was justified in leaving me there all week-end on the 
grounds that my being locked in was the unintended consequence 
of a perfectly legal and morally unexceptionable act. I would 
feel that once the consequences had been pointed out to him 
he ought to come and let me out, and if he did not, his 
act would not be the same morally blameless one it was 
originally. Similarly, once we know that certain social 
arrangements leave some individuals and groups unable to do what 
they and our society deem to be valuable, and what they are 
legally entitled to do, we are not in the same state of 
innocence that we were once. It is not satisfactory for us 
to say That is an unintended consequence of legal actions, 
and though it is a shame it cannot count as a restriction of 
freedom because we did not do it on purpose, ' and then carry 
on as before. We should either justify the restriction of 
their freedom or attempt to remove it. 
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Up to this point I have concentrated mainly on 
situations in which individuals or groups are prevented by 
human actions, intentional or otherwise, from doing what they 
want. However, as was said earlier, freedom is not simply 
doing what we want. The threatened farmer Y, I argued, would 
still have had his freedom restricted by X even if he had 
wanted to leave town anyway, because the range of actions he 
might have chosen to do had been restricted. We are unfree, I 
claimed, not only if we are prevented from doing what we want 
to but if other possible options are closed to us. It is 
possible, of course, that if we do not consider or attempt 
certain possible courses of action, we may be unaware that 
they are closed to us. Our freedom may have been restricted 
without our knowledge, and power exercised over us without 
any observable conflict of wants. 
The belief that unless there is visible conflict, 
power over others is not being exercised is criticised by 
Lukes. (10) He argues that though power may only show up 
clearly where there is conflict, it does not follow that open 
conflict is necessarily present when one person or group 
exercises power over another. Firstly powerful people or groups 
may use their power to prevent certain issues coming to public 
notice and being discussed, and so avoid overt conflict. 
Secondly 
"A may exercise power over B by getting his to do what he does 
not want to do, but he also exercises power over him by 
influencing, shaping or determining his very wants. Indeed, is 
it not the supreme exercise of power to get another or others to 
have the desires you want them to have7' (11) 
I believe it would be accepted widely that the extreme 
cases of determining another's wants - hypnotism and 
brainwashing - are exercises of power which diminish freedom. 
More subtle forms of manipulation, I would argue, are also 
exercises of power which restrict freedom, and differ only in 
that they are harder to observe. 
-34- 
To discover the existence of unexpressed grievances 
and unacknowledged desires is not easy. If we concentrate on 
what V says he wants and what X does to prevent him 
achieving it, then it is usually quite straightforward to 
decide if X's power has restricted Y's freedom. But what are 
we to think if Y has never expressed his wants, or appears 
to have no wants of his own, or has always agreed and 
co-operated with X to achieve X's ends? If X has been 
successful in creating certain wants and preventing others 
from arising then this is exactly what we would expect, but 
it creates difficulties for those who try to interpret what 
a free Y would have wanted had it not been for the 
intervention of X. Is it, as has been suggested, arbitrary 
and biased (14) or an arrogant assumption of omniscience for 
an observer to say that Y's wishes are not his own, and 
that though he thinks he has embraced certain ends freely, 
the observer knows better and recognises that Y has been 
manipulated. Democrats and lovers of liberty are in a 
dilemma, for they place great importance on allowing people 
to choose how they shall live, but if those choices have 
been engineered, then to treat them as the true wishes of 
autonomous individuals is mistaken and merely supports the 
wishes and reinforces the power of the manipulators. On the 
other hand, to dismiss them as fabrications and compel people 
to do what the enlightened observers believe they would have 
wanted (though they have said they do not) is hardly 
democratic, and does not promote individual liberty. 
In an attempt to clarify when power is used to 
restrict freedom, Lukes uses the notion of interests as 
opposed to expressed wants, and says that 
'A exercises power over B when A affects B in a manner contrary 
to B's interests. ' (13) 
I disagree with the idea that we exercise power over others 
only when we affect them adversely. If I snatch someone 
from the path of a lorry it is as much an exercise of 
power as if I pushed them into the road, but it is, in 
the latter instance, a justifiable exercise of power for the 
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benefit of the person coerced. In the same way a government 
exercises power over the population when it enacts and 
enforces legislation, whether or not this is in the interests 
of those affected. However, Lukas is right to make a 
distinction between wants and interests. We know our wants, 
like our pains and fears, better than anyone else, and 
though they may be foolish wants, or have been created in 
us by someone else, and though we may be persuaded to change 
our minds, still, if we say truthfully that we want 
something there should be no disputing that we do want it, 
even though we might be wiser not to. Interests are 
different. It is possible for us to be mistaken about our 
interests, to want what is not good for us and not want 
what is. It is clearly possible also that an observer, 
perhaps better informed or more experienced, may be able to 
judge our interests better than we can ourselves. However, a 
democrat would hesitate to claim the right to make people do 
what is in their interests ('true' interests, 'long-term' 
interests) on the grounds that their expressed wants may have 
been created in them. We have the problem that if our 
wants are manipulated we are not free, and if they are 
disregarded in our own interest then we are not free either. 
According to Benton 
the radical critique is committed to the claim that the real 
interests, true needs etc. and the potential wants whose 
satisfaction they would be, are quite other than the wants and 
satisfaction which are currently experienced by the 
population. '(14) 
This is not so. There is no reason for us to suppose that 
the population is absolutely unaware of its interests or that 
the people's expressed desires are the complete opposite of 
what they would have been but for the influence of those in 
power over them. To say that wants have been created and 
interests misinterpreted is not to say that all wants must 
have been created and all interets wrongly perceived. If an 
individual or group in power is unconcerned with the health 
of the subject population and does not want them to upset 
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the status quo by pressing for improvements in health care, 
it does not have to persuade them to want to live diseased 
and die early. It could do a hundred things, from 
suppressing information about diseases to persuading people 
that the country could not afford a proper health sevicel 
from ensuring that the cost of safe practice in industry and 
agriculture was paid by the workers who could not afford it 
(by paying piece work rates, when safe working takes longer) 
to extolling the virtues of individual freedom and linking 
this with individual responsibility for health care. It would 
not have to reverse people's normal desire to live free from 
pain and disease. It is not necessary for the articulated 
wants to be "quite other" than the potential wants. Factual 
ignorance and a faulty perception of how to achieve basic 
wants may be quite enough to ensure the result desired by 
those in power. 
The distinction between wants and interests, then, 
is of some help in the decision of what we should do if 
we want people to be free to make their own choices, for 
it is useful for corroborating the claim that wants have 
been created or prevented from arising by an exercise of 
power. If we see people, sometimes large groups of people, 
ostensibly wanting what is apparently not in their interests, 
we may not be able to prove that they have been 
manipulated, but we should consider the possiblity. If we 
look at Y (who says he is content) and see that he is 
poor, badly-housed and overworked, we may deduce that he 
would not have wanted this if X had not persuaded him that 
it is good for his immortal soul, that it is unalterably his 
lot in life or that the alternatives would be much worse. 
We feel reasonably secure in assuming this because we believe 
that to be poor and overworked is not in his best 
interests, and we think we know that because we believe he 
has certain basic interests that he shares with us and 
everyone else. 
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Unless it is the case that we share certain 
interests with those from our own and other cultures, we 
could never know what was in anyone else's interests, and 
the claim that Y's wants would have been different but for 
X's power would be impossible to sustain. If we have no 
cross-cultural criteria for judging what is in someone's 
interests, then we would have no way of knowing that y 
might have wanted anything different, and even less of 
knowing what it might have been. Our notions of what is in 
our interests are necessarily value dependent, but, I would 
argue, not entirely so. Though our wants and interests are not 
fixed and given (and if they were they could not be changed 
by another's power) there are some things all societies deem 
desirable and undesirable and often these coincide. No-one, 
for example, in normal circumstances, wants to 'starve or be 
in pain, nor is such suffering in their interests. To accept 
that we may be mistaken or misled about our interests, is 
not to believe that we are often misled about such basic 
shared interests as these. 
Because Lukes' analysis of power goes beyond overt 
conflict and action as he attempts to deal with the problem 
of consent and consensus on the part of a subject individual 
or population, it has been criticised for being unfalsifiable 
supposition. It is mistaken, however, to assume that there 
are two kinds of power* one observable and obvious, and the 
other quite hidden and unavailable to empirical research. We 
may not be able to see the power of the manipulator as 
clearly as that of the dictator, but that does not mean we 
can see nothing at all. If it is accepted that people share 
certain important basic wants and interests, then any group 
which appears to be acting voluntarily against those interests 
could be investigated, and there are many signs an observer 
could look for in an attempt to discover why. Perhaps the 
people are working towards and even more important end and 
are prepared to give up their leisure, comfort to even their 
lives to achieve itt but perhaps they have been 
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illigitimately persuaded that the course of action they are 
taking is in their best interests. It would be necessary to 
discover who does seem to benefit, and whether they have at 
their disposal any possible methods of persuasion. If 
persuasive arguments had been used these could be examined 
critically, and the prevailing ideology could be examined to 
see what influence that exerted on the population. Once the 
possibility that those in power can create wants in less 
powerful individuals or groups has been admitted - and I do 
not see how it can be denied - then empiricists can find 
evidence for it if they are prepared to look. 
I would not claim, however, that all forms of 
persuasion and influence are exercises of power that restrict 
freedom. If someone is persuaded to change his/her wishes by 
rational argument and for good reasons then this does not 
seem like an exercise of power or a restriction of freedom. 
If Y wanted to pursue a certain course of action but was 
persuaded by the facts and arguments presented by X that it 
would not be wise, then no freedom has been restricted. it 
was the facts and arguments which convinced Y and X was 
merely the instrument of their presentation. If, however, X 
is a smooth-tongued orator who uses his intellect as a weapon 
to defeat y and 'talk him round', then I think it would 
be right to say that X's powers of persuasion restricted Y's 
freedom. A clear and truthful account does not restrict 
freedom because it informs the listener of the way things 
are and of what must be considered when choosing what to 
do, but a misleading, distorted or partial account which 
persuades the listener that certain options are closed when 
they are not does restrict freedom. Clearly this does not 
apply only at the individual level. The use of the press, 
television and radio by governments (or others) for 
propaganda purposes is also an exercise of power which 
restricts freedom, becuase it prevents people from making 
decisions about their actions and opinions in the light of 
the fullest possible knowledge. If people do not know what 
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is happening they are prevented from protesting about it or 
changing it as surely, and more effectively, than if protest 
demonstrations were banned. The lack of overt conflict between 
those in power and those kept in ignorance is a sign, not 
of agreement, but of restricted freedom. 
I have argued that the traditional liberal 
interpretation of freedom is too narrow. It is not wrong in 
saying that freedom is the absence of restriction, or that it 
can be restricted only by human beings and not by natural 
laws, but its notion of human action is itself too narrow. 
Freedom may be restricted, I have claimed, not only by 
deliberate coercion, but also by the unintended consequences 
of individual action and inaction, and by the consequences of 
joint action and of social arrangements which are themselves 
not given, but the result of human choice and therefore 
capable of alteration. Our minds may be restricted as well 
as our bodies, and, as freedom involves the absence of 
restrictions on the satisfaction of potential as well as 
actual wants, it is possible for freedom to be restricted 
without our being aware of it and without obvious signs of 
conflict. 
If freedom can be retricted by what we do and do 
not do, say and do not say and whether we mean to or 
not, then obviously restriction of freedom will be a more 
common occurrence than if it were brought about only by 
deliberate action. It might seem as if our entire lives were 
spent oppressing our fellow men and women. It should be 
remembered, however, that we do not have a moral obligation 
to remove every single removal obstruction to the fulfilment 
of everyone else's desires or possible desires. We are none 
of us entirely free, nor should we expect to be, and we do 
not have either 'freedom' or restriction but many different 
freedoms that we can enjoy to different extents. Some of 
these are such more valuable and important than others, and 
some are antisocial, undesirable, and ought to be 
-40- 
restricted, and I will be looking in later chapters at the 
questions of whether we have a right to freedom, and of 
what might justify restrictions of it. However, even though 
some restrictions are justified, and some freedoms undesirable, 
if our society valued freedom as much as it claims to, a 
wider interpretation of what counts as a restriction of 
freedom would not be resisted, and more vigourous efforts 
would be made to remove the restrictive circumstances of many 
people's lives. (15) 
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CONSENTING TO THE RESTRICTION OF FREEDOM 
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Consenting to the restriction of freedom 
"The ultimate raison d'etre for the contract theory all 
through its history has been to reconcile the apparently 
conflicting claims of liberty and law. The demands of 
government could be explained and justified, it was thought, 
if they were based on the consent of the governedi people 
would freely obey a government they had themselves created 
and untertaken to obey' (1) 
In the previous chapters I have claimed that, while 
we value freedom highly, not all freedoms are equally 
valuable and some are undesirable and ought to be restricted. 
I said nothing, however, about who should decide which 
freedoms ought to be restricted and have the authority to 
restrict them. In this chapter I shall consider the claim 
that limitations of individual freedom are legitimate when 
people have agreed to accept them, and the idea that this 
agreement, expressed in the form of a covenant or contract, 
compensates people for their loss of freedom by securing for 
them other benefits in return. 
The belief that the authority of the state is 
legitimated by a social contract has a long history, and 
Rousseau expresses its fundamental premise when he says 
'since no man has any natural authority over his fellows and 
since force alone bestows no right, all legitimate authority 
among men must be based on covenants. ' (2) 
I question the idea that legitimate rule is based on a 
social contract for two reasons. Firstly, as I shall argue, 
even if governments were instituted by contract this would 
not be sufficient to justify their rule, for more than 
agreement is required to make a contract fair. Secondly, it 
is unnecessary to postulate the existence of a contract or 
agreement to explain all our obligations, including obligations 
to governments or rulers, I claim, as we can have 
obligations other than contractual ones. If this is the case, 
the question which then has to be asked is whether 
obedience to the govenment is one of our obligations and the 
answer to this, I suggest depends on what the government 
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does rather than whether we have made a contract with it. 
It is rarely if ever asserted that people have 
actually contracted to give up freedom in exchange for other 
benefits, and so the social contract on which our political 
obligation is supposedly based is said to be hypothetical 
rather than actual, or logical rather than chronological. 
However, apart from this difference (although it is, as I 
shall explain later, an important difference) there is no 
suggestion that the criteria by which we judge the fairness 
or legitimacy of actual and hypothetical contracts vary. A 
hypothetical contract to surrender freedom in exchange for 
security should be judged, then, like any real contract, on 
whether its terms were fair to both parties. (3) The terms 
of the agreement have to be considered because it is 
possible that through ignorance or foolishness or for some 
other reason people might enter a contract freely though its 
terms were unfair to them or made demands on them to which 
they had no right to accede. If this is sometimes the case 
with real contracts there seems to be no reason why 
hypothetical contracts should be any different. It will be 
accepted, then, that agreement alone is not sufficient to 
make a contract fair to both parties, (even though it may 
make it legal. ) So a contract to give up freedom for 
security will be considered fair only if it is thought that 
freedom is something that can properly be signed away, and 
that the benefits given in return are a fair exchange. 
Agreement alone is not enough. 
The belief that there are limits to the amount of 
freedom that may be exchanged for other benefits is to be 
found in theories of social contract as different as those 
of Rousseau and Hobbes. Rousseau said that there can be no 
contracting away of freedom because it is essential to 
humanity. (4) (Actually Rousseau believed that freedom is 
essential only for sen, but he gave no satisfactory 
explanation of why the claim that to renounce freedom is to 
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renounce one's humanity' (5) should not apply to women also. ) 
When Rousseau suggests that giving up freedom is something 
which may not be agreed in a contract, he implies that this 
would be unfair to those giving up their freedom, whatever 
was offered in exchange and however happily they agreed to 
the contract. Hobbes, who thought that people would be 
prepared to give up a great deal of freedom for the peace 
and security that could only come from submission to an 
absolute ruler, (6) also held that not all freedom could be 
given up in a contract. He thought that if we want peace 
we must have laws] if we have laws they must be enforced) 
and for laws to be enforced there must be one sovereign 
powerful enough to enforce them on everyone else. However, 
even Hobbes did not envisage people giving up all their 
freedom. He said they would be left with 'harmless liberties' 
- the freedom to act where there is no legislation, and 'true 
liberties' - the rights a subject cannot contract away to 
another, or the things he cannot, with justice, be obliged 
to do, (such as obey a command to kill himself, starve 
himself or confess to a crime, and allow himself to be 
assaulted without resisting. ) (7) So if, as Rousseau and 
Hobbes both believed, some submission cannot be justified even 
by a contract, and not everything that is agreed is thereby 
just, then more than agreement must be necessary to justify 
the exchange of freedom for other benefits. Political 
obligation cannot be justified solely by reference to 
agreement or contractsi there must be also, at the very 
least, the belief that political obligation and some 
individual freedom are things which may legitimately be agreed 
by conract. Contract theorists do not tell us the basis of 
this belief, and could not attempt to do so without admitting 
that the fact that a contract has been made cannot, by 
itself, be the conclusion of an argument justifying giving up 
freedom. 
Up to this point I have talked of the social 
contract as if it always involved people agreeing to exchange 
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some of their individual liberty for other benefits, and, 
indeed, this is what is usually proposed. However, not all 
contract theorists argue thus, and Locke pointed out the role 
that laws can have in safeguarding freedom as well as 
restricting it. Criticising Hobbes' claim that we can gain 
security only by submitting to an absolute ruler, Locke 
pointed out that this would be a bad bargain as it would 
be hardly likely to bring security, saying 
'This is to think that Men are so foolish that they take 
care to avoid what Mischiefs may be done them by Pole Cats 
and Foxes, but are content, nay think it safety, to be 
devoured by Lions" (8) 
Clearly this criticism is justified and part of Hobbes' 
mistake lies in placing freedom and security in direct 
opposition to each other. Locke was aware that laws can 
extend freedom as well as restrict it. Sometimes, it is 
true, he went too far in the direction of defining 'freedom' 
as desirable freedom, and of denying that necessary 
restrictions are restrictions at all. He called law 
"not so much the limitation as the direction of a free and 
intelligent agent to his proper interest, ' (9) 
and believed that as the laws of government were based on 
the laws of reason they do not restrict liberty. 
Redefining 'freedom' to" mean only desirable freedom is 
a dangerous step along the road to confusing being free with 
doing what is right, and this can lead to the conclusion 
that people are free when forced to do the opposite of what 
they want, if what they are forced to do is right and what 
they want to do (or what they mistakenly think they want 
to do) is not. However, Locke does not go to these lengths 
and it is not necessary to do so in order to accept that 
law can enlarge freedom as well as restrict it, for while 
all laws restrict some freedoms they may also guarantee 
others. If X's freedom to demand protection money from Y is 
restricted, Y's freedom to do what he chooses with his own 
money is increased. Locke was aware that there is not one 
thing - freedom - which is either restricted and becomes less 
or is not restricted and becomes greater; is either given up 
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for security or is retained in insecurity. There are many 
freedoms, some of which are necessary for security and some 
of which conflict with other freedoms. The restriction of one 
freedom may allow the greater exercise of another. 
The belief that a social contract involves exchanging 
liberty for other goods with which it conflicts is dismissed 
by Rawls also, though for different reasons than those 
suggested by Locke. In "A Theory of Justice" he puts forward 
the idea that people choosing the rules of justice for their 
society, but unaware of what their place in it would be, 
would give priority to liberty rather than to any other 
goods. (l0) What Rawls means by giving liberty priority is 
that it may not be exchanged for any other social or 
economic goods, and that utilitarian ideas such as the public 
good or the happiness of the greatest number cannot be put 
on the scales and weighed against individual liberty. (11) The 
reason he gives for saying that people in what he calls 
the 'original position' would choose to give liberty this 
priority is that they recognise that freedom is necessary for 
us to carry out our life plans, whatever they are, and 
that it is therefore too valuable to risk losing it for 
ever or distributing it unequally. 
The principle that liberty may be restricted only 
for the sake of liberty is meant to be of use in resolving 
the conflicts that arise in real life, but when we try to 
give it practical application we become aware of the 
difficulties involved. Firstly it rules out the possibility of 
restricting freedom on the grounds that it causes harm, 
suffering or injustice. Of course it is possible always to 
restate the ill-effects of these harmful freedoms in terms of 
liberty, so that a restriction on, say, theft or trespass 
can be justified because it increases the liberty of others 
to use their property as they wish, and a restriction on 
assault is justified, not because it prevents pain and fear, 
but only because it increases _Lt e 
freedom of the population 
OMARY 
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to go freely about their business. However once we start to 
redefine all our values in terms of liberty then the 
principle that liberty can be restricted only for the sake 
of liberty becomes empty and useless. If every good is 
reduced to liberty and liberty becomes the only good, then 
the possibility of restricting it for other goods does not 
apply. What we need, when freedoms conflict, are principles 
which will guide us in our decisions of which freedoms 
should be restricted and which encouraged, and we do not 
choose between them as Rawls suggests we should, by seeing 
which freedom is the greater, but which is the more 
worthwhile. Otherwise, we might argue that removing the 
restrictions on theft would be justified because so doing 
would result in an increase in the liberty of all to use 
what, at the moment, belongs to a few. 
As an example of liberty restricted for the sake of 
greater liberty, Rawls cites the rules of debate which give 
people greater freedom to put their points of view because 
they limit the freedom of others to interrupt. (12) However, 
as Hart says, it is 
"misleading to describe even the resolution of the 
conflicting liberties in this very simple case as yielding a 
'greater' or 'stronger' total system of liberty for these 
values suggest that no values other than liberty and dimensions of it like extent, size or strength are involved. 
Plainly what such rules of debate help to secure is not a 
greater or more extensive liberty but a liberty which is 
more valuable for any rational person than the activity 
forbidden by the rules. '(13) 
To decide which liberties should be permitted or why the 
liberty to punch or steal should be restricted we have to 
use some criterion other than the priority of liberty. We 
refer to other valuese we look beyond liberty and its extent 
and consider the use to which it is put. To acknowledge 
that some freedoms are undesirable and others unimportant may 
seem to show a dangerously low valuation of freedom, reducing 
it to mere means rather than an end in itself. However, as 
Raphael puts it 
The fact that something is a means to an end and not an end 
in itself does not make it of comparatively small 
importance. If it is a necessary means to a vital value, then it is itself vital 
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I would suggest that the important freedoms that we value 
highly are more easily defended if they are distinguished 
from trivial freedoms, and not encompassed in one indivisible 
whole called 'Freedom'. 
I will turn now to what I said was the second 
basic assumption about a contract to restrict liberty and 
justify political obligations that agreement to be ruled is 
necessary for the rule to be legitimate, and the accompanying 
belief that we have consented to be ruled. Of course, if 
contract theorists wish only to set out the conditions under 
which they claim rule would be legitimate they do not need 
to show that there has ever been consent. They could, like 
Rousseau, say what they believed would constitute legitimate 
rule and say that this is rarely, if ever, found. However 
problems arise for those who wish to say both that consent 
is necesary for legitimate rule and that their present rulers 
are legitimate. They try to get round the difficulty by 
looking for signs of consent other than the ones normally 
accepted for agreement to a real contract, and they claim to 
find them in tacit compliance, non-rebellion and acceptance 
of benefits from the state. 
This presents a clear inconsistency in liberal social 
contract theory. It is claimed that agreement to the 
contract is like a promise, committing the individual because 
it has been undertaken freely. However, for a contract to be 
agreed freely there must be the possibility of not promising 
or contracting, and in the particular case of political 
obligation it would follow that those who witheld their 
consent to the contract could not be bound by it to obey 
the laws of the state. To overcome this problem the idea of 
consent is watered down, but in the process it must lose 
its justificatory power. If everybody is assumed to have 
consented by not emigrating or by an act such as not 
rebelling or using the highway (even if they do not realise 
that these actions will be taken as showing consent) then 
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giving consent ceases to be the rational act of free 
individuals who could withhold their consent if they wished. 
We may conclude either that obligation to obey the laws of 
the state exists only when undertaken freely (and therefore it 
has only rarely been justified) or that if we have 
obligations to the state these must be based on something 
other than free consent. 
Not all contract theorists claim that the justice of 
laws depends solely on the fact that they have been 
accepted or agreed by those who are subject to them, but 
insofar as they do not believe this they are less than 
contract theorists. Locke, for example, did not think that 
the contract preceeded social obligation, for he believed that 
in the state of nature people were already bound by the 
law of nature or reason on which the laws of the state 
were then based. Thus he differentiated between society (which 
was natural) and the state (which was formed as the result 
of a contract) rather than between an aggregate of lawless 
individuals and a law-governed society. Locke's contract, then, 
is not taken to be the basis of an individual's obligations 
to his fellows: rather it is the means by which society is 
kept running smoothly and securely, disputes are settled and 
punishments meted out impartially. I would argue that for 
Locke the social contract is unnecessary as an explanatory 
device. If people who already acknowledge obligations to each 
other and are aware that society would be safer, more just 
and more orderly if they co-operated with each other, gave 
up some of their freedom and submitted to the same laws, 
then a social contract cannot be the basis of their 
obligations. These will exist regardless of whether a promise 
is made or not. 
In most theories of social contract it is held that 
individuals' willingness to keep contracts which restrict 
their freedom is based on both moral and prudential grounds. 
If people are rational as well as self-interested, it is 
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argued, they will accept limits on their freedom as long as 
everyone else does the same so that they can all enjoy the 
benefits of additional security. Once the contract has been 
agreed then, it is held, they are morally bound by their 
promises. However, one of the persisting criticisms of 
contract theory has been that promise-keeping is understandable 
only in the context of a moral community, and it is not 
something that a totally independent self-interested, pre-social 
individual could either comprehend or take part in. In order 
to promise it is necessary to acknowledge moral obligations, 
and a person who was a stranger to the idea of being 
morally obliged to act in certain ways for the benefit of 
others would neither understand nor accept that promises ought 
to be kept for anything other than prudential reasons. If 
the obligation to keep promises is not accepted, then although 
people might keep contracts for prudential reasons, they 
would break them as soon as it suited them to do so, and, 
therefore, would give up no freedom. If they were forced to 
keep the contract then the legitimacy that is thought to 
pertain to the laws of the state because of the free 
agreement of the governed would exist no longer because the 
government would then be ruling by force. 
The argument about promise-keeping is one aspect of 
a wider criticism of contract theory I wish to make, which 
is that it is based on what Wolff calls 
'the classical liberal mistake of conceiving the 
relationship among men as purely instrumental or accidental 
rather than as intrinsic and essential' (15) 
As Wolff says, 
'Classical liberalism... portrays society as an aggregation 
of Robinson Crusoes who have left their islands of private 
value merely for the instrumental benefit of increasing 
their enjoyment through mututally beneficial exchange' (16) 
I believe that the idea of free individuals making a 
contract to limit freedom presupposes this 'liberal' view of 
individuals and their relationship to society. The social 
contract is, as is always stressed, a logical construct and 
not an historic event, and contract theorists do not need to 
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show that any such contract has ever been agreed before they 
can make use of the concept. Nevertheless, as it is a 
construct which is intended to help explain an aspect of the 
relationship between individuals and society (looking, as it 
does, for the basis of political obligation) it may still be 
criticised for its assumption that the free individual is 
logically prior to society. Contract theorists may not believe 
that there ever existed an individual, recognisably human but 
totally free and independent of society, but their way of 
talking as if this were so means that we are led to look 
at the questions surrounding freedom and obligation from one 
perspective. Whether we consider Hobbes who preferred any 
subjection whatsoever" to what he saw as the only alternative 
"civil war and the right of the sword" (17), or Rawls who 
believes that liberty should have priority over all other 
social and economic goods, we start with individuals and 
their freedom and then move to the justification of their 
obligations. We are shown individuals who have freedom before 
they have obligations and who then choose to give up some 
of that freedom for something else they want more. This is 
a mistaken view of human nature and human freedom. 
Human beings are essentially social beings, and not 
just individuals who sometimes choose to leave their 
isolation, and so human freedom is neither logically nor 
temporally prior to social obligation, and our obligations are 
as natural as our freedom. Despite agreeing with many of 
the criticisms of liberal social contract theory which Pateman 
makes, I disagree with her claim that 
"free and equal individuals can justifiably have obligations 
if and only if they have taken them upon themselves' (18) 
This entails that a person who chooses to accept no 
obligations has none, and if all obligations are voluntary 
then it follows that political and social obligations, or 
obligations relating to our role as parents or children, may 
be accepted or rejected by individuals regardless of the 
effect this has on the other members of society. 
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Obligations, I would argue, are inescapable rather 
than voluntary. It is only recently that people have had 
much choice as to whether they became parents or not, and 
if we have only the obligations we have voluntarily chosen, 
then parents in past ages would have had no obligation to 
look after their children. Similarly, no-one could be said to 
have an obligation to try to save a friend's life, or even 
treat their fellows with common honesty in their dealings, 
unless they had chosen to do so. The standards for all our 
other-regarding behaviour would be a matter for our own 
individual choice, and we could not be criticised for 
anything except failing to carry out what we had agreed to 
do. The obligations of parents to their children, or, I 
would argue, of members of a society to their fellow-members, 
are not simply a matter of individual choice. It is true 
that Pateman distinguishes between obligations and 'things we 
ought to do' which have not necessarily been freely accepted, 
but I do not find this distinction useful. If there are 
things which we ought to do even if we have not undertaken 
them freely, then we are morally obliged to do them, and so 
they are obligations. Freely agreed obligations (like 
agreeing to obey the rules of a club when we join it) form 
a small section of a much larger range of obligations which 
exist whether we choose them or not. Society is not a club 
that we can choose not to join. 
To argue that obligations are inevitable and that 
the 'obligationless' individual does not exist, is not, as 
Pateman suggests, to treat political obligation as 
unproblematical. The question "Why should I obey the 
government? " must still be asked, but it will be asked by 
social beings who are aware of having obligations to the 
other members of their society and wonder whether obedience 
to the government is part of them, and not by isolated 
individuals wondering whether it would suit them to give up 
their total freedom and commit themselves to some voluntary 
obligations. The obligation to obey the government, if and 
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when it exists, is not based on a promise, explicit or 
tacit, to the rulers, but exists because participation in a 
just, law-governed society provides the way of carrying out 
our obligations to our fellow citizens, while engaging in a 
free-for-all does not. 
However, if our political obligation is based on our 
obligations to the fellow members of our society rather than 
to the rulers, it follows that our obedience is contingent 
upon the rulers pursuing the welfare of our society. Our 
awareness of our obligations to our fellows will not always 
make us compliant and may lead us to realise that we ought 
to oppose the government, try to bring it down, or even to 
disobey its laws. We are not bound to unquestioning obedience 
to a government or other ruling authority simply because we 
recognise that we have obligations come what may, whether we 
choose them and whether we make a contract or not. To 
accept this entails acceptance of the idea that we cannot 
abdicate our wider social responsibilities and leave everything 
to the government, and a complete rejection of Hobbes' 
belief that laws are "the measure of good and evil actions". 
(19) I suggest it entails also that we have the obligation 
to participate in the organisation of a just society, and I 
will look at the relationship between democratic participation 
and freedom in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER 5 
DEMOCRACY AND LIBERTY 
-57- 
Democracy and Liberty 
In the last chapter I argued that we cannot explain 
political obligation or justify the restriction of our 
liberty by saying that we have a contract with our rulers 
in which we consent to be ruled. I examined the claim that 
any de facto government, whether monarchy, aristocracy or 
democracy, is legitimate if it has the consent of the 
governed, and argued that we cannot be said to have given 
our free consent unless we have open to us a genuine 
possibility of refusing to give it, for we do not give 
consent simply by not emigrating or not rebelling. I claimed 
also that even if we had contracted to give up our freedom, 
this did not necessarily justify the subsequent restriction, 
as agreement alone is not sufficient to make a contract 
iustl nor is agreement a necessary pre-condition of the 
legitimacy of an obligation, as we have many obligations 
thät we have not chosen. My conclusion, then, was that 
political obligation is not based on a contract, even a 
hypothetical one, with our rulers, and it does not 
necessarily require our consent. However, I did not argue 
that obligation to the government is one of our 
non-contractual social obligations and that we are morally 
obliged to obey any and every governments only that obedience 
to the laws of the state may be a way of fulfilling our 
natural and inescapable obligations to the other members of 
our society. 
It is sometimes argued, however, that though people 
do not give their consent to many forms of government, a 
democracy, is different because the democratic election of a 
government is analogous to the voluntary agreement of a 
contract. As consent in a democracy is expressed positively 
through the ballot box (rather than tacitly through lack of 
protest) and as an alternative is available, then, it is 
said, the obligation citizens owe to a democratically elelcted 
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government is based on consent in a way that is not true 
in other political systems. This is not the case, however. 
In a democracy people who do not vote are still held to be 
subject to the country's laws, as are those who vote for 
losing candidates or parties, and while those who vote for 
losers might be said to have shown their consent to the 
system by taking part in it, this does not apply to the 
non-voters. The alternative that is said to be on offer is 
only an alternative within a prescribed framework, and there 
is no opportunity for people to give or refuse to give 
consent to the whole system. They have some choices, it is 
true, but not the choice of either consenting to obey the 
laws and give up some freedom or not, and so the claim 
that our obligations to the state cannot be based on a 
contract' is as true of democracies as of any other political 
system. If we have an obligation to obey a democratically 
elected government this is not because we have agreed to do 
so, or have chosen it freely. 
If this is the case then the question arises of 
what the relationship is between democracy and liberty and 
whether they are essentially connected. It was argued in 
Chapter 3 that, contrary to Hayek's claim, there is some 
correlation between democracy and liberty, for people who are 
not allowed to exercise the democratic rights of voting, 
standing for election and opposing the government lack certain 
freedoms, regardless of whether a benevolent despot turns a 
blind eye to all their other activities. However, it must be 
asked whether this is all there is to the relationship. 
Other things being equal, are the citizens of a democracy 
more free than their counterparts in other political systems 
only because they have open to thee the chance of choosing 
their leaders and replacing them when they become unpopular, 
or is there a more intimate relationship between democracy 
and freedom based on the idea that in a democracy we are 
obeying the laws we have made for ourselves, and so our 
freedom is not restricted? 
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Though we may as individuals sometimes choose to do 
something that restricts our future freedom, still, at the 
moment we make our choice I think it would be generally 
accepted that we are exercising our freedom. We may choose 
to enter a strict monastic order, or enrol for an Open 
University course, and from then on our freedom will be less 
than it otherwise would have been. Yet if those future 
restrictions were known at the time we took our vows or 
filled in our application forms, and were accepted freely, 
then when we have to get up at the crack of dawn to pray 
or watch television we are, obeying the law we made for 
ourselves and are, in that respect, free in a way we would 
not be if some-one else had made us enter the monastery or 
the O. U., or even had added the requirement of early rising 
after we had joined. However, there is a problem in 
transferring Kant's maxim from the autonomous individual to 
the democratic society, and in saying that when 'we' obey 
laws which 'we' have made, 'we' are still free, because the 
'we' who do the obeying and the 'we' who make the laws are 
often not the same people. If we are able successfully to 
influence the outcome of discussions of public policy, then 
we will have made laws for ourselves, and could claim to be 
free when following them. However, democrats who are 
unsuccessful in getting their ideas to prevail still have to 
abide by rules they have not made for themselves and may 
not agree with, and therefore have their freedom restricted. 
Unless we follow Rousseau, postulate an idealised general 
will and say that true freedom comes from following it even 
when it goes against our individual will, then it must be 
admitted that the rules and requirements of a democratic 
government will restrict our freedom. 
I have argued that 
opt out of society if we 
essentially social beings 
obligations to other members of 
we are not individuals who can 
choose, but that we are 
with certain non-contractual 
our society, which arise not 
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from our individual choice and are not simply the obligations 
that one individual may have towards other individuals. That 
there are differences between types of obligations is clear. 
My obligation to give a friend a lift to the station when 
I have said I would do so is different from my obligation 
to look after my child, and both are different from my 
obligation to oppose an unjust government. The first is 
voluntarily agreed between individuals, the second is similarly 
the obligation of one individual to another, but not 
voluntarily agreed, while the third, also not voluntary, is 
an obligation towards all other members of the society, known 
or unknown. However, unless we accept the existence of the 
third type of obligation we could not have the first. For 
there to be voluntary contractual obligations between 
individuals there must be at least one general non-voluntary 
obligation we owe to other people - that of honouring the 
obligations we have undertaken voluntarily. 
We have non-contractual obligations to other members 
of our society, then, and I would argue that one of them 
is to co-operate in and contribute to the organisation and 
running of a just society. Without suggesting that only 
people living in parliamentary democracies attempt to carry 
out this obligation, I do claim that it can be discharged 
most fully in a democratic society and that a truly just 
society would be democratic. In a just society people would 
neither be in the power of others nor have power to use 
others, the welfare and interests of all would be of equal 
concern and basic human rights would be protected. To this 
end power would have to be distributed equally so that 
people could have control of the decisions and circumstances 
of their own lives, and there would have to be the 
opportunity for people to represent their interests and put 
forward their views. The parallel with democracy is obvious, 
as is the extent to which present democracies fall short of 
the ideal. All human societies always will, of course. The 
ideal type is unachievable in reality, but the fact that a 
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society cannot be fully democratic or just does not remove 
from us the obligation to make it more so. 
If we are to discharge our obligation to 
participate and make our own contribution in the joint 
enterprise it will be necessary for us to be able to oppose 
what we believe to be wrong, dissent from some decisions and 
put forward individual and minority views. Unless we 
interpret 'co-operate' and 'contribute' to mean keep quiet and 
do as we are told, we must have these freedoms in order 
to fulfil our obligations. In addition we must have 
knowledge. People cannot be involved in the making of 
decisions if they are uninformed and so we must have 
accurate and relevant information on which to base our 
opinions and be able to hear a variety of views, otherwise 
our contribution will be of little value. It is part of 
Mill's classic defence of free speech, of course, that people 
need to hear all sides of the question before they can 
make up their minds. (I) I as not as confident as Mill that 
truth will always win the battle with falsehood and error, 
but clearly it cannot do so if it is not heard, and so if 
information is suppressed or distorted then people will not 
be able to come to a proper decision. Therefore a democracy 
will need a minimum of secrecy on the part of government, 
and a press that it 'is not simply free from government 
control, but is critical and does not represent a narrow 
viewpoint or sectional interest. There will have to be some 
restriction of individual freedom in a democratic society, as 
there always must be when people live together, because we 
cannot all be free to do just as we wish. However, if it 
is accepted that all have a contribution to make and an 
obligation to participate, then it will be necessary for many 
individual freedoms to be guaranteed also in order that we 
can carry out our obligation. 
These freedoms are not just important freedoms that 
happen to appeal to democrats, then, or that can be 
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successfully demanded by those who elect their leaderss they 
are essential for the existence of democracy, and essential 
for us to fulfil our obligation to our fellows to promote a 
just society. The relationship between democracy and freedom 
is not that democracy will give us or guarantee freedom, but 
that without certain personal liberties we cannot have 
democracy. Without education and information we could not 
take part in joint decisions, and without the right 'to 
criticise, dissent, protest, join with those who agree with 
us and seek to persuade those who do not we could not 
contribute our view of what our society should be like, or 
ensure that our interests would be considered. It will be 
apparent that in saying this I am using a wider 
interpretation of 'democracy' than is often used today and 
saying that democracy involves much more than voting for 
leaders who will do our thinking for us, more even than 
holding referenda on important issues and then abiding by 
majority decisions. Democracy involves participation in the 
joint enterprise of promoting a just society, and a society 
that did not give serious consideration to the views of all 
its members would not be a just one. 
Although there is general agreement in our society 
about the value of democracy, this apparent consensus is not 
evidence of a deeper consensus of values and beliefs about 
the role of the individual in society and the relationship 
of the individual to the sources of power. The defining 
characteristic of democracy is generally taken to be that 
citizens are involved in political decision making, but some 
democratic theorists, such as Schumpeter (2) accept, or even 
recommend, that this involvement should be minimal and 
restricted to the choice of leaders. Schumpeter claims that 
in the classical theory of democracy it was believed that 
people held views on policies and elected representatives to 
get them carried out. His theory reverses this and makes it 
the primary function of the citizens to elect leaders whose 
job it is to produce the policies. Leaving aside the 
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question of whether there ever was a coherent classical 
theory such as he describes (3) I shall consider what 
Schumpeter's view says or implies about liberty and its 
relationship with democracy. 
According to Schumpeter 
, the principle of democracy merely means.... that the reins 
of government should be handed to those who command more 
support than do any of the competing individuals or 
teams"(4) 
If this is the case, then, as I suggested earlier the 
relationship between democracy and liberty would be simply 
that citizens of a democracy had a few more (or perhaps 
just a few different) choices that they could make. All 
citizens would be free in theory, and a few in practice, to 
stand in open competition for positions of powert all would 
have the chance to vote for an individual or team (though 
not necessarily one that represented their point of view) and 
all could try to vote out an unpopular government, but 
inbetween elections they would have very little to do but 
stand back and let the government get on with it. They 
would have neither an effective method of making their views 
known, (Schumpeter is not enthusiastic about petitions and 
letters to rulers because these may distort their judgment) 
nor the necessary information available on which to make 
up their own minds about issues. They would be (or should I 
say 'we are'? ) as Rousseau said, free once every four 
years(5), but Schumpeter would not view this as a 
disadvantage as, for him, democracy is not basically about 
freedom to make the decisions that affect our lives, but 
about getting power and choosing who will be in power. 
It should be noted that Schumpeter's theory of 
democracy is not purely descriptive. When purporting to give 
the advantages of his theory he also cites what he perceives 
as advantages of the system he describes, one of which is 
that it does not require such citizen involvement. Clearly, 
whether this is an advantage or not is arguable, but what 
cannot be disputed is that if citizens are not involved in 
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the making of poliical decisions, then the gulf between the 
'we' who make the rules and the 'we' who obey them is 
widened. The idea that democracy should be, in some way, 
government by the people as well as of and for them is 
lost, and the vast majority of people will have to abide by 
rules they not made and over which they have exercised no 
influence or control. 
Schumpeter's opinion is that the system he describes 
is an improvement on other systems in which the mass of the 
population is more directly involved, but this seems unlikely 
if the system and the people involved - the prospective 
leaders and the masses -- are as he describes them. The 
former simply want power for no ostensible reason except to 
have power, and the latter are apathetic, ignorant and have 
totalitarian tendencies. Yet it is on them, the masses, that 
the responsibility rests for selecting the good leaders who 
are needed, and for preventing any misuse of power or moves 
towards totalitarianism. It is highly questionable whether a 
political system in which the majority of the population is 
involved only during periodic elections would be a better 
guard against would-be dictators than a system in which 
people were more involved and expected to consider political 
issues for themselves. So the advantage of forestalling 
dictators, which Schumpeter claims for his system, though 
undoubtably desirable, turns out to be an advantage only over 
systems with less popular involvement, not those with more. 
If the bulwark against tyranny - the masses - are 
supposedly incapable of considering political issues, then 
those who want to be leaders have no need to consider them 
either for, according to Schumpeter, they are interested only 
in being in power. In Schumpeter's system our freedom to be 
involved in the making of decisions that affect us is traded 
off for a supposed increase in efficiency but if, as he 
assumes, love of power for its own sake is the only motive 
of all politicians, then he should tell us why he thinks 
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this 'democracy' will throw up good leaders. He does not 
explain why a system in which knowledgeable (though 
power-hungry) leaders periodically have to defer to and please 
the ignorant masses would produce a system which is more 
efficient than one in which the people are more directly 
involved: nor does he consider that anyone might want power 
in order to achieve certain ends rather than just to have 
power. If his analysis were correct then belonging to any 
but the largest party would be irrational, because it is the 
largest party that has the best chance of getting to power. 
Anyone wanting to be a leader would support it as the best 
way of getting themselves into power, the other parties 
would fade away, and the competition for power would be 
between individuals within one party as happens in 
totalitarian states. Clearly, even representative parliamentary 
democracy could not continue without people who are prepared 
to support a minority party that has no realistic expectation 
of taking power, but has policies which they believe to be 
in their own interests or even that they believe to be 
right. 
Schumpeter, however, regards political policies - the 
plans of how our society will be organised - as little more 
than advertising slogans. Comparing politics to war he says 
'the first and foremost aim of each political party is to 
prevail over the others in order to get into power or stay 
in it... the decision of the political issues is, from the 
standpoint of the politician not the end but only the 
material of parliamentary activity' (6) 
However, Schuspeter's theory is unable to account for the 
grounds on which the electorate makes its choice of leaders. 
Even if all the would-be leaders do is dangle policies like 
baubles before the apathetic masses, the electorate would 
still be influenced by the perceived advantages of one policy 
over another, or what would be the point of offering any 
policies at all? Again, if the candidates for leadership do 
not believe in the policies themselves why would they choose 
any one policy rather than another except in the belief that 
it would be electorally popular? Try as he might - and he 
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does try - Schumpeter cannot make a coherent theory of 
democracy that dispenses entirely with citizen involvement in 
policy making or policy selection and reduces it to no more 
than the choice of leaders, for the choice of leaders is 
inevitably influenced by perceptions of what they will do 
when elected. 
The disadvantage for the ordinary citizen of a system 
in which their involvement is confined to the election of 
others (whether they are called leaders or representatives) or 
to voting in a referendum is described by Lucas. He says 
"A vote is a poor substitute for a voice... It is not enough 
to able occasionally to answer questions when we are asked 
theml we want sometimes to be able to pose questions, put 
forward proposals. What is important is not only the 
possession of the vote but the opportunity of taking the 
initiative. ' (7) 
It is the desire for a voice that has always been the 
motive force behind demands for democracy. Though Schumpeter 
may use the word 'democracy' for the selection of leaders 
who will make decisions for us, choosing leaders is not 
self-determination, and it was the desire for this as much 
as the wish to choose leaders that prompts people to demand 
democracy. Early democrats believed that when decisions and. 
rules were made that affected their lives, then justice 
required that they should have some say in their making. 
That has not changed. In any large group it will not 
possible to satisfy all and make the rules and decisions 
exactly as any individual might wish, because there will be 
others who have different views and interests who will be 
affected too. However, when decisions which may affect us as 
individuals or members of the community are being made the 
democratic desire is to be able to influence them by 
contributing our experience and opinions. 
To argue thus is to view democratic participation as 
a right, whereas I have spoken of it as an obligation. In 
fact it is both. We participate as individuals in order to 
protect our own interests, have charge of our own lives and 
concerns and avoid being in the power of othersi but we are 
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not simply individuals with individual interests and so we 
participate in joint decisions in order to make our 
contribution to the task of organising a just society. 
Although democratic participation is an obligation, the first 
demands for it came from those who had suffered the 
injustice of coercion by a powerful government over which 
they had no control. They had been told their duty was not 
to participate but to obey and in such circumstances it is 
not surprising if democracy is demanded as a right rather 
than- accepted as an obligation. The Levellers, for example, 
claimed the right to be involved in the formation of the 
laws that affected their lives on the grounds that it was 
not only the propertied classes who had a stake in the 
running of the country and should govern it. As Colonel 
Rainborough said in the Putney Debates 
"the poorest he that is in England hath a life to live, as 
the greatest he". (8) 
He expressed the demand largely in terms of the view I 
criticised in Chapter 4- that each man should have to obey 
the government only if he had first given consent to do so, 
(9), but the basic claim was that as each man has his own 
life to live, justice demands that he should not be managed 
or used (and, I would say, or manipulated) by others with 
power over him. 
Of course the decisions which affect and regulate 
our lives and may restrict our freedom and self-determination 
are made not only by central governments, and so it is not 
only governments which need to be democratic. Rules impinge 
on people at many different levels and through different 
organisations, which may themselves be democratic, allowing 
their members to participate in the making of decisions that 
affect their lives and the formulation of the rules that 
govern their behaviour. A democratic society would not only 
have regular parliamentary and local elections but arrangements 
so that people at work, the tennis club, tenants' 
association, Trade Union, school and home would be able to 
participate in making the decisions that affect their lives. 
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It might be questioned whether most people want to 
participate actively in the making of decisions, and suggested 
that those who do not are showing admirable common-sense in 
not wishing to involve themselves in a life of endless 
debates and meetings. The present apathy of voters in 
national and local elections could be cited as evidence of 
this desire to be left in peace to get on with the 
important things of life and avoid politics. I have not 
suggested, however, that people should be forced to participate 
in formal democratic structures, even though I have said 
they ought to do so. The unavoidable obligations which I 
have contrasted with contractual, voluntary ones are 
unavoidable only in the sense that we do not choose whether 
they exist or not, but we are still free to choose whether 
we carry them out, as we are free to make other moral 
decisions. Nor have I suggested that democratic participation 
is the only or even the most important obligation we haves 
there may be times when we have other more pressing ones 
that we have to put first. If it were generally recognised, 
however, that we have an obligation to involve ourselves with 
matters of common concern, we would bring up our children 
to value participation, we would welcome any moves towards 
it, try in so many different ways to facilitate and 
encourage it, and, without spending all our lives moving from 
committee meeting to rally, the level of participation 
generally would be increased. Even if people are 
uninterested in national politics they are much less so about 
things that affect them more immediately, and the reaction 
to, say, the closure of a local school or post office is 
anything but -apathetic. People are 
less likely to be 
apathetic if they have a realistic chance of influencing 
events, if the issue is important to them and if they have 
been socialised or educated to fulfil their obligation to 
contribute to the running of society. It may be that those 
who take little interest in politics at present have realised 
that scant notice is taken of their views anyway and would 
have a different attitude if they thought their opinion would 
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be given serious consideration. Perhaps they have perceived 
the current situation more accurately than those of us who 
attempt to influence governments, and their apathy is a 
rational reaction to the present distribution of power rather 
than an inevitable fact of life. It should not be assumed 
that mass apathy is inevitable. 
When we- are able to participate in the making of 
decisions that affect our lives we can expres our opinions 
about what should be done, represent our interests and limit 
the power that others can exercise over us. However, there 
will still be occasions when we will not get our way and 
will have our freedom of choice and our freedom of action 
restricted. If, after all our participation and influence, we 
are still in the minority, and our opposition and dissent 
are unavailing, then we cannot be said to have made the 
laws that we are expected to obey. If we are not successful 
in getting our own way, despite having the opportunity to 
put our point of view, then our freedom will have been 
restricted and we will want to know if we have an obligation 
to obey a government which we did not choose and with which 
we disagree. 
The first point to make is that the object of 
democratic participation is not to enable individuals to get 
their own way, but to make joint decisions that reflect the 
common interest where it exists, and reconcile individual 
interests where possible. In any democratic group the 
contribution of all its members should be valued, and the 
final decisions will owe something to each contributor, even 
those whose -views did not prevail and who disagree with the 
conclusions. Thus the disappointed democrat who participated in 
a open discussion will have contributed something to the 
final decision, even if the result was not quite as s/he 
would have liked. Unless the society is one in which certain 
individuals or groups constantly find themselves in a 
minority, the individual's freedom to influence Joint decisions 
will be greater than in an undemocratic society, and even 
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when the conclusion does -not satisfy all there should be 
greater understanding of why it was reached. However, after 
all that can be said about greater freedom to influence 
decisions, and greater understanding of disagreeable 
conclusions, the question still remains of whether we have an 
obligation to obey a democratic government when we disagree 
with it or believe it to be wrong, and the answer to this 
question, I claim, depends on what the government does. 
It will be argued that if we reserve the right to 
decide when we should obey the government according to 
whether we approve of what it does we will have a chaotic 
society, or rather no society at all, but an aggregate of 
the isolated individualists of the liberal theory I have 
criticised. This is not the case, however, ' because there is 
an important difference between individualists choosing their 
obligations, and autonomous moral agents attempting to 
determine what their obligations to their fellows are and 
whether they can be fulfilled best by compliance with or 
opposition to government commands. Our obligations, like those 
of the government, are to the other people who make up our 
society. Sometimes, indeed often, we will carry out our 
obligations best by obeying the laws of the government of 
the day, but at other times we do it by opposing the 
government or even occasionally by disobeying its laws. 
There is no reason to suppose that a society 
composed of autonomous moral agents would be chaotic, though 
it might not be as easy to rule as one made up of 
tractable, obedient citizens. Firstly, those who acknowledge 
the obligation to promote a just society will admit a prima 
facie obligation to obey the law, for without law the 
attempt to promote a just society would fail. Secondly, if 
the- society is fully democratic there will be an additional 
imperative to respect the law, for the government will have 
facilitated discussion, listened to dissent and allowed 
protest, and so the final decision ought to represent the 
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considered wishes of the majority. The majority is not always 
right, of course, and people are not always aware of what 
is in their best interests, but if one criterion of a just 
society is that it is organised for the benefit of all its 
members, then the fact that something is desired by the 
majority of them indicates it should be considered very 
seriously. Thirdly, it should be remembered that we reserve 
the right to disobey the law only when by obeying it we 
would fail to carry out our obligations to others. This is 
very different from saying we can do it when we feel like 
it, or find ourselves in a minority. Often we may be 
required to do something we would rather not do, and have 
not chosen or agreed to do, but unless our objections are 
that to obey the law would prevent us from fulfilling our 
responsibility to others, we should not break it. 
As has been said there is a prima facie obligation 
to obey the law, and so even when faced what appears to 
be an unjust law, the person committed to promoting a just, 
democratic society would not consider the question of whether 
to break it in isolation, without regard to wider 
consequences, such as diminishing respect for the law in our 
society. For example, if we know that some of our taxes 
will be used to make nuclear arms and we believe that this 
is contrary to our obligations, we might decide that we 
ought to withhold some of our tax bill. However, there are 
more issues involved than simply the one of whether we 
should contribute to the building of nuclear weapons. The 
possibility of setting a precedent for others who did not 
want to contribute to the provision of schools or hospitals 
should be considered, as should be the fact of whether or 
not a majority of fellow citizens wanted to build the 
weapons. Another consideration would be, of course, the 
consequences of breaking the law. Although we might hope, 
through our action, to draw attention to the fact that the 
particular law we had broken was unjust and should be 
changed, even a democratic government that was most sensitive 
to the wishes and needs of the people, would enforce the 
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law as it stood, until the case for changing it had been 
accepted. Breaking the law is sometimes right, but, like 
other moral obligations, it cannot be done at no cost to 
ourselves. 
The consideration of a wide range of factors rather 
than one simple question is part of what is involved in 
exercising moral autonomy, and we do not concede this right 
when we accord to a government a provisional right to make 
decisions on our behalf. We still have to decide whether our 
natural and non-contractual obligations to other members of 
our society are best served by obedience to the government 
of the day. We are not torn, as is sometimes suggested (10) 
between either obeying a government and thereby giving up 
moral autonomy, or remaining morally autonomous and therefore 
having to deny the right of any government, even a 
democratic one, to make commands. The mistaken premise on 
which this view rests is, I believe, that we have a 
government to do our moral thinking for us. This is not 
so. We have a government to help us organise a just 
society, and it should not be our ruler but our partner. 
Sometimes a democratic government will need to restrict our 
freedom for the benefit of others; (the question of whether 
it should ever restrict our freedom for our own benefit will 
be considered in Chapters 8 and 9) but it will also have 
to protect the important freedoms necessary for our 
participation in the organisation of our society and the 
fulfilment of our obligations to its members. The restrictions 
of freedom imposed by a democratic government are not 
legitimate because we have contracted to accept them, or 
because they are expressions of our own wishes, but only if 
they are the necessary means of organising society for the 
benefit of all its members. 
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CHAPTER 
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The Right to Liberty 
The suggestion that we have the non-contractual 
obligation to play a part in establishing a just society, 
and that the state may legitimately restrict our individual 
freedom in order to promote that end, may sound like an 
acceptance of a dangerously high level of state interference 
in individual liberty. However my claim is not as careless 
of individual liberty as it might sound. It is a claim 
about the conditions under which restrictions of liberty 
would be justified if the government and the various agencies 
of the state were also striving to establish a just 
society. It does not justify every restriction of liberty 
which a government may claim is in the common interest. That 
governments may, and do, try to infringe individual liberty 
on the grounds that this is necessary for the organisation 
of a just society when this is not the case is undeniable, 
but this demonstrates the fallibility or duplicity of those 
in government, and cannot be taken as a criticism of the 
principle. Nevertheless, it will be asked whether there are 
no limits to the restrictions the state may legitimately 
place on the individual in the name of the common good or 
in the interests of the other members of society? Have we 
no individual rights to liberty that the government cannot 
violate in the name of the greater good? 
In considering the question of whether we have a 
natural right to liberty I shall start by looking at what 
is meant by saying that we have a right to something for 
there are many theories about the variously described natural 
rights, human rights and rights of man. There are theories 
which treat the phrase X has a right to Y' as purely 
descriptive, such as positivist theories which state that 
there are no rights where there is no power to achieve 
whatever is claimed; (1) and legalistic theories which say the 
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only rights people have are those laid down in law; (2) and 
there are a number of theories which accept the existence 
of moral rights, even where there is no power to enforce 
them, and share the view that statements about rights are 
prescriptive. The existence of natural rights has been 
confidently assumed (3) and equally confidently dismissed as 
nonsense, (4) from which diversity and disagreement we can 
learn little about rights except that if we do have them it 
is not in the obvious way we have arms and legs. 
The first, the least contraversial and some would 
say the only meaning of 'rights' is to be found in a legal 
context. We have a legal right to have, do or not do what 
the law says we should be allowed to have, do or not do, 
and other people (either particular ones or all others) have 
a corresponding obligation either to provide the object of 
our right or not prevent us from attaining it. Often, 
however, the term 'right' is used outside the legal context, 
of a moral right which may have no chance of being upheld 
in court. When, say, black South Africans claim the 
government has no right to impose apartheid, they clearly are 
not refering to a right enshrined in the law of the land. 
However, though rights may exist beyond the legal code, they 
do not exist independently of human , society. Even lone 
reformers claiming hitherto unacknowledged moral rights are 
appealing to a wider audience beyond their own country and 
generation rather than postulating the existence of 
metaphysical rights. Rights exist in a social context and 
cannot be totally unacknowledged and unaccepted by anyone 
anywhere. Though this prompts the unanswerable questions of 
how many people must acknowledge a right for it to exist, 
or how long we should wait for it to be acknowledged, there 
is, in the notion of a right, some implication of others 
acknowledging the right and accepting the claim. Individuals 
claiming rights are not listing possessions, but contributing 
to a joint decision about how we should treat each other 
and making a statement about how we should behave towards 
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each other. 
The idea that there must be a connection between 
having a right and having it acknowledged arises in realist 
theories which equate rights with expectations. These say that 
people have the right to have or do X if they have a 
reasonable expectation that they will be allowed to have or 
do X, but this argument is correctly criticised on the 
grounds that what we feel is morally due to us (our right) 
is often very different from what we may realistically 
expect. However, although realistic expectations are predictions 
of the future rzther than statements of belief about what 
ought to be, there is another usage of 'expectation' which 
is connected with the language of rights. "We expect children 
from his school to put their crisp packets in the litter 
bins', headteachers may announce at school assemblies, though 
experience will have taught them that realistically they must 
expect many packets to be dropped on the floor. They use 
the word 'expect' for what ought to happen, and what could 
happen, though alas it might not. In this 'school assembly' 
sense of 'expect' human beings expect to be treated. properly 
by their governments and not arrested arbitrarily and 
tortured, even though actual experience has taught them 
otherwise, for they ought to be free from such evils and it 
is possible that they could be, If the standard that is 
'expected' were rarely if ever achieved then talk of 
expectations, even optimistic school assembly expectations, 
would be inappropriate. 'Rights' can be stretched a little 
further than expectations, as we can maintain in the teeth 
of all opposition that we have a right, but if our claim 
is valid we expect it to be acknowledged at some time. 
If talk of 'expectations' and 'rights' is talk of 
what ought to be, the question arises as to what, if 
anything there is to the notion of rights beyond the idea 
of what ought to be. Is anything extra gained when we say 
"I have a right to do X" or "You have no right to do Y" 
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beyond what is expressed by 'You ought no to stop me doing 
X" and 'You ought not to do Y"? Apart from in the strict 
legal sense of 'right' I believe that by talking of 'rights' 
we add nothing to the idea of moral imperatives. If we are 
imprisoned without trial and we claim the government has no 
right to imprison us and that we have the right to be 
free, we are saying that the government ought not to lock 
us up without a trial and that it ought to let us go. If 
a torturer, having doubts about his job, asks why he should 
not torture, the answer "Because people have the right not 
to be tortured' may be couched in the form of an answer 
providing a reason, but it is really a restatement of the 
claim that he ought not to torture. I realise that to talk 
of rights in this way seems rather prosaic compared with the 
inspiring demands for human rights or the rights of man. 
However, I maintain that all such claims are basically 
statements about how people should be treated, and how others 
should treat them. 
It might be asked why, if what I say is correct, 
we should use the phraseology of rights at all. We do so 
firstly because it is persuasive. When we claim a right it 
sounds as if we are giving a reason for being allowed to 
secure, or attempt to secure, the object of our right, 
rather than just asserting our claim. Secondly, the use of 
'right' rather than the corresponding sentence using 'ought 
to' puts the emphasis on the person in the relationship who 
has the right rather than the one with the obligation. If 
we say "X has the right to a fair trial" we are focussing 
more of our attention on X than if we sy "Y ought not to 
arrest X arbitrarily". Obviously what Y must not do to x 
and what X must not have done to him by Y are the same, 
but focussing on the person with the right emphasises his or 
her importance and avoids the implication that Y would shun 
the action for reasons of his own, such as that it would 
be demeaning for a man in his position or would endanger 
his immortal soul. Thus when we say "X has the right to 
-79- 
Z" we are demonstrating that it is with X's welfare or 
justice to X that we are concerned, and not the moral 
health of others. We are not, however, providing a reason 
why X should be allowed to have or do Z. 
As claims about rights are made for people (and 
occasionally for animals and foetuses) and are concerned with 
the holder of the right rather than others, the range of 
occasions in which we speak of rights is narrower than that 
in which we use 'ought' or 'ought not'. Perhaps I ought not 
to rob the bank or blow up the bridge, but rights are 
held only by sentient beings and the bridge and bank have 
none. There is much discussion about which beings can have 
rights. Hart claims that there is a difference between having 
a right and benefitting from the performance of a duty (5), 
and that while babies and animals benefit from the fulfilment 
of our duty to treat them properly they do not have the 
right not to be ill-treated. According to Hart, if one 
person has a right and another the corresponding obligation, 
their relationship 
"is not that of two persons bound by a chain, but of one 
person bound, the other end of the chain lying in the hands 
of another to use if he chooses. "(6) 
According to this idea people who have rights 
must be capable of choosing whether to exercise the right or 
not, and this rules out not only babies and animals, as it 
is intended to, but but also the mentally handicapped, 
possibly the mentally ill, and those who are seriously ill 
or unconscious. To claim that my hamster has the right to 
proper treatment may seem to stretch the notion of rights 
rather far, but this seems less unacceptable than an 
interpretation which restricts rights to those who are healthy 
and bright enough to consider waiving them and releasing 
others from their obligations. The implication of Hart's view 
is that no-one has the right to be cared for when seriously 
ill or senile. Presumably even those who had been promised 
care in their old age would lose their right to that care 
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at the very moment they needed it most, and those who had 
contributed to a medical or other insurance scheme, in the 
understanding that this would entitle them to treatment or 
compensation when they needed it, would lose the right to 
have it when they became so ill or badly injured that they 
could not choose to waive their right. Other people might 
still have the duty to care for them, but the care would 
not be theirs as a right even if they had arranged it and 
paid for it in advance. 
Hart's main point, however, is not to restrict right 
holding to the bright and healthy but to show that if 
there are any moral rights at all we have a natural right 
to freedom. The right is natural because it is not conferred 
or created by voluntary action. It belongs to all people 
just because they are people and not because they belong to 
a particular society or are in a special relationship. 
However, Hart does not take the view that because a right 
is natural it has a special status and is inalienable or 
imprescriptable. A natural right does not necessarily take 
precedence over other special rights. Indeed these special 
rights are a moral justification for overriding the natural 
right to freedom. For example, when one person uses his 
natural right to freedom to take something which belongs to 
someone else the right to freedom is overridden by the 
owner's special right to keep what he owns. The owner's 
right is a moral justification for limiting the freedom of 
others to help themselves to his property. The special right 
justifies the restriction of another's freedom: a justification 
which would not be needed unless a natural right to freedom 
existed. 
Because of the sharp distinction he makes between an 
obligation (which corresponds to another's right) and things 
we ought to do, Hart believes 
`There is no contradiction or other impropriety in saying 'I 
have an obligation to do X, someone has a right to ask me, 
but now I see I ought not to do it,. It will in painful 
situations sometimes be the lesser of two moral evils to 
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disregard what really are people's rights and not perform 
our obligations" (7) 
Thus he says that sometimes we ought not to fulfil our 
obligations, but that when this is the case the obligations 
and the corresponding rights still exist. I suggest that this 
is mistaken. If having a right is having a moral 
justification for interfering with the liberty of another 
person, then Hart is claiming that sometimes we have no 
moral justification (we ought not) to do what we have a 
moral justification (we have the right) to do. I believe 
this contradiction arises from a too rigid distinction between 
what we have an obligation to do and what we ought to do. 
As I argued earlier, rights are not things which belong to 
us: to use the language of rights is to make a statement 
about what people should be allowed to have or do which 
places emphasis on the holder of the right. When we talk of 
'rights' we are giving greater attention to the importance 
of the person with the rights, and it is the same with 
obligations: but what we are talking about in both cases is 
what ought to be done. 
Thus, whereas Hart would say that X has a right 
which still remains even when it may be morally justified to 
override it for some greater good, I believe that the 
greater good negates the right. I am not suggesting that 
'greater good' means the good of the greatest number and 
that therefore the rights of individuals or minorities must 
be sacrificed, but simply that if it is morally justified to 
override a right and cancel an obligation then there is 
nothing which remains. If we have promised X to murder Y 
and then realise that we should not, we do not have an 
obligation to X, and X does not have a right which has 
been overriddeni the greater good of not doing murder 
nullifies the obligation to keep promises and the right to 
have promises kept. There are many less dramatic examples of 
rights which seem to have been overridden for the sake of 
a greater good- but which, I would argue, did not ever 
exist. Parents may be told that they have the right to 
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choose their children's school, and then they feel aggrieved 
when the school of their choice is full and their children 
are allocated places elsewhere. I believe that this is not a 
case of a right overridden but of a right that was 
improperly described. The 'right of parents to send their 
children where they choose, and the obligation of L. E. A. s to 
carry out the wishes of every parent, never existed. What 
might have existed was the right of choice providing the 
school was not full, the allocation in line with Government 
and L. E. A. policy etc. etc. The existence of 'et ceteras' 
complicates matters and prevents us from being able to lay 
down precisely what our rights are, for our rights are the 
things we should be allowed to have or do, and we cannot 
know exactly what these are unless we know the full 
circumstances. The rights we have, if described accurately, 
are always 'rights providing that..... ' and, of course, it is 
not always possible to fill in the provisos in advance. 
In claiming that obligations which have been 
overridden cease to be obligations, I would not want to 
suggest that the recognition of our obligations is 
unproblematical, or that genuine and distressing conflicts do 
not occur. My claim is firstly that we cannot have an 
obligation to do what is wrong, assuming, of course, that it 
is clear to us what is right or wrong. This is a large 
assumption, and much of the uncertainty and heart-searching 
that takes place over the question of our obligations is an 
attempt to work out what would be right and wrong, and 
therefore what our obligations really are. I state, however, 
the theoretical position that if something is wrong we do 
not have an obligation to do it, and others cannot have a 
right that we do it. 
Secondly, I claim that we cannot have an obligation 
to do the impossible. So, if there Is a conflict between 
two apparent obligations that are incompatible, we cannot 
have the obligation to do both if this is impossible. If, 
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for example, I have promised my children to attend their 
school play or parents' evening and I am knocked down by a 
bus, I cannot reasonably be said to have an obligation to 
keep my promise or do my parental duty and turn up. 
Similarly, if I were to hear that my mother had been taken 
seriously ill and was in hospital asking for me, and this 
seemed to be the more important and pressing obligation, 
then, as I could not be both at my children's school and 
mother's bedside I cannot have an obligation to go to the 
play or parents' evening. However, to say this is not to 
claim that my obligations to my children in respect of this 
particular issue cease entirely. Though unable to be at 
school myself, and therefore free of the obligation to 
attend, I would immediately , aquire other non-contractual 
obligations - perhaps to explain to the children what had 
happened, to make other arrangements to see the teacher when 
I had recovered or whatever. My obligations as a parent 
would not have ceased when overridden by my obligations as a 
daughter, only the particular one of keeping my promise and 
attending the school function. However, these new obligations 
and the corresponding rights of others would depend, like the 
overridden obligations, on what was possible. 
However, to return to the subject of the right to 
freedom, according to Hart 
'Any adult human being capable of choice (1) has the right 
to forbearance on the part of all others from the use of 
coercion or restraint and (2) is at liberty to do (i. e. is 
under no obligation to abstain from ) any action which is 
not one coercing or restraining or designed to injure 
others. " (8) 
We cannot, as I have already argued, have a right to do 
what is wrong, and therefore, as Dworkin points out, we 
cannot have a natural right to liberty for liberty is a 
licence to do right or wrong. (9) Dworkin says that every 
law is an infringement of liberty, but we only protest that 
our right to liberty has been infringed in a limited range 
of cases. Many restrictions of trivial liberties are not 
considered important at all, which they should be if it is 
Liberty itself which is important. Dworkin gives the example 
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of the creation of a one-way street and of restriction of free 
speech, both of which are restrictions of liberty but only 
one of which arouses complaints about the violation of 
individual's rights. Dworkin puts forward the obvious suggestion 
that this is so because free speech is a basic liberty, but 
then says 
'However... if the distinction between basic liberties and 
other liberties is defended in this way, then the notion of 
a general right to liberty as such has been entirely 
abandoned. 1(10) 
Clearly, if free speech is important and the freedom to drive 
up and down a one-way street is not, then it is not liberty 
in general which is valued and to which we claim to have a 
right, but certain particular liberties. As Dworkin argues, the 
idea of a general right to liberty creates a false sense of 
conflict between liberty and other values and provides too easy 
an answer to the question of why suppression of free speech 
is wrong. If we do not assume that we have a right to 
freedom as such then we have to probe more deeply to find 
out what we think is really important about free speech, and 
why it should be allowed. 
As the restriction of some freedoms requires a much 
stronger justification than others, it cannot be freedom itself 
that is so valuable. The mere fact that a one-way street is 
in the public interest is reason enough to set one up and 
restrict individual freedom, Dworkin says, but to say that 
someone has the right to free speech is to say that he has 
that right even if it is not in the public interest. He 
calls individual rights "political trumps held by individuals" 
(11) -a view similar to that of Margaret Macdonald who says 
that claims to natural rights tend to arise 
"when the plain citizen tries to make.. articulate his 
obscure, but firmly held conviction that he is not a mere 
pawn in any political game nor the property of any 
government or ruler, but the living and protesting 
individual for whose sake all political games are played and 
all governments instituted. ' (12) 
I would agree with the point that individuals matter, must be 
considered, and do not belong to rulers or governments, but, 
as I have argued, they do belong to a society; though not in 
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the sense of being society's possessions. I am unhappy with 
Dworkin's claim that individual rights exist even when they are 
not in the public interest, for our rights are what we 
should be allowed to do or have, and this cannot be decided 
without reference to some concept of public interest, or 
general good, and the rights of others. Although individual 
rights sometimes appear contrasted to, or even in conflict 
with, what it would suit the government, the state, or society 
in general to permit, this does not mean they exist 
regardless of the public interest, for they are not individual 
possesssions, but individual examples of what everyone should be 
allowed to do in similar circumstances. We cannot decide what 
individuals should be allowed, by the other members of their 
society, to do or have, without taking account of what the 
effect of exercising those individual rights would be on the 
rest of society, or other individual members of it. 
For Dworkin's example of free speech, which he claims 
is a right even if it is not in the public interest, I 
believe it is necessary to have a conception of public 
interest that goes beyond the immediate issue. Even if what a 
person has to say may be judged to be not in the immediate 
public interest, suppressing it may be against that interest in 
the long-term. A precedent for silencing unpopular opinions, 
once set, could be used to silence opinions and facts that it 
would be in the public interest to hear. However, even an 
important freedom like the freedom of speech should not be 
seen as an inalienable right, for speech is action and actions 
have consequences to others. The fatuously expressed Second 
World War injunction to "Be like Dad, keep Mum" had behind it 
the very reasonable assumption that when other people's lives 
are at stake we should not indulge in an excess of free 
speech. That and other freedoms which were generally thought of 
as rights in peacetime were viewed differently when 
circumstances changed so dramatically. 
It has been the liberal tradition to regard rights 
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as the same for everyone everywhere, and, consequently, because 
economic standards vary so, to make a sharp distinction between 
civil/political liberties or rights and social/economic liberties 
or rights. Cranston, for example, argues that the 
philosophically respectable concept of human rights has been 
muddied by the incorporation of new so-called rights which are 
really aspirations. (13) He claims that the traditional rights 
to life, liberty and a fair trial are, as real human rights 
must be, rights for all people at all times, which the new 
economic and social rights, such as the right to education, 
work or an old-age pension, cannot be. These latter so-called 
rights, he argues are expressions of ideals and cannot be 
proper rights because it is not always possible to secure 
them, and while we have an obligation to respect rights, we 
cannot have an obligation to do the impossible. I would agree 
that the right to a holiday with pay (one of Cranston's 
examples of new 'rights') is less important than the right to 
a fair trial, but I do not believe he is correct to 
distinguish between the traditional, respectable human rights 
which are of paramount importance, always the same and able to 
be secured by simple legislation, and new, so-called rights 
which are expressions of utopian aspirations. 
Firstly, not all the traditional rights are easily 
secured or can be maintained universally. It is true, as 
Cranston says, that not all countries are able to set up a 
welfare state, certainly, but nor is it the case that they 
could all easily secure the traditional basic human rights 
either. Most governments could do a great deal better than 
they do, and often use 'national interest' as a euphemism for 
their own interest when suppressing liberties, but nevertheless 
there are circumstances such as war or other emergencies in 
which some of the traditional basic rights such as freedom of 
speech or movement are extremely difficult for governments to 
guarantee. Secondly, even the traditional rights are not all of 
equal values I believe most people would regard freedom from 
arbitrary arrest and torture more important than freedom of 
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speech and movement. Thirdly, economic and social considerations 
cannot be separated from some of the traditional rights. If we 
have a right to life it is not clear why this should be 
interpreted narrowly as the right not to be killed unlawfully, 
rather than according to a wider interpretation which includes 
having enough to eat. 
I argued in Chapter 3, with regard to restrictions of 
freedom, that if we are concerned about freedom we should not 
take a narrow view of what constitutes a restriction, but 
should include all removable constraints brought about by human 
action. In the same way if we are concerned about the way 
people should be treated and what they should be allowed to 
do and have (i. e. their rights) then we should not limit this 
concern to the traditional rights. As Margaret Macdonald says 
"assertions about human rights... are assertions of what 
ought to be as the result of human choice. "(14) 
The things that ought to be vary according to what is 
possible, and while Cranston is right to say that no-one can 
have an obligation to do the impossible, once something has 
become possible the obligation to do it may be as binding as 
any other. Thus, if it is possible to prevent starvation or 
to provide education for all, the obligation to do so, and 
the corresponding rights, should no longer be judged as utopian 
aspirations which are of a different order from the 
traditional human rights. 
Rights and obligations which exist, not because they 
have been voluntarily agreed but because they belong to all 
human beings just because they are human beings, could be 
called 'natural rights'. However, to acknowledge that there are 
natural rights in this sense is not necessarily to accept that 
they are inalienable or imprescriptable and may never be 
overridden. This more extreme view is taken by Nozick who 
says 
"Individuals have rights and there are things no person or 
group may do to them (without violating their rights). So 
strong and far-reaching are those rights that they raise the 
question of what, if anything, the state and its officials 
may do. ' (15) 
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Nozick disagrees with Hart's claim that one of the special 
rights which overrides the natural right to liberty is the 
right of people conducting a joint enterprise according to 
rules to require submission on the part of others. (16) It is 
a right of this kind, Hart claims, which members of a society 
have over other members, but Nozick questions whether people 
who benefit from a social enterprise have the right to demand 
a contribution from others, even if they benefit as well. He 
asks why this should be, and what would be the case if the 
others do not benefit, or if they do benefit but would rather 
not, and he concludes 
On the face of it enforcing the principle of fairness is 
objectionable. You may not decide to give me something, for 
example a book, and then grab money from me to pay for 
it... You have .. even less reason to demand payment if your 
activity that gives me the book also benefits you. " (17) 
Nozick argues that there is very little the state may 
do without violating individual rights, and that, therefore, a 
minimal state limited to the narrow functions of protection is 
all that is justified. Although I disagree with his claims 
about the kind of state that is justified, his criticism of 
Hart's position requires further examination. Hart says that 
apart from the natural right to liberty there are special 
rights and obligations which arise from voluntary actions, and 
that political obligation is based on one of theses the right 
of those who have submitted to restrictions while undertaking a 
z joint enterprise to require a similar submission from others. 
Nozick argues that those who do not voluntarily take part in 
an enterprise are under no obligation to obey the rules. If, 
to use his example, a book is given to them, they have no 
obligation to pay for it and no-one has the right to take 
their money. Nozick's criticism of Hart appears reasonable 
because of Hart's insistence on the voluntary nature of 
obligations. If, however, as I have- argued, obligations are not 
necessarily voluntary but are simply things that we ought to 
do, and if, as I claim also, one of our inescapable 
obligations is co-operation in the organisation of a just 
society, then Nozick's criticism is not justified. 
-89- 
There is an irreconciable conflict' between my view and 
that of Nozick. It' can be seen in the conflicting claims that 
the state may legitimately use its coercive apparatus only for 
protection against aggression, and the opposing view that one 
of the most important functions of the state is to promote 
the welfare of its members: it is apparent also in the claim 
that any form of redistribution (apart from reparation, which 
does not count as redistribution) is a violation of individual 
rights, and the opposing claim that a reasonably equal 
distribution of important goods is an essential part of a just 
society. However, the basis for these differences can be found 
in fundamentally different views of man, of society and of 
rights. On the one hand there is Nazi ck's individual with 
rights of freedom, but no rights of recipience except those 
voluntarily agreed, who comes together with others to serve his 
own purposes, and with them forms a society which cannot 
justifiably require him to do any more than fulfil his 
contracts and respect the rights of freedom of others. Opposing 
that is my view of man as a social being as well as an 
individual, whose rights of recipience and rights of freedom 
arise, as do his obligations, within a social context. I can 
see no reason to start, as Nozick does, with individuals and 
one certain set of rights, and ignore the inescapable 
non-contractual obligations that arise from the mutual 
interdependence of human beings. 
Individual rights cannot be inalienable or 
imprescriptable not only because individual interests sometimes 
have to be subordinated, but also because on many occasions 
the prima facie rights of individuals conflict. Benn and Peters 
point out that, for example, in a famine one person's right 
to life might conflict with another's right to property. There 
are public discussions about the conflict between the right to 
strike and the right to work, the right to stage mass 
demonstrations and the right to walk peacefully to the shops 
or through the park. As Benn and Peters say 
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"social regulation is a continuous process of adjustment 
between conflicting claims; the theory of absolute natural 
rights would seem to make the process impossible. " (18) 
For a case to be made for absolute rights it would be 
necessary to specify in advance all the exceptional 
circumstances in which the right would not apply. Thus we 
might say not that we have an absolute right to life or 
liberty but that we have the right except in this circumstance 
or when that happens, but we cannot know in advance what 
circumstances may arise. It might be claimed that we have the 
right to liberty, but when examined more closely the right to 
turns out to be a right to liberty except when we break the 
law, or when our liberty clashes with that of others, or when 
we are found to be carriers of deadly infectious diseases 
etc. etc. As was argued earlier we cannot specify in advance 
exactly what our rights are, because they are the things we 
should be allowed to do or have, and these vary according to 
changing circumstances. 
If we take 'right' to mean the treatment that is due 
to people or what they ought to receive, and 'natural' to 
mean not specially created for any particular people but due 
to all human beings, then it could be said that we have 
natural rights, but not a right to liberty as such. We cannot 
have this right, because liberty is license to do good or 
harm, and there can be no right to do harm. However there 
can be a presumption that people should be free to decide for 
themselves what they do in the absence of a good reason to 
restrict them. What will count as a good reason for 
restricting liberty will vary according to the liberty in 
question and the circumstances in which it is to be exercised. 
This is a subject on which there is such debate, and as 
individual members of society affected by the decisions, I 
would claim that we have the right to take part in this 
debate about what should and should not be allowed. Individuals 
do matter and should have their views and interests taken 
into account together with those of others when liberties and 
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rights are discussed. However, it should be remembered that in 
saying that we have a right to contribute to the general 
discussion and have our views and interests considered I am 
not giving a reason why this should be allowed. To say that 
we should be allowed to contribute our views and have our 
interests considered and to say that this is our right are 
just two ways of saying the same thing. 
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CHAPTER 7 
CHILDREN'S RIGHTS TO LIBERTY 
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Children's rights to liberty 
In the previous chapter I claimed that while we 
have no right to liberty as such, we have a right to - i. e, 
we should be allowed to - take part in the making of 
decisions that affect our lives and in the debate about how 
our society is run. I did not specify who 'we' are, and in 
this chapter will be considering whether children should be 
included amongst the right-holders, and, if so, whether their 
rights differ significantly from those of adults. The subject 
of children's rights is one on which there is much 
disagreement and confusion, some caused by different 
interpretations of what rights are and some by different 
views of how children should be treated. The problems fall 
into three broad areas; firstly there are all the problems 
of rights in general, which were dealt with in the previous 
chapterl secondly, the question of whether children are the 
sort of beings who can have rights; and thirdly, if they 
are, there is the question of what rights they have. 
Clearly the answer to the question of whether 
children have rights and what these are varies according to 
the interpretation of 'rights' that is being used. If the 
whole notion of rights is nonsense and they do not exist 
then children cannot have rights. If, as Hart says, (1) to 
have a right one must be able to choose to waive it, then 
young children and babies cannot have rights but older 
children would not be excluded. Disagreement about whether 
rights are legal requirements, moral imperatives or statements 
of idealistic aspirations will be carried over into the 
discussion about children's rights as will the distinction 
between what Raphael calls rights of recipience and rights of 
action. (2) Those who are concerned with the former 
concentrate on the child's right to certain welfare benefits 
such as love, a home, toys, a free education, a nationality 
or whatever. The actual list varies but the emphasis is on 
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what children should have, whereas the alternative view is 
concerned with whether children should be free to vote, earn 
money, leave home or have sexual relationships. Again the 
list of activities varies but the emphasis is on what 
children should be free to do. The U. N. Charter of 
children's rights, for example, concentrates on their rights 
of recipience and says nothing about what they should be 
allowed to do. (3) The draft charter of children's rights 
published in Where (4) shares the U. N. declaration's 
non-legalistic concept of rights but is much more concerned 
with children's rights of action. Both these declarations 
would be criticised by those who hold that the identification 
of 'rights' with idealistic aspirations devalues the concept 
of a right from something which must be respected immediately 
because of its overriding importance, to something desirable 
but non-essential which may be respected at some non-specific 
time in the future. (5) Where's draft charter makes it clear 
that it does not interpret 'rights' in this way, saying 
"a charter or rights is not a legal document. Nor is it a 
description of what can and will happen tomorrow. It is an 
ideal statement of how the world might be. " (6) 
Clearly many of those who talk about children's rights are 
not talking about the same things. 
I have already argued in the previous chapter that 
in my view to talk of people having rights is to make a 
statement about how they should be treated or allowed to 
behave. Furthermore it is to emphasise that the particular 
treatment is due because of a relevant feature of the person 
receiving the treatment and not because of the effect on 
someone else. Thus if we say A has the right not to be 
tortured we are saying not that he has a possession -a right 
- but that he ought not to be tortured, and also that B 
ought not to torture him because of some feature or features 
about A (perhaps his human dignity and capacity for 
suffering) and not because torture is an unreliable method of 
extracting information, or that it will make B unattractively 
callous, or that the screams will upset C. When I talk of 
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children's rights, then, I shall be talking of the way 
children should be treated or allowed to behave because of 
some significant feature or features they possess, and because 
of the effect such treatment has on them. Because my 
interest is in liberty rather than rights as such, I shall 
concentrate on children's rights of action, their rights to 
liberty, rather than their rights of recipience but it is 
not possible to separate these completely. Sometimes rights of 
action are empty and useless if rights of recipience are 
not respected: sometimes there is conflict between them, as 
with the right to receive protection and the right to make 
one's own decisions. However, unless I state otherwise, when 
I refer to children's rights I shall be thinking of the 
things they should be allowed to do rather than what they 
should have. 
The first question which must be asked about 
children's rights specifically, rather than rights in general, 
is whether children have rights. Since differences should be 
demonstrated rather than assumed the question is better 
tackled by asking why should children not have rights if 
adults have them, and as I have already indicated the answer 
to thise question is strongly influenced by the 
interpretation of 'rights' that is being used. Using my 
interpretation it is clear that children do have rights 
because there are certain ways they should (and should not) 
be treated because of the effect this treatment has on them. 
If their rights are different from those of adults, and if 
their freedom is to be restricted in ways other than those 
which apply to the rest of us, then it must be because of 
some relevant difference in them, and not because it suits 
adults to treat them differently. 
As I have mentioned, Hart's interpretation rules out 
young children as potential rights holders. Another view which 
does this is the one which says that rights go hand in 
hand with responsibilities and obligations, and that as 
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children do not shoulder responsibilities they cannot claim 
rights. However although rights and obligations do go together 
they do not do so in the sense that only those with 
obligations can have rights. The relationship is not that A 
has obligations and so is allowed to have rights, but that 
As right corresponds with B's obligations. Justice requires 
that those who want their own rights respected should carry 
out their obligations to others and respect their rights 
also, but we do not have rights as a reward for for 
carrying out our obligations. There are, of course, special 
rights which may derive from the carrying out of special 
duties, such as the right to a week's pay for the person 
who has done a week's work, and those who had not earned 
the special right would not have it. The claim that children 
do not have rights because their do not carry out 
obligations may be the lesser claim that they do not have 
certain special adult rights because they do not share the 
relevant adult responsibilities. For example, if children do 
not contribute to paying the mortgage, keeping the house in 
good repair, or enabling the bread-winner(s) to pursue a 
career, then it might be argued that they should not (as 
Harris suggests they should t7)) have a right to share in 
its legal ownership. However, even if this is so, all that 
is demonstrated is that the possession of certain special 
rights corresponds with fulfilling certain related 
responsibilities and it cannnot be taken to show that 
children do not have rights at all. Even if it were true 
that children have no responsibilities and obligations this 
would not entail that they cannot have rights. 
It is sometime 
rights as individuals, 
it is assumed, is a 
within it. Acceptance 
entail treating parents 
family or giving them 
it is argued that the 
s argued that children do not have 
but only as part of a family, which, 
whole with no conflicting interests 
of this view does not necessarily 
as the most important members of the 
rights over their children. However, if 
welfare of the children is best 
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promoted by allowing the parents maximum freedom from external 
interference in the upbringing of their children, then 
treating the family as a unit with no conflict of interest 
amongst its members will, in effect, give power to the 
parents. The view that the family is a unit whose interests 
are taken to be identical with those of the husband and 
father was once popular with those who argued against the 
emancipation of women. The protection of the more vulnerable 
members was said to be best served by denying them 
independence and by placing them wholly in the power of the 
most powerful member who had legal rights over them as well 
as economic and educational advantages. This argument is 
seldom heard nowadays with regard to women, as it is more 
widely accepted that opportunities for independence give a 
better guarantee of proper and humane treatment than total 
dependence on the goodwill of another. 
The argument is still used with regard to children, 
however, despite overwhelming evidence that some families do 
not serve the needs of the children in them, and that what 
many children need is protection from their parents or the 
chance to live away from them. For example, Robert Burt, 
taking the view that children do not need rights, says 
'children cannot be adequately or even sensibly protected by 
giving them the 'rights' that state officials will enforce 
against parents. Children can only be protected by giving 
them parents. The Children's Rights movement today is in 
danger of ignoring this simple homely truth and thus 
disserving the best interests of children. '(B) 
Burt argues that to speak of rights for children is to be 
legalistic, rigid and disinterested in situations such as the 
home and school where we should be flexible and passionately 
involved with individual children. 
Burt's reference to "state officials" illustrates 
another dimension to the debates the fact that it is not 
merely about the assignment of rights and obligations betwen 
two groups - children and adults. The adults are further 
divided into parents and the state, both of which may claim 
the right to act in the best interests of the childp the 
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former claiming the right to raise children free from 
external intervention and the latter claiming the right to 
protect children from neglect or cruelty and to ensure that 
they are educated. Burt is aware that if children have 
legally enforceable rights these may have to be enforced by 
the state against the parents, and he fears that this will 
destroy what children need most -a close loving relationship 
with parents. In saying this Burt is demonstrating the 
attitude to rights exemplified in the common phrases "he's 
always standing on his rights' or 'she knows her rights" 
which suggest that to know or claim rights is to be 
somewhat aggressive and awkward. When we get to the point in 
a relationship when we start talking of our rights then, it 
/is felt, it is clear that the relationship has broken down, 
j for happy families and good friends do not resort to bills 
of rights. 
However, it should be remembered that in an ideal 
world we would not need declarations of rights for adults 
either, not even' laws against murder, so we should not 
exclude children alone from being rights holders on the 
grounds that claims for rights would be unnecessary in a 
good family relationship. Sadly not all families are happy, 
and although state intervention in a family dispute would not 
be the most desirable state of affairs, it is not 
demonstrably worse than the alternative of children being 
oppressed. I would also argue that this attitude to rights 
is excessively legalistic, seeing an acceptance of children's 
rights resulting only in court cases and state intervention 
in family life. It is true that people sometimes have to 
make a stand and demand their rights, but this is usually 
only a last resort. A general acceptance of children's rights 
would mean that compulsion and confrontation would be the 
exception, in the same way that a growing acceptance of 
women's rights means that woman now go unremarked and 
unopposed into areas where once only those pioneers who 'knew 
their rights' would venture. 
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Apart from Burt's argument that children do not 
need rights, the other arguments against children being rights 
holders which I have considered have been dependent on a 
particular interpretation of what it means to have a right. 
Each argument could be rephrased more accurately in the form 
"if having a right entails X then children do not have 
rights", and my criticism has been that having a right does 
not entail what has been suggested. My interpretation of 
'rights' does entail that children have them, for clearly 
there are ways that children should and should not be 
treated for reasons related to the children and not to the 
effect on others. However, because of the wide variety of 
rights it is possible to have, to say that children are 
rights holders is to say almost nothing. The important 
question to answer is what children's rights are, and to do 
this it is necessary to consider first what rights adults 
have over them. 
The question of whether adults have the right to 
make decisions for children and to restrict their freedom is 
made more complicated by the fact that the adults are 
divided into parents and others - usually the state or its 
various agents. Both, on occasions, claim the right to make 
decisions for children and to restrict their freedom to act 
as they might otherwise choose. Often there are disputes as 
to who has the right to do so, but the question I wish to 
consider first is whether parents have the right to make 
decisions for their children - not whether it is parents rather 
than the state who have that right, but whether parents 
have the right and their children have the corresponding 
obligation to obey. If parents do have this right, rather 
than sometimes being right to restrain their children for 
their own or other people's good, then actions which are 
otherwise morally neutral or even good would be judged wrong 
because forbidden by parents. The right to restrict children's 
freedom would apply not only to dangerous practices such as 
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glue-sniffing or anti-social ones like playing the trumpet at 
dawn but harmless actions such as playing football in the 
park or joining the orchestra. Nor would it be necessary for 
parents to find reasons for their pronouncementst the mere 
fact that it was a parental requirement would be sufficient 
to justify it. 
According to Wringe, the question of what children's 
moral status is, is fundamental to the problem of what 
rights adults have over them. He asks 
" whether children are separate and to some extent morally 
autonomous individuals who must remain temporarily in the 
care and control of others for purely practical reasons, or 
whether they are in some way inherently subject to an 
adult's authority. " (9) 
He concludes it must be the former, because the traditional 
arguments against children having the right or liberty to do 
what they choose (when it is not a wrong action in itself) 
are not convincing. The old answer to the question of why 
parents should have the right to expect obedience from their 
children was that they had given them life, and it was even 
argued that this gave parents the right to take their 
children's lives. Locke criticised this view on the grounds 
that the act of giving does not entail a right to take 
back again, and he pointed out that if giving life carried 
with it the right to receive obedience then this would last 
for as -long as the parent lived, which would probably be 
past the time when the children had children of their own. 
Thus when children became parents they could not have 
absolute authority over their own children because they would 
still be in subjection to their parents. (10) Locke 
acknowledged the right of parents to 'honour' from their 
children but said this was not the same as a right to 
power. 
"Honour thy Father and Mother cannot mean an absolute 
Subjugation to a Sovereign Power, but something else... What 
law of the Magistrate can give a Child liberty not to honour 
his father and mother? 'Tis an Eternal Law annex'd purely 
to the relation Parents and Children and so contains nothing 
of the Magistrate's power in it. " (11) 
Parents seldom claim the right to take their 
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children's lives today, (though there are arguments about 
whether they have the right to deny them life-giving medical 
treatment). More often the question of parental rights over 
their children is about whether they should require obedience 
from their children, sometimes in such important areas as 
religion, education, employment and marriage, or sometimes in 
areas in which there is no question of the child's or 
anyone else's welfare being affected, but which are matters 
of parental preference. I would argue that there can be no 
right, as such, for parents to arrange their children's 
lives, restrict their freedom and expect their complience, but 
sometimes parents will be right to make decisions for their 
children in the children's interest. To make out a case for 
parents having the right to the obedience of their children 
it would be necessary to show that children are incapable of 
making sensible decisions for themselves; that people 
incapable of making sensible decisions for themselves ought to 
have those decisions taken for them by others; and that the 
others who ought to take the decisions are the child's 
parents. The question of children's abilities as compared 
with those of adults will be discussed in the following two 
chapters on paternalism, as will the view that people who 
cannot make decisions for themselves should have them made by 
someone else. For the moment I will say only that the 
acceptance of this view would have consequences which would 
stretch far beyond the subject of parental rights and would 
entail a right of the knowledgeable to the obedience of the 
ignorante unless, that is, it is thought that the parents' 
right to their children's obedience is justified not because 
of their ignorance or irrationality but simply because they 
are children -a different class of beings from even the most 
foolish adult. 
The idea that children are not persons in any 
meaningful sense often accompanies the belief that they are 
something akin to parental property. This view can be seen 
in antipathetical attitudes to children's rights of action and 
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to state intervention in family matters, and it is more often 
assumed than argued. If an argued rebuttal is needed, however, 
and the intuitive counter-assertion that people are never 
property is not sufficient, then Locke's criticism of the claim 
that parents have the right to rule their children is equally 
pertinent to the view of parents as owners. If procreation 
entailed ownership this would last until the death of the 
parent or until given up voluntarily. Therefore, if elderly 
parents do not own their middle-aged children, then nor do any 
parents own their young children. The proprietorial attitude 
towards children was also attacked by Mill who said 
"One would almost think that a man's children were supposed 
to be literally and not metaphorically a part of himself, so 
jealous is opinion of the smallest interference of law with 
his absolute and exclusive control of them. "(12) 
According to Mill, freedom for parents to do just as they 
wished with their own children is a misapplied notion of 
liberty, and although he did not advocate the extension of 
adult liberties to children he made it clear that he did 
not think that one of the liberties that must be guarded is 
the liberty of adults to control the lives of their own 
children. 
Despite the fact that Mill, convinced libertarian 
that he was, argued that parents should have less liberty 
and not more with regard to the upbringing and education of 
their children, and that emphasis should be placed on 
parents' responsibilities towards their children rather than 
their rights over them, the claim that the state should not 
intervene in family life was argued then and is still argued 
today on libertarian grounds. Libertarians are in somewhat of 
a dilemma (though they do not always seem to realise this) 
because on the one hand they are in favour of people having 
control of their own lives and not being coerced by others, 
but on the other hand one of the freedoms they value most 
highly is for adults to bring up their children as they 
wish without the intrusions of the state. They do not 
acknowledge the fact that state 'intrusion' may safeguard 
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children's freedom, while freedom for parents may restrict the 
freedom of children to the point of oppression. In the 
argument between parents and state over who has the right to 
decide what is in the best interests of the child, the 
children's own opinions are usually overlooked. For example, in 
the celebrated case of Wisconsin v Yoder et. al. (13), members 
of the Amish community were allowed to withdraw their children 
from school two years early because they claimed the extra 
education was inimical to their religious beliefs. The issue at 
stake was taken to be the religious freedom of the adultsi 
the views of the children were neither sought nor thought to 
be relevant. 
A similar lack of regard by libertarians for the 
views of children was shown by the American Civil Liberties 
Union (A. C. L. U. ) over the problem of Vietnamese children offered 
for adoption in the U. S. The A. C. L. U. was involved in a 
series of cases in which Vietnamese parents tried to regain 
custody of children in America - children who, in some cases, 
did not want to return to Vietnam. Explaining the A. C. L. U. 's 
position Rena K. Ulliver -says 
'If the right to bear and raise children is a fundamental 
liberty safeguarded by the Bill of Rights, then it cannot be 
abridged by a 'best interests of the child' standard'. (14) 
However I believe she is wrong in assuming that the rights 
of the parents should come before the best interests of the 
child. Though the welfare of children is not the only 
concern of society or parents, it has an extremely high 
priority, and when, in such sad cases, a choice has to be 
made between unhappy children and unhappy parents the decision 
should not be made in favour of the adults on the grounds 
of their parental rights. 
If the justification for adults ever having the 
right to override children's wishes and make decisions for 
them is that this is in children's interests because they 
need protection and guidance, then adults' rights to make 
decisions for children should be limited to making decisions 
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in the child's interest and to the provision of the necessary 
protection and guidance. Their rights will not extend to rights 
over the child, regardless of what is in the child's 
interest. In saying this I as not assuming that the questions 
of what is in a child's best interest and whether the child 
is capable of understanding fully the issues involved in making 
a decision are unproblematic. They are far from that, but 
however difficult the application may be in certain cases the 
principle is simple. If adults have the right to make 
decisions for children on the grounds that children do not 
understand what is at stake and do not appreciate, as adults 
do, what is in their best interest, then, firstly, if children 
do understand the issues and can perceive their interests 
correctly, adults' rights to make decisions for them must 
cease, and secondly, the decisions which adults make for the 
children must be in the children's interest. 
Ulliver's statement illustrates a confusion between two 
ways in which we might have the right to bear and raise 
children. We have that right, but we have it in the same way 
we have the right to marry - the state should not stop us if 
we are able to do iti but having children, like marrying, 
involves others who also have rights. No-one would suggest that 
we have the right to marry anyone we want to regardless of 
the opinion of the person we have chosen, yet that is the 
sort of right Ulliver seems to be claiming for parents, not 
only that they should be able to raise children as they wish, 
free from the interference of the state, but that the other 
partner in the relationship - the child - should have no say 
in the matter either. She falls into the trap of thinking 
that either the state or the parents must determine what 
children do, and she does not consider the possibility of 
children being allowed to make some important decisions about 
their own futures and of the state's 'interference' being 
limited to the role of ensuring that the child's decision is 
put into effect. When the decision is as important as where 
and with whom the child should live the question should not 
-106- 
be "Who has the right to the child? " but "What does the 
child want? " or "What is in its best interest? " 14 the child 
is old enough to understand the issue and have an valid 
opinion on it then that should not be over-ruled on the 
grounds that some-one else has rights over the child. 
The belief that children should be treated as persons 
who should be allowed to make decisions for themselves and not 
as the property of either parents or state was one of the 
main tenets of the Children's rights movement which emerged in 
the '60s. However, the comparison of children with possessions 
has been criticised as rhetoric by Wringe, who points out that 
though there are laws restricting what we may do with our 
property these limitations are not imposed in the interests of 
the property but in the interests of other people. (15) 
Limitations on what we may do with our children, on the 
other hand, are intended to be in the interests of the 
children, and so, Wringe concludes, children are not treated as 
property. It is true that children are not regarded in 
exactly the same light as the television or even the poodle 
but there are parallels. Early legislation requiring parents to 
provide for their children was introduced not for the benefit 
of children but to prevent them becoming a burden to the 
parish. Even if we now accept legislation protecting children 
against cruelty and neglect or requiring them to be educated 
these laws were all criticised when they were first introduced 
as an intrusion into family life and as destructive of 
parental control. It appears to be generally accepted also 
that parents may restrict their children's freedom in ways that 
no adult would accept and not only in circumstances in which 
it is in the children's own interest or to prevent harm to 
others. (One would need an unusually broad interpretation of 
'children's interests' and 'harm to others' to include all 
arbitrary parental prohibitions and requirements. ) Thus while it 
would be an exaggeration to say that children are treated as 
if they were parental property and nothing else, it is true, 
I believe, that they are often treated more like possessions 
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(even if cherished and pampered ones) than individuals with 
their own lives to lead and their own ideas on how they wish 
to lead them. 
If children are not possessions but persons with plans 
and purposes of their own, it must be asked whether there is 
any reason why they should not be as free to carry our 
those plans as adults are. As was stated earlier, if 
children's rights are different from those of adults this must 
be because of some relevant difference between children and 
adults, and the question is whether age constitutes such a 
relevant difference. At first glance age alone does not appear 
to be the sort of difference that Justifies dirrerential 
treatment. Like sex or race it is beyond the control of the 
individual and it is but one characteristic shared by people 
who are in other respects very different from each other. 
Most frequently it is argued that it is not children's age 
alone that makes it right for adults to restrict the liberty 
of children and for children's rights to be defined differently 
from those of adults, but the accompaying characteristics of 
dependency, irresponsibility and irrationality. However, we are 
all dependent to some extent on others, and elderly and 
handicapped people are particularly so, but it is not suggested 
that their rights to liberty should be different from those 
of other adults, except in extreme cases. Irresponsibility and 
irrationality are often found in adults, so if it is 
possesssion of those characteristics which makes restrictions of 
liberty legitimate then there are many adults who should be 
restricted. As Harris says 
ON freedom from control and full political status are 
things we qualify for by acquisition of a range of 
capacities then as soon as anyone possesses those capacities 
they qualify and if they never acquire them they never 
qualify. " (16) 
He concludes that we do not qualify for political or other 
personal liberties on account of our capacities and so we 
have no right to deny freedom from control or the right to 
vote to children on the grounds that they lack them. If we 
do not wish to be stricter with adults, it should be 
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considered whether we should lower the voting age or abolish 
"it altogether. 
It has been suggested that children should be allowed 
to vote or partake in other adult activities as soon as they 
are ready, (17) which, in the absence of qualifying examinations, 
would be as soon as they feel themselves to be ready. There 
is no one conclusive argument 'against this point of view, but 
there are reasons why it would not be right to free children 
entirely from all the restrictions which do not apply to 
adults. If children are to be allowed to vote, be sexually 
active, work for money, and choose whether to attend school we 
must acknowledge and deal with the problem that they may be 
manipulated or pressurized by adults. Children, at least while 
they are smaller and less articulate than adults are vulnerable 
to adult attempts to coerce and manipulate them. Holt, who 
argues for children to be allowed to share adult rights, 
claims that a society which agreed to give children the vote 
and other adult freedoms would not be the sort of society in 
which adults would manipulate, coerce or pressurise children, 
(18) but I find this argument unsatisfactory. 
It seems foolish to argue for specific changes in the 
way our society is organised and then trust that there will 
be a corresponding change of spirit in every adult in that 
society. It is wiser, surely, to follow Rousseau and take men 
as they are and laws as they might be, and sadly some men 
and women as they are are likely to use children in ways 
that are not in the children's interests. We have abolished 
the death penalty but people gather at the scene of a murder 
trial at the defendent. showing that a change in the law does 
not necessarily bring about a different attitude. Similarly we 
might extend the suffrage and other adult rights to children, 
but this will not necessarily bring all adults to see that 
children should be treated as individuals with equal rights of 
choice. Holt tells us of the cruelty of parents to their 
children and of the number who maltreat, murder and neglect 
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them; yet his response to the fears that some parents may 
coerce their children to vote a particular way or exploit 
their labour if they were allowed to work is that such 
sentiments are 
"snobbish and hypocritical. "(19) 
This position is inconsistent. Those who are concerned enough 
about children to want to extend their rights and freedom 
should ensure that they do not leave children with less 
effective freedom because there are more opportunities for 
adults to use their power over children unofficially. A 
wholesale extension of adult rights to children would give 
children some freedoms they may not understand, and could place 
them even more securely in the power of individual adults who 
wish to exploit them. 
The notion of understanding is relevant to the 
question of children's rights because to say we have a right 
to do X is to say we should be allowed to do X if we 
choose, and we cannot be said to have chosen to act in a 
particular way if we do not understand something of the 
meaning of the action and what the choice entails. If children 
are to be free to choose to take on adult rights and take 
part in the debate about how our society sould be run, then 
they must have some understanding of these rights and the 
issues being debated, or what they do when they opt to leave 
home or have a sexual relationship with an adult or vote will 
not be a free act. If we consider the example of voting it 
will be acknowledged that voting is not simply putting a cross 
by a name it is an action with a meaning, and, while it 
is not necessary to know all the political implications of a 
particular vote, unless a person understands the meaning of 
putting a cross by a name they are not voting. So we might 
give children the right to enter a polling booth and place a 
cross by a name from the first moment they could hold a 
pencil, but until they understand what they are doing they 
would not be voting. 
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I have often carried out votes in infant classes to 
decide such issues as which songs to include in the end of 
term concert and the elections can be chaotic. Many children 
do not understand that they are , being asked to choose 
between alternatives so their hands shoot up for every song 
they like, and if I manage to clamp down on that electoral 
malpractice the first song on the list always wins. The 
minority who do not like the final choice are 
uncomprehendingly aggrieved because they thought we were 
choosing their favourite song and they cannot understand how 
something they do not like can be their favourite song! For 
all its apparent simplicity voting does not come easily to 
the under sevens, and to extend the right to vote to this 
age group would do nothing more than give an extra vote to 
the parents who could coach their children on where to 
place their cross. 
It should be noted, however, that I have spoken of 
young children, and of a wholesale extension of adult rights 
to them. The argument does not, a fortiori, extend to 
children who understand what they are doing and are less 
likely to be coerced by their parents or other adults. 
However, the problem still arises of how to decide when 
people should assume adult rights. What must be decided is 
whether there is greater injustice in denying adult rights to 
all children -below a certain age, allowing them to those 
who pass a qualification test, or allowing them to all, 
including those unable to understand or exercise them. If age 
is the criterion that is chosen then any age that is fixed 
upon will will discriminate unfairly against those below the 
age who would be capable of exercising their rights wisely. 
Harris says that 
"We must remember that to deny someone control of their own 
lives is to offer them a most profound insult, not to 
mention the injury which the frustration of their wishes and 
the setting at naught of their own plans for themselves will 
add. Perhaps we should conduct annual examinations from an 
early age to be sure that we do as little of this sort of 
damage as possible? " (20) 
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However, I would suggest that the insult and inury would be 
greater from being examined and judged inadequate than from 
being judged too young. 
If political knowledge rather than age were the 
criterion for being allowed to vote then there would be the 
danger that any test that was introduced to find out who 
was sufficiently well-informed about political issues to be 
trusted with a vote might discriminate against a section of 
the community - most probably the poor and ill-educated. This 
would substitute one injustice for another. If people have 
to qualify for adult rights, then unless a test could be 
devised that was more accurate and free from human error and 
bias than any test has ever been, there would also 
certainly be instances of injustice through misapplication of 
the test. Even if testing techniques were vastly improved and 
the possibility of corruption could be eliminated, individuals 
and groups would still be treated unjustly under such a 
system because they would be denied rights and excluded from 
playing their part in their society by other members of that 
society imposing their own standards and values. There is a 
manifest injustice in excluding people from so many important 
areas of private and public life on grounds which others 
have selected and which the rejects have no chance to 
change. If certain rights are basic, human rights (the way 
all human beings should be treated simply because they are 
human) then these should not have to earned by the 
demonstration of certain skills. The third possibility, then, 
is to say that if all members of a society should have the 
same basic rights to make decisions regarding their private 
lives and participate in public life, then children too must 
be allowed these same rights. But this entails giving rights 
to some children who will not understand what is involved 
and it carries the risk that relaxing the laws about what 
children are allowed to do may place them more securely in 
the power of individual adults who are In a position to 
control them. 
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The argument that restricting children more than 
adults is not unjust because children will be granted adult 
rights eventually has been much criticised. (21) It is rightly 
pointed out that imprisoning everyone for several years could 
not be justified on the grounds that it is everyone who is 
imprisoned and that eventually they will all be released, 
and that individual instances of injustice do not cease to 
be injustices when they are multiplied. However, there is a 
sense in which a deprivation equally shared is considered to 
be less unfair than one meted out to a few individuals or 
groups, particularly if it is felt to be necessary. National 
Service, however much it was disliked by those who had to 
do it, was considered less unfair than the American draft 
for the Vietnam war which drew most heavily on the 
unemployed and those without college education. Similarly I 
would argue that the restrictions on children's freedom which 
are necessary to protect those who need it are less unfair 
when they are shared by all than they would be if attempts 
were to be made to sort out the competent from the 
incompetent. Discrimination on the grounds of age is rough 
and readyi it does not distinguish between those who are 
rational and mature in outlook, would drink moderately, have 
responsible sexual relationships and who are fortunate in 
having parents who would not exploit them, and those others 
who need protection from adults and from their own 
inexperience. In this it is less than just to some 
individuals. The inflexibility of law, however, is not 
confined to the the question of children's rights. Laws are 
general and therefore cannot make fine discriminations and 
though this is sometimes cause for concern when we feel that 
particular extenuating circumstances should be taken into 
account, it is also one of the strengths of laws. Their 
generality rules out partiality and arbitrary judgments. They 
have, at least, the virtue of letting us know where we 
stand, and although laws relating to the age at which we 
are allowed to do certain things restrict our freedom, they 
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also make it clear that after the stated age we are free 
to do those things. We do not usually have to prove we are 
capable or make out a special case and hope for a 
favourable judgement: we have our adult rights simply because 
we have lived a certain number of years. Discrimination an 
the grounds of age, unlike discrimination on the grounds of 
sex or race is not imposed by one group on another cohesive 
group. It consists of restrictions to which we are all 
subject at one stage of our lives and from which almost all 
of us escape. If these restrictions are necessary to protect 
children from worse injustice then I believe they are 
justified. The crucial question, then, is whether some 
restrictions are necessary for children in addition to those 
imposed on adults. 
Despite remarkable stories of children surviving 
without adult help it is still the case that because of 
their size, inexperience and less-developed rationality they 
are more vulnerable than most adults and need protection and 
guidance. No-one would deny that this is true of babies, but 
the problem is that children grow in the experience and 
understanding necessary to exercise adult rights and withstand 
adult manipulation only gradually. Holt argues that what 
children need are not special rights and protection but the 
same rights and protection as the rest of usi(22) the 
protection of the law and the right to sue those who damage 
our interests. However, though I would agree that this would 
sometimes help to protect children, I believe they need 
additional protection, because the inexperience which might 
make them vulnerable to those who wish to exploit them would 
also be a disadvantage when they tried to claim their 
rights. The probability is that they would not be able to 
assert their ordinary rights as citizens even as effectively 
as adults can. If children have special needs and 
disabilities related to their age, then it is no more unjust 
to ensure that these needs are met than it is to 
discriminate in favour of other people who are handicapped in 
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some ways by ensuring that their particular needs are met. 
As Houlgate argues (23), lack of the capacity for rational 
choice is a handicap which prevents people from having an 
equal chance of the good life, and so restricting the 
liberty of those who are handicapped in this way is not to 
impose a burden on them, but to provide them with a benefit 
of protection and guidance. 
Restricting children's freedom, then, in ways 
different from those in which adults' freedom is restricted 
must be in response to the child's need. Of course, the 
concept of need is itself problematic, and most adults who 
restrict children's freedom say (and sometimes really believe) 
that they are doing it for the child's own good. If 
individual circumstances are to be taken into account then 
important decisions in children's lives will be left to 
individual adults, because general rules cannot be found that 
will apply to all children. This obviously leaves the grounds 
for decisions on restricting children's freedom rather vague, 
and there will be much scope for individual value judgments. 
However, laws stipulating that all children should or should 
not be allowed to do X could not take into acount the 
maturity and capabilities of individual children. Inevitably, 
if we accept that children's freedom should ever be 
restricted there will be disagreement about when that 
restriction is justified, because decisions on the important 
factors - the children's needs, interests and ability to choose 
rationally for themselves - are subjective. Children do not 
become rational individuals with plans and purposes of their 
own at one obvious point in their livesi they do so 
gradually, and are able to make sensible choices in some 
areas before they can do so in others. We know that making 
mistakes has educational value, and so children should 
sometimes be given the opportunity to learn from their own 
mistakes, but sometimes the dangers of allowing children to 
make their own decisions and mistakes will be judged to be 
too great. Therefore many of the arguments about children's 
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rights are not about whether children are inherently subject 
to adults and whether as a group they should have any 
rights of action, but about the age at which they should be 
free to make certain decisions. Should twelve year olds be 
allowed to choose to have their ears pierced, be tattoed or 
buy cigarettes? Should people of fourteen choose the subjects 
they study at school, or even whether they have to go to 
school at all? These are examples of the many questions 
asked about children's rights, and the children's rights 
campaigners correctly stressed that 'childhood' today is now 
prolonged far beyond what was normal only one or two 
centuries ago. Without wishing to suggest that previous 
generations were right to fix the age at which people start 
work at twelve, seven or even three, the existence of 
different standards should at least make us question our own 
and consider whether children ought to be allowed greater 
liberty to make their own decisions. 
If restriction of children's freedom were based 
solely on genuine need and the promotion of the children's 
interests, I believe it would be less extensive than is 
common today. There would be certain areas of choice 
(personal appearance for example) where there was no question 
of harm to the child, which could be extended to even the 
youngest children capable of expressing a preference, and 
others where the recognition that people between the ages of, 
say, twelve and eighteen have more in common with adults 
than younger children would lead to an extension of their 
rights of action. However, sometimes children will need to be 
protected from themselves and the consequences of their own 
actions, and then adults will be obliged to restrict the 
children's freedom. Knowing that there is no perfect solution, 
concerned adult members of a society will be aware that new 
laws may be necessary to protect children, or that old ones 
no longer serve their original purpose and should be 
changed, but if children need protection and guidance beyond 
that needed by most adults, and if adults have an obligation 
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to provide this, then we can say 
that children have a 
right to this protection, and a right 
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According to J. S. Mill 
the only purpose for which power can rightfully be 
exercised over any member of a civilized community against 
his will is to prevent harm to others. His own good, either 
physical or moral is not a sufficient reason. He cannot 
rightfully be compelled to do or forbear because it will be 
better for him to do so, because it will make him happier, 
because is the opinion of others it would be wise or even 
right. " (1) 
In this chapter I want to consider the claim that the only 
legitimate use of power over an individual is to prevent 
harm to others. I shall suggest that we are sometimes 
justified in compelling or restraining others in their own 
interest - that is, in exercising paternalism - and that we 
have responsibilities to them beyond those of trying to 
persuade them and leaving them alone. Like all moral 
judgements this cannot be proved, but if we believe our 
reponsibilities do not go beyond persuasion the consequences 
would be far-reaching, as can be seen if we imagine a 
society in which it was considered wrong to do any of the 
following: stop a three year-old child from drinking bleach, 
a twelve year-old from going on a glue-sniffing binge, an 
intoxicated friend from breaking a window or writing a letter 
of resignation while in a temper, or a mentally retarded 
person from signing a damaging contract. 
In fact, although Mill claims that his one simple 
principle is that prevention of harm to others is the only 
purpose for which power can rightfully be exercised, he too 
admitted some exceptions (children and people from 'backward 
countries') and, once exceptions to the general rule have 
been made, it is necessary to say in what relevant way 
these are different, and then to accept that whenever and 
wherever similar relevant differences exist they will also be 
exceptions to the rule. Mill does not go into these details 
(and nor shall I until the next chapter) but simply asserts 
that paternalism for minors and backward peoples is justified 
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because 
"Those who are still in a state to require being taken care 
of by others must be protected against their own actions as 
well as against external injury" (2) 
We do not have to suppose that Mill thought anyone under 
twenty one or from a 'backward nation' was incapable of 
choosing their life plans rationally while everyone over 
twenty-one from a 'civilized' nation did nothing else. His 
purpose in writing "On liberty" was not to discuss the 
problem of just when people become rational, or even what to 
do with the minority who never do, but to make a plea for 
freedom from interference for adults, most of whom are 
fairly rational most of the time. 
Mill's modified claim, then, is that paternalism is 
never justified for civilized adults, but even this is 
unusually strong and definite for Mill whose pronouncements 
are usually hedged round with qualifications. I believe it is 
too strong, being based on an overconfident assumption that 
as individuals we know, when we make choices, what the 
consequences of our choosing might be. As was argued in 
Chapter 3, what looks like a free choice may be the result 
of subtle manipulation or undue influence as well as plain 
ignorance. Hart points out, rightly, that since Mill's time 
there has been 
"a general decline in the belief that individuals know their 
own interests best, and ... an increased awareness of factors which diminish the significance to be attached to an 
apparantly free choice. " (3) 
He accuses Mill of mistakenly endowing people with 
"too much of the psychology of a middle-aged man whose 
desires are relatively fixed, not liable to be artificially 
stimulated by external influeces; who knows what he wants 
and what gives him satisfaction or happiness; and who 
pursues these things when he can. " (4) 
In fact we do not have to look far to find 
people doing things the predictable consequences of which will 
make them unhappy, and if this is the case then a 
utilitarian such as Mill should be in favour of some 
intervention which will prevent unhappiness. However, Mill was 
not a consistent utilitarian on this point, his concern for 
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liberty being ao great that he felt coercion was not 
justified even if it did make people happier. To be 
consistent a utilitarian who disapproved of paternalism would 
have to argue that, a priori, the happiness of being allowed 
to go to the devil in one's own way is always greater 
than any happiness that might follow from paternalistic 
compulsion. However, this would not be convincing as it is 
not hard to find empirical evidence to the contrary. For 
example the day after the wearing of safety belts in cars 
was made compulsory, the news media featured a man whose car 
had overturned. It was, he said, the first time he had 
ever worn a safety belt, he would not have done so but for 
the law, and without it he would almost certainly have died 
or been seriously injured. Naturally he was delighted that 
the law had compelled him in his own interest, and I am 
sure that he, and everyone else whose lives have been saved 
by that law, feel that being deprived of a little freedom, 
and perhaps even a little self-respect, is a small price to 
pay for the benefit of being alive. 
Yet even if paternalism can be defended on 
utilitarian grounds, and if Mill was over-optimistic in his 
belief that people always know best what is best for 
themselves, we are still uneasy about compelling people in 
their own interests. Paternalism seems to fit badly with out 
ideas of equality and liberty and we are wary of it. I 
think part of our mistrust of paternalism is that we are 
aware of the dangers of allowing people to use power over 
others on grounds that are hard to define and for reasons 
which owe much to subjective value judgments. It is not easy 
in practice to distinguish between what A knows will make B 
happier, what A thinks will make B happier and what A 
believes ought to make B happier, and there is also the 
danger that A may use a general acceptance of paternalism to 
do things which he says are for the benefit of B but are 
really in his own interests. Then again, if we acknowledge 
that individuals may be mistaken as to which is the best 
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course of action to pursue (and this human fallibility is 
part of the rationale of paternalism) then we must accept 
that this may be true of the paternalist as well. It is 
not only B who may be ignorant, under stress or subject to 
illigitimate persuasions this may also be true of A. There 
are no experts in living to whom we would hand over the 
running of our lives, as we might entrust our car to a 
mechanic or our appendix to a surgeon. 
To acknowledge that there may be difficulties in 
distinguishing genuine paternalism from its counterfeit is not, 
of course, to show that there is anything wrong with 
paternalism. To say that A may be mistaken, hypocritical or 
corrupt does not tell us what, if anything, would be wrong 
with his actions if they were prompted by a sincere wish to 
help B and a correct assessment of what is in B's 
interests. I make no apology, however, for mentioning the 
practical difficuties and problems of paternalism, for Mill 
was also concerned to point out that state interference on 
behalf of the individual was usually ineffective as well as, 
in his opinion, morally unjustified. Paternalism is a use of 
power over other people and so it is understandable that we 
should be worried about its potential misuse. However, 
although some of our suspicion of paternalism comes from the 
fear that the power of the paternalist may be misused, there 
is also some doubt as to whether even genuine concern for 
the best interests of others is a sufficient justification 
for compelling them to do what we and not they have 
chosen. 
There appear to be two different and conflicting 
sets of ideas and no clear way of resolving the conflict 
between them. On the one hand is the belief that there is 
something of value for individuals in making their own 
choices, simply because they are their own, and that for 
these always to be made by someone else, no matter how 
wise, would be in some way demeaning. Together with this 
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goes the knowledge that, as a matter of fact, we learn to 
make wise decisions by sometimes making foolish ones, and so, 
if we are ever going to learn we must have the opportunity 
to make our own mistakes. On the other hand, most people, 
even Mill, believe that there are some circumstances in which 
we are justified in coercing people for their own good, and 
that anyone who is concerned about the welfare of others 
should not always stand by and watch them come to some 
predictable and preventable harm. What appears to be needed 
and what many have attempted to formulate is a principle or 
set of principles which lay down the conditions under which 
paternalism is justified, thus enabling us to secure the 
benefits of allowing some limited paternalism and to avoid or 
minimise its dangers. (That paternalism should be limited 
appears not to be in doubt. I have not encountered one 
claim that we are always justified in coercing people 
according to our ideas of what is good for them. ) 
Mill's principle is that 
"Despotism is a legitimate mode of government in dealing 
with barbarians, provided the end be their improvement and 
the means justified by actually achieving that end. "(5) 
Other suggestions are that paternalism is justified if 
1) there is no alternative way of achieving the same end; 
2) there is good reason to believe that the person coerced would or 
will consent to the paternalistic interference; 
3) the coerced person is helped to realise his or her own ends; 
4) the judgement or desire which is overruled has been 
clouded in some relevant way, such as by ignorance, 
irrationality, emotional stress, inexperience or some other 
such cause; 
5) the harm to be avoided is serious 
6) the paternalism restricts present freedom but enlarges the 
possibility of future choice; 
7) the value of what would have been chosen is not great; 
It is necessary to consider these suggestions in some detail 
to see if any of them provides a justification of 
paternalism. 
-124- 
The requirements that paternalism should firstly be 
effective and secondly be the only effective way of achieving 
the same end may seem inappropriate criteria in a 
consideration of whether paternalism is justified because they 
refer to the practical questions of whether it works and 
whether it works better than anything else. However I believe 
they are important, for the question of whether paternalism 
works (i. e. does secure advantages for the coerced person) is 
not merely empirical and therefore irrelevant to a judgement 
of whether it is justified. The aim of paternalism is to 
benefit the person who is coerced and if the result of As 
paternalism is disasterous for B (and if any sensible person 
could have guessed that it would be) then the cry "I only 
meant it for the best" will not serve as a justification. 
The question of whether there is an alternative way of 
achieving the same end is also relevant because if we admit 
that there are disadvantages in coercing people we must 
consider whether we could secure the advantages of paternalism 
another way. Dworkin considers this to be sufficiently 
important to make it one of his two principles of justified 
paternalism, saying that if there is another way of 
accomplishing the same end we should use it no matter how 
expensive it may be. (6) 
As there are practical disadvantages to paternalistic 
coercion as well as moral scruples about its use, it is 
clearly preferable to use other methods of benefitting the 
object of paternalism if this is possible. However, Dworkin's 
principle that other ways should be used regardless of 
expense is too strong. A point will surely be reached at 
which the expense of an alternative method is sufficiently 
high to make it prohibitive. For example, a government which 
wanted drivers to wear safety belts would, following Dworkin's 
principle, have to be prepared to conduct personal interviews 
with every driver individually, pointing out the dangers, 
explaining the evidence and trying to convince the drivers of 
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the wisdom of wearing their belts before they could bring 
in paternalistic legislation. If the powers of persuasion of 
junior civil servants were not successful, then presumably the 
Ministers of Transport and Health would have to try before 
coercion could legitimately be used. The possibility that the 
time and money involved could be spent more profitably, and 
that it ought to be, cannot be ruled out - as it would be 
by Dworkin's principle. 
As paternalism is concerned with making people do 
what they have not chosen to do, first thoughts would 
suggest that paternalism and consent have little to do with 
each other. However Dworkin argues that 
the basic notion of consent is important and seems to me 
the only acceptable way of trying to delimit an area of 
justified paternalism. " (7) 
To overcome the apparent incompatibility Dworkin stretches the 
notion of consent so that it contains prior and retrospective 
consent to specific instances of paternalism, consent to a 
government which may make paternalistic laws, and consent to 
general aims which may require paternalism for their 
achievement. His example of Odysseus, begging in advance to 
have his eyes and ears stopped even if he later says he 
has changed his mind, shows prior consent clearly, but it 
illustrates what is a minority of cases of paternalism, for 
we do not usually ask in advance for specific future 
restrictions. However, we quite frequently look back and say 
we are glad we were made to learn French or wear a safety 
belt, though we did not wish to at the time, because we 
now appreciate the benefits. Thus we give subsequent or 
retrospective consent to our compulsion. But does the presence 
of this subsequent consent mean that the paternalism was 
necessarily justified? I believe not. 
Firstly, it is possible that, although the person 
who was compelled subsequently approves of the compulsion, 
the beneficial results might have been achieved by other, 
non-coercive, methods. Secondly, and more importantly I 
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believe, the person who gives the retrospective consent may 
have been so changed by the coercion that s/he is not able 
to do anything but consent, because the restriction and 
compulsion were geared to obtaining subsequent consent and, if 
successful, will have created a person who is incapable of 
refusing that consent. For example, people who have been 
brainwashed or indoctrinated may subsequently approve of this, 
believing that it was a justifiable method of introducing 
them to 'the truth'. Even in less extreme cases we may 
subsequently approve of coercion that was either unnecessary 
or predominately harmful. Human beings are resilient and often 
manage to extract something of value from the most unlikely 
or unpleasant experiences, but it does not follow that a 
paternalist would be justified in creating these circumstances 
in order to produce that 'something of value'. Listening to 
talk about war experiences or even school bullying, it 
becomes clear that many people believe they have gained 
something from these experiences, but it would not be 
justifiable to start wars or encourage bullying in order to 
foster admirable qualities such as fortitude. Even if they 
are right about the value of their experiences, perhaps as 
well as gaining something they have also lost something of 
which they are unaware. The six of the best which "made me 
what I am' may have done just that, and have gained 
subsequent approval, but it may have left the subject unable 
to appreciate that its main effect has been destructive 
rather than beneficial. I would argue that when we are 
considering paternalism, the likelihood that the person to be 
coerced will later approve of their coercion is an important 
factor in the decision of whether the paternalism is 
justified, but the probability, or even the certainty, of 
retrospective consent is not sufficient to justify coercion. 
Indoctrinators and brain-washers restrict and coerce 
in order to impose their own conception of the good on 
their victims. It might be thought, therefore, that it is 
this imposition of values which is wrong and that compulsion 
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which assists those who are compelled to achieve their ends 
would be justified. I do not believe, however, that 'helpful' 
paternalism is always justified, nor that imposing a 
conception of the good is always wrong. My daughter has 
occasionally asked me to 'make' her do some music practice 
when an exam is in the offing because she feared that 
without a little coercion she would not do enough. So far I 
have agreed, and the coercion needed to help her achieve 
her conception of the good (passing the exam) has been 
minimal. However, I can imagine a situation in which I might 
rightly refuse to turn the house into a battlefield and 
myself into a tyrant to help her achieve her ends, 
particularly if I believed her long-term interests would be 
better served if I imposed my conception of the good, which 
involves learning the value of self-motivation and 
self-discipline. 
Some of the situations in which we might most 
readily agree that paternalism is justified are those in 
which the paternalist's conception of the good is imposeds 
when dealing with the very young, the suicidal or the 
mentally ill, for example. We may make the assumption that 
those we coerce will come to appreciate our compulsion when 
they are older or less disturbed, but we are not helping 
them achieve the ends they have acknowledged, for it is 
because we believe they are mistaken in their values that we 
judge them to be in need of paternalism. Odysseus did not 
want to hear the sirens, so he was compelled to do what he 
really wanted, and this was known because he had made his 
wishes explicit. Usually, however, we do not have such a 
convenient statement about what others want to achieve and so 
we have to make assumptions about what they will want, or 
would want if they were fully rational and aware of all the 
facts. It is when we do this, that we run the risk of 
being mistaken. Some of our assumptions, of course, are quite 
reasonable. It is because we assume that people do not want 
to cut their faces on their car windscreens that most 
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people accept a paternalistic law insisting we wear seat 
belts. This law restricts our freedom, but it does so to 
help us achieve our own ends and in accordance with our own 
wishes - the wish not to be thrown through the windscreen. 
If we stop someone committing suicide, however, we are not 
helping them to achieve their own ends and are imposing our 
own conception of the good - continued life - on them. 
There is always the possibility of a mistake when we 
assume we know what other people want, but the difficulty 
is compounded when we try to imagine what they would want 
(if they were not irrational or ignorant) or what they ought 
to want. Even if it were possible to be certain of what 
the rational thing to do would be on every occasion, there 
would be little individual freedom if the wise and 
knowledgeable were always Justified in coercing the ignorant 
and foolish. As it is there are no experts whose views on 
what it is rational to desire should be followed, for 
individuals and individual tastes vary. In an attempt to 
overcome the problem of choices which might appear to be 
irrational but are genuine wishes and individual preferences, 
Hodson distinguishes between unencumbered and rational 
decisions. (8) An unencumbered decision is not the same as 
that of Dworkin's rational will or the choice of a fully 
rational person. It is the decision of an individual, but 
unencumbered by such factors as ignorance, emotional stress, 
undue influence or mental illness. The advantage of this 
distinction is that it places emphasis on the choices of 
individuals rather than on a fixed view of what any and 
every rational person would want. Thus we could accept as 
unencumbered the decision of a mountaineer who claimed not to 
want to die to make a hazardous ascent. An unencumbered 
decision's is an individual's personal decision, and 
individuals vary in what they want and think important. 
However, I think the notion of unencumbered decisions 
is less useful than it first appears, because the value 
judgment on what it is rational to want is simply replaced 
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by another value Judgment on whether the decision is 
encumbered. On one level it is simple and straightforward to 
see if ignorance has encumbered a decision. For example, if 
you do not know that smoking is dangerous then your decision 
to smoke is encumbered. However, in other circumstances the 
judgment that ignorance has encumbered a decision will be 
influenced by the values of the person making the Judgment. 
I cannot be the only person who sometimes feels that if 
those who disagree with as knew what I know they would come 
to think as I do on the disputed subject. It can only be 
their ignorance or perhaps the undue influence of others 
which prevents them from acknowledging the evils of this 
system or the dangers of that course of action. Now 
natural, then, for a powerful would-be paternalist to take 
any -disagreement as a sign that Judgments have been 
encumbered, and to overrule them. Also, if a decision is 
wrong " then it Bust be encumbered, by ignorance, false 
reasoning or both. As none of us has perfect knowledge, all 
of our Judgments are encumbered to some extent, and so it 
cannot be a sufficient condition of justified paternalism that 
the judgment or choice that is overruled was encumbered in 
some way. 
So far, in my attempt to discover when paternalism 
is Justified, I have been concerned mainly with certain 
features - of the person whose freedom is to be restricted, 
such as whether they : consent to the restriction or are 
incapable of making rational decisions. However, it is 
possible that the justification for paternalism lies not in 
something about the person whose freedom is restricted but in 
the nature of the act which is forbidden or prevented, and 
it is to this suggestion that I now turn, considering first 
whether it is the seriousness of possible harm that 
Justifies paternalistic intervention. It might be questioned 
whether the size of the disaster to be averted should sake 
any difference when a -principle is a stake, for we do not 
say that people ought to keep big promises and not tell big 
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lies but that little ones do not matter. However, I 
believe that in the case of paternalism it is relevant for 
paternalise, unlike, ' perhaps, truth telling or promise keeping, 
is never desirable as such, but merely sometimes better than 
the alternativesi we never celebrate its but see only if we 
can excuse it. A decision on when paternalism is more 
desirable than the alternatives must be influenced, then, by 
what the alternatives are, and so the question of whether 
the intervention will prevent serious harm or a minor mistake 
is relevant to its justification. 
Mill was right to say that our own decisions have 
a special value simply because they are our own, regardless 
of the content of the decision. The taking of decisions 
which affect us is inextricably linked with our self-esteem 
and so any over-ruling of our personal decisions has to be 
for important reasons. However, for most people, injury, death 
and financial ruin are serious misfortunes to be avoided (or 
in the case of death, postponed) when possible, so if we 
have to weigh the value of a life against the more nebulous 
notion of the self-esteem which comes from making our own 
decisions, we usually decide in favour of the life - not 
least because when that has gone the self-esteem and 
possibility of making other decisions has gone also. The 
calculation would be different if instead of saving life we 
were preventing a small blunder or minor inconvenience. It 
might be noted at this point that the various factors to be 
considered in a decision of whether paternalism is justified 
are not entirely separate. The possibility of death or 
serious injury, for example, would be regarded by most people 
as a misfortune and so any paternalistic intervention which 
prevented it, would assist the coerced person to achieve his 
or her own ends and would probably receive retrospective 
consent. The seriousness of the harm to be avoided is 
related also to the criterion of enlarging or enhance future 
freedom, which Dworkin considers to be very important to a 
justification of paternalism. (8) Certainly people who are 
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alive, healthy and well-informed will have a wider opportunity 
for future choice than the dead, injured or ignorant and so 
present restrictions which preserve life or promote health 
and knowledge may make- for greater future freedom. However, 
the increase of future freedom cannot be a sufficient 
condition for justified paternalism or we would be constantly 
compelled to keep our options open. There are many things 
we do which produce irreversible changes in our lives and 
restrict our future freedoms we take and give up jobs, get 
married and have children, and these cannot be delayed 
indefinitely for the sake of enlarged future choice. Making 
decisions and accepting the inevitable consequences are part 
of what it is to live a rational and responsible life. It 
cannot be that preventing people from making decisions now 
that would close options for thee in the future is always 
justified, for the consequences of choices made now will 
inevitably influence and restrict the possibility of making 
different choices later. 
The final factor which I mentioned as relevant to a 
decision about the justification of paternalism does not 
refer exclusively to the act which is enforced or forbidden 
or to the person whose 'choice is overruled or prevented. It 
is the consideration of the value to the person who is 
coerced or what s/he is forced to give up. Firstly, 'of' 
course, the person has to forgo makin an autonomous choice, ---. - 
but secondly s/he has to give up whatever that choice would 
have been. If it is believed that freedom of choice itself 
is the crucial issue then the second consideration - the ". 
value of what would have been chosen - need not concern us 
at all. If it is the choosing that is all-inportant and not__ 
what is chosen, then choosing a brand of washing powder it-, 
as important as choosing a government, and being forbidden to 
watch Driller Killer as important as being prevented from -. w. 
hearing that the local beach is contaminated with radio-active 
waste. It is because this is not the case, that I do 
consider that the value of what would have been chosen is 
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relevant to a decision of whether paternalism is justified. 
If we assume that motor cyclists do not usually-. -. _ 
want to die then we might agree with a law enforcing the 
wearing of crash helmets. For most riders this would involve. --,. 
only minor inconvenience and the cost of the helmet, but for 
motor cyclists who are also Sikhs it also involves 
disregarding a requirement of their religion. The benefit -" 
would be the same but the value of what has to be given 
up would be such greater. Similarly a law requiring the 
wearing of safety belts is intended to save lives, and a 
law forbidding hang gliding, mountaineering or pot-holing might 
have the same intention. However, while the first law would 
necessitate only installing safety belts and remembering to "ý. 
use them, the second law would entail adventurous spirits- 
having to give up one of their great pleasures in life. The. 
benefit of increased safety might be the sase, but the. ^_. 
value of what had to be given up would be much greater. 
However, it is not the case that paternalism is justified as 
long as the people whose freedom is restricted do not have-. _ 
to give up anything they- value greatly. Once again I would 
argue that this relevant factor is not a deciding factor, 
and, like the other considerations mentioned so far, neither 
a necessary nor suficient condition for justified paternalism... 
In this attempt to find a principle of Justified 
paternalism I have considered some features of the person 
whose freedom is restricted and also the nature of the act 
which -is forbidden. I have not yet looked at the 
paternalist g, except to say that we are rightly wary of 
powerful people who claim to know what is good for others 
and to have the right to enforce their views. The very word - M. 
'paternalist' conjures up- a picture of an interfering 
busybody. like Lady Catherine De Burgh who 
'whenever any of the cottagers were disposed to be 
quarrelsome# discontented or too poor... sallled forth into the village to settle their differences, silence their 
complaints and scold them into harmony and plenty. ' 19) 
It is clear that Lady Catherine enjoys managing other 
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people's affairs, and one cannot imagine her worrying about 
the morality of her interference, or thinking that the 
cottagers' wishes, plans and purposes were as important to 
them as hers were her, and as worthy of consideration. In 
short, paternalists of her type do not regard the objects of 
their paternalism as persons to be respected, and I suggest- 
that respect for persons is essential to a justification of 
paternalism. 
By this I do not mean that it is a separate. 
criterion - number eight on my list - which we look for and 
assess in the same way as the others. It underlies these- 
criteria and they are ways in which it may be expressed. 
For example, if we respect someone as a person but believe 
that circumstances are auch that we should overrule their 
wishes in their own interest, we would want to feel that 
they would eventually consent to our action, but could not 
engineer this consent by destroying their ability to withhold 
it. Similarly we would want to enlarge their future prosects 
rather than restrict them and, respecting their aims and 
desires, only in extremis would we impose our ends on them. 
Aware of the dangers of paternalism, and the value of. 
autonomous decisions we would seek to persuade and convince 
if this were possible, and only resort to paternalism if 
there seemed no other reasonable way of benefitting the 
object of our paternalism. 
Respect for persons excludes the possibility of - 
condescension, tyrrany or using people as means to an end 
they do not share. It provides the basis of a paternalism. 
based on fundamental equality, though clearly in one sense 
paternalism does not belong in a relationship between equals. . ti _. 
Within the relationship one person is, perhaps, far-sighted, 
experienced and powerful while the other is not, but that 
does not alter the fact that the paternalist should see the 
other as a person with plans, wishes and ends of his or---... 
her own, and a right to freedom as great as that of the 
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paternalist. However, as was argued in Chapter 6, we do not - 
have an absolute right to freedom, and we do have 
obligations and responsibilities towards other members of the 
community. Sometimes a conflict may arise between our 
reponsibility for the welfare of others and our obligation to 
respect their freedom, but when those others are young 
and/or ignorant, irrational or in danger I believe our _ 
responsibility for their welfare will sometimes have to extend 
to over-ruling their wishes. It does not extend to .. 
considering then unimportant or irrelevant. There are no -ý_ 
absolute criteria by which we can judge when paternalistic - 
acts are justified, and no definitive list of the- 
paternalistic behaviour and attitudes consistent with respecting 
persons. we can only try to balance the value to 
individuals of making an autonomous choice, the seriousness of 
the harm from which we seek to protect thee, the likelihood-- 
of their subsequent consent to our compulsion, the value to 
them of what must be given up and the aceptability (or- 
of alternatives, the state of mind of the person otherwise) 
whose decision is to be over-ruled, the possibility of 
protecting them or promoting their welfare by non-coercive -. 
means, the possibility that we may be wrong in our ,.... 
assessment of their interests, and then make our decision. If 
we are sincere in our belief that we are justified in our 
action, then we should be prepared for others to act in a 
similar way to protect us and promote our welfare also. 
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In the last chapter I claimed that paternalism can 
be justified by reference to two notions - responsibility for 
the welfare of other members of the community and respect 
for persons. I argued that we could have no right to 
intervene in other people's personal decisions unless it is 
the case that we have soae responsibiity for their welfare, 
and although the existence of this responsibility cannot be 
proved the consequences of assuming that it does not exist 
would generally be found unacceptable. At the same time I 
accepted that condoning the use of power by individuals or 
groups over others less powerful than themselves was 
potentially dangerous, and eight reinforce inequalities of 
power and freedom. I argued that for the paternalism to be 
justified it must not only be in the interests of the 
coerced but that the paternalist oust respect the persons who 
are coerced as individuals with purposes of their own and 
as equals in importance if not in knowledge or experience. I 
said that there are no absolute criteria by which we can 
judge when paternalism is justified and no definitive list of 
the paternalistic behaviour consistent with respecting persons. 
However, I claimed that there were certain factors (such as 
the likelihood of subsequent consent, ignorance or lack of 
understanding of unperceived danger etc. ) the presence of which 
would support a claim that paternalism was justified in a 
particular instance. 
I now wish to argue that paternalism towards 
children can be justified in the same way and with reference 
to the same notions of responsibility for the welfare of 
others and respect for persons. It would not be necessary to 
sake this point if it were not widely assumed that 
paternalism towards adults and children are very different 
activities, the former rarely if ever Justified, and the 
latter self-evidently so. Although those who are antipathetic 
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to paternalism towards adults sometimes attempt to explain why 
their principles should not apply to all, more frequently 
the assumption is made that the basis for the difference in 
treatment is so obvious and unproblematic that it needs no 
explanation, and so the particular problem of paternalism for 
children is either ignored or also dismissed in a brief 
aside in which the author paints out that what has been 
argued applies only to adults. When I say that paternalism 
for children is a particular problem I mean, of course, 
that it is and should be recognised as a particular problem 
for those who claim paternalism is right for children but 
not for adults, for they have to Justify treating the two 
groups differently. I shall argue, however, that children are 
part of the general problem of paternalism,. not a separate 
species of sub-persons or possessions to whom the adult 
ideals of freedom and self-respect do not apply, 
Often, as I have said, the difference between 
children and adults which is taken to make paternalism right 
for one and not the other is assumed to be so obvious that 
it is not stated, let alone examined, but when reasons for 
differential treatment are given they are usually that 
children lack some adult competence. Mill, for example, who 
makes it clear that his antipaternalist principle is 
'meant to apply to human beings in the maturity of their 
facuItiIs.. land not) children or ... young persons below the 
a, which the law may fix as that of manhood or womanhood' 
says this is because 
'those who are still in a state to require being taken care 
of by others must be protected against their own actions as 
well as against external injury. (2) 
He assumes that the difference between adults and children is 
important enough and clear enough to make it justifiable , to 
protect the latter but not the former against their own 
actions, and the difference of which he speaks is that 
adults have mature faculties and can take care of themselves 
while children cannot. Now whether we agree about that or 
not, once the qualities of maturity and self-sufficiency have 
been isolated as the criteria by which we judge whether 
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someone should be free from paternalism or not, then we 
should ensure that any children who show these qualities 
should not be subject to paternalism and any immature 
dependent adults should. 
It is true that we associate 'maturity' with adults, 
but whatever 'mature faculties' are they are not acquired 
simply by reaching the age of twenty-one or eighteen. 
'Maturity' encompasses, amongst other things, the ideas of 
rationality, experience, steadiness and consistency of purpose 
and ability to see and plan ahead, all of which we would 
hope to gain with age, but unfortunately do not always do 
soi and if we do gain them, we do not do so in the way 
we gain grey hair and wrinkles, merely by staying alive long 
enough. As Mill himself points out 
'the mental and the moral, like the muscular powers are 
implroved only by being used. ' (3) 
and presumably this is as true for children as it is for 
adults. No-one could seriously claim that clear judgment, 
common sense, rationality, knowledge, experience and a sense 
of purpose descend on people on their twenty-first or 
eighteenth birthdays, or even that they finally spring into 
flower at that time fully operational at last after years of 
gradual development. Anyone, if pressed, would have to admit 
that some children are more rational knowledgeable and 
purposeful than some adults. What follows,. then, is that if 
it Is on the basis of ignorance, irrationality and 
inexperience that we decide whether a person needs 
paternalistic treatment we cannot maintain a rigid distinction 
between adults and children in this matter. 
It would be wrong to suggest that all who believe 
paternalism for adults is not Justified are unaware of any 
contradictions in their position. Schrag, for example, examines 
the common intuition that paternalism is justified for 
children and not adults and tries to explain the 
inconsistency. In an attempt to Sake us aware of our 
unexamined assumptions about the rightness of paternalism for 
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children and its wrongness for adults, Schrag invents a 
society called the Nasuh. In this society the strong 
intelligent knowedgeable Tluda control the weak ignorant Dlihc, 
meting our arbitrary punishments and, though claiming to love 
them and be concerned for the welfare, restricting their 
freedom. He says 
*Any such hierarchically ordered society would be 
universally condemned by almost every writer on ethics since 
Kant' (4) 
yet this (with the names reversed) is our society. 
Schrag is very clear about the difficulties of our 
society's attitude to paternalism. He considers whether 
children, as a group, are different to adults, as a group, 
in ways which are relevant to their different treatment. He 
takes all the differences which are usually suggested, plus a 
few more, considers them as criteria for the justification 
of paternalism for children and finds them all unsatisfactory. 
If we take linguistic competence as the difference between 
children and adults, then the age of change over is nearer 
six than eighteen; if the difference is sexual maturity, then 
the change comes in the early teensy if it is the 
attainment of some intellectual standard (perhaps Piaget's 
formal operations) then some children will qualify early and 
some adults not at all. If ability to maintain oneself is 
taken to be the relevant characteristic, than some children 
would be quite capable of doing this, whereas some disabled 
people would not and would, therefore, be legitimate targets 
for paternalism. However, Schrag claims this would be 
unacceptable because although disabled adults may require some 
assistance this does not entail that they need to be coerced 
in their own interests. Finally, he argues, if we try to 
justify paternalism on the utilitarian grounds that it will 
make children happier, then we must still -explain why this 
would not Justify paternalism for adults also. What Schrag 
wants, but cannot find is a rationale for paternalism that 
will confirm our present beliefs and arrangements. He wants 
to find a distinction between children and adults that will 
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justify paternalism for the former and not the latter, and 
he cannot find it, but instead of concluding that paternalism 
is, in principle as acceptable or unacceptable for children 
as it is for adults and for the same reasons, he comes out 
in favour of a distiction he has shown to be insecurely 
based. 
Schrag says we have to choose between two views - 
either that there is a clear distinction between children and 
adults or that there is not. Having shown that there is 
not, he then opts for the view that there is because, he 
claims, this is essential if we are to maintain that 
paternalism for adults is wrong. The second, gradualist, view 
he says contains the danger of Justifying paternalism for 
adults and so we must avoid it. It is unacceptable to show 
a position to be untenable, as he does, and then choose to 
hold it for no other reason than that he dislikes the 
implication of what he says is the only alternative. He says 
'Perhaps some will consider this decision to support a kind 
of 'noble lie', but if so it is not one in which a few 
deceive the masses for their own good but rather one in 
which we all believe for our own good. " 14) 
Leaving aside the fact that many children do not believe it, 
(but perhaps Schrag does not consider them part of 'us 
all'), it is still not a noble lie. It Is a convenient 
belief, untenable when examined, which enables adults to 
maintain their fantasies of self-sufficiency, their power and 
their assumption of superiority over the younger members of 
society. 
According to Scarre, Schrag is wrong to look for a 
rationale for allowing some paternalism for children and none 
at all for adults. Scarre claims that 
"a fair criterion of justified paternalism will refer to 
some feature or features of person which will in principle be capable of being possessed by both children and adults, 
though it will in practice be possessed by far more of the former than the latter. ' (6) 
He claims that Schrag overemphasises the importance of liberty 
for adults and therefore is unwilling to let anything count 
as a justification for paternalism for thee. In this, Scarre 
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is surely correct, as he is in 
would constitute a fair criterion 
Where he is wrong, I suggest, 
human characteristics - those which 
unjustified - as adult characterist 
possessed by children as well. 
his identification of what 
of justified paternalism. 
is in identifying certain 
he says render paternalism 
lcs, when in fact they are 
According to Scarre 
'children are inexperienced in the ways of the world and are 
incapable of forcing life-plans or systematic purposes] 
indeed the capacity to form coherent purposes and the 
development of the will-power to stick by them are part of 
what distinguishes adults from children. ' (7) 
However, inexperience of the ways of the world is a vague 
expression and too inexact a concept for us to base a 
justification of paternalism on it. Unarguably children have 
not been around as long as adults and so are likely to be 
relatively inexperienced compared with adults, but so is a 
person of twenty-five likely to be relatively inexperienced 
compared with a person of sixty. Relative lack of experience 
cannot justify paternalism, then, or it would be justified 
for all but the elderly. It Is true that we gain 
experience as we grow older but we do not do so uniformly, 
and as a teacher of young children I am frequently surprised 
at what does and what does not fall within their 
experience. Some children, at quite a young age, have met 
and coped successfully with situations that I did not 
encounter until years later - if at all. Certainly, 
inexperience of particular circumstances is a factor which 
should be taken into account when paternalism is considered. 
A child with no experience of the dangers of tides and 
off-shore winds, for example, and unable to understand even 
when told about them, should not be let loose on a windy 
sea on a lilo. However, that is an example of particular 
inexperience justifying a particular instance of paternalism. 
It is not the case that children's inexperience justifies 
generalised paternalism towards them. If children have not the 
experience or understanding to cope with traffic or 
electricity than they need to be protected from them; if 
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they are inexperienced in managing money or making decisions 
about their school work then they will need help, but, as 
was stressed in the chapter on children's rights, they are 
not a separate class of beings who are always in need of 
adult direction and subject to adult authority. If 
inexperience is a handicap to be overcome, then adults' 
responsibility towards children is not only to protect thee 
from the consequences of their inexperience, but also to help 
them gain the important experience they need. 
Despite the admitted relative inexperience of the 
young, I do not think Scarre is right to say they are 
unable to form life-plans and systematic purposes. Some 
children decide when quite young what Job they want to do 
when they grow up, and work steadily towards the realisation 
of their ambition. Many children, when they do have a chance 
to plan and control some area of their lives, do it 
carefully and sensiblyt not always, of course, but then nor 
do we. If children have no life-plans and systematic purposes 
then those adults responsible for their welfare Mill, until 
that situation changes, have the duty to oaks plans for 
thew they will also have the duty to help bring about the 
change, so that the children are able to fore their own 
plans. 
Another characteristic which Scarre takes to be the 
prerogative of adults is love of freedom. He rejects Schrag's 
analogy of the Tluda and Dlihc because he says it misleads 
us into thinking of the downtrodden Dlihc as possessing our 
own adult love of freedom, whereas really they are children 
and therefore quite different. Scarre gives what he takes to 
be an example of this difference when he says that we 
cannot force an adult alcoholic to dry out because this 
would be imposing our plans on his in place of his own and 
would thus be an insult. However, he says 
'children do not have systems of purposes of their own, so it does not infringe their rights to intervene on their behalf when their irrationality threatens their well-being. (8) 
-144- 
This is not an explanation of why paternalism is justified 
for children but a set of assertions about their nature 
which he does not back up and with which I disagree 
strongly. From my observation and memory I would argue that 
children often do have systems of purposes of their own and 
are affronted by the restriction of their freedom by powerful 
adults. According to Scarre's view an eleven year old child 
may want to be a doctor or gymnast and may work 
systematically towards that end for years, but s/he may 
justifiably be coerced because "children do not have systems 
of purposes of their own. ' An adult alcoholic, on the other 
hand, may drift aimlessly doing whatever may be 
counterproductive to his/her stated aims, yet s/he may not 
justifiably be coerced because s/he is an adult and adults 
are insulted and their rights infringed if we impose our 
plans on thee. I wonder how these propositions might be 
falisified. What would a child or an adult have to do to 
destroy Scarre's belief that the latter has coherent purposes 
and will-power and the former has not? 
Empirical evidence seems to show that children do 
share the adult's love of freedom. There can be few children 
who read 'Swallows and Amazons' without envying the Walkers 
their anti-paternalist father when he sanctions the sailing 
holiday with the telegram 'BETTER DROWNED THAN DUFFERS IF NOT 
DUFFERS WON'T DROWN' t9), (and few parents who would not 
prefer living duffers to dead tributes to anti-paternalism! ) 
Children's books are full of stories of children whose 
parents are conveniently dead, missing, absent-minded or 
amazingly understanding in allowing their children the freedom 
to follow up the exciting possibilities that present 
themselves, and the fact that these are so popular would 
suggest that, in their fantasies at least, children value the 
freedom to do things for themselves without parental 
interference. In fact as well as fiction, children do have 
purposes and plans of their own, want very much to be able 
to carry them out and are sometimes affronted by adult power 
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over them. It is because we have already decided that we 
will treat them as if this were not so that we dismiss 
their plans, their desires, their dignity and sense of worth 
as individuals as less important than our own, and we set 
up a false distinction between use the adults, who value 
freedom and whose plans and purposes must be respected, and 
children who do not share those feelings. 
Paternalism is always something of an affronts it is 
so from the first time we try to assert our own wishes as 
infants (and, for our own good, are not allowed to succeed) 
until the day we die in the nice safe Home we are moved 
to because our own home is deemed to be unsuitable. We 
should admit that and then argue that it is sometimes better 
to insult, affront or impose our will on others (adults and 
children) than let them be killed, cheated or exploited. 
Paternalism is not ideals it is always second best to 
autonomy. We would such rather explain to young children why 
it is not a good idea for them to put their fingers into 
an electric socket, and we would prefer that walking across 
the park at night was so safe that we did not have to 
forbid young teenagers to do it, but we cannot organise all 
the circumstances of our lives so that paternalism is never 
necessary - either for children or adults. When paternalism for 
children is necesary and right it is so not because 
children's hurt feelings, individual wishes or self-respect are 
somehow less real or less important than those of adults, 
but for the same reasons that it is sometimes Justified for 
adults. The same factors have to be consideredt whether the 
original decision or desire is rational, made from ignorance 
or knowledge, will enhance or restrict future freedom, is 
consistent with other aims (especially valued long-term ends), 
is likely to result in hare, is considered particularly 
valuable or important, and whether the paternalism is likely 
to be aproved subsequently, is likely to be successful and 
is the only practicable way of achieving its object. 
Paternalism for children is justified (when it is Justified) 
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on the same grounds as for 
persons with purposes and 
individuality we value, but 
responsibility so that we 
them come to hare. 
adults - that they are unique 
plans of their own and whose 
for whose welfare we have sass 
cannot stand idly by and watch 
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COMPULSORY EDUCATION AND THE FREEDOM OF 
-CHILDREN 
-149- 
Compulsory Education and the freedom of Children 
Having argued that the restriction of children's 
freedom in their own interest is sometimes justified, I will 
turn now to the subject of compulsory education and consider 
whether it is a morally justifiable restriction of children's 
freedom on paternalistic, or any other grounds. As I have 
claimed throughout this dissertation, freedom is not an 
indivisible entity. There are many freedoms, some of which 
are more valuable than others and many of which are 
incompatibles the restriction of some freedoms can lead to an 
increase of freedom in other areas, and the restriction of 
the freedom of one person or group can lead to greater 
freedom for others. The important questions about compulsory 
education for me, then, concern whose freedoms and which 
freedoms are restricted, whether these are important and 
valued freedoms, whether their loss is compensated for by a 
gain in more valuable freedoms or other goods, and whether 
the restriction is justified. However, as it has been denied 
that compulsory eduation is a restriction of freedom at all, 
I will consider that claim first before going on to the 
questions I consider more important and interesting. 
The view that compulsory education restricts freedom 
has been challenged on the grounds that most people would do 
what is required by law anyway, and so the law does not 
affect their behaviour. Katz puts this view when objecting to 
the use of words 'compulsion' and 'coercion' in the context 
of school attendance laws. (I) He claims these are not 
coercive because most people do not obey them simply through 
fear of the consequences of disobedience, and that 
'CoePulsory school attendance laws codify an existing norm 
or standard' (2) 
It is true that if we were planning to do anyway what the 
law says we must we do not fttl coerced or oppressed, but, 
as I argued in Chapter 21 laws which close certain options 
to us restrict our freedom, and this remains true even if 
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we had no wish to choose what is forbidden, or even if we 
were unaware of its existence. 
Katz also claims that to speak of the laws as 
forms of compulsion or coercion is to "de-emphasize" their 
legitimacy, but this is to fall into the trap of thinking 
that, as he disapproves of coercion and approves of both 
freedom and compulsory school attendance, the school attendance 
laws cannot be coercive. (3) Put simplistically the argument 
is thiss freedom is good, restriction is bad, so, whenever 
we have a case of what appears to be a necessary or 
desirable restriction, then either the freedom is not really 
freedom or the restriction is not really a restriction. 
However, it is not the legitimacy or otherwise of a 
restriction, nor our approval or disapproval of it that makes 
it restrictive of freedom. Not all freedoms are desirable 
and not all restrictions are evil, and though there is a 
need to justify restrictions there is no need to explain 
them away or disguise them as something also. Laws can 
compel and coerce and still be legitimate. 
It has been suggested that although laws compel they 
do not restrict children's freedom because children lack the 
capacity for freedom. Freedom, according to this view, is 
something we achieve when we have certain abilities and as 
children lack those abilities and cannot achieve freedom they 
cannot be deprived of it. locke has been accused of holding 
this view by Gardner (4) who quotes his him as saying that 
man's freedom is 'grounded in is reason' and that to 
'turn his loose... before he has reason to guide him is not 
allowing his... to be free. ' (5) 
This suggests that reason is necessary for freedom and that 
without reason there can be no liberty. Gardner criticises 
this thesis, not on the grounds that children do have reason 
but because 
'the amoral, the untutored those with under-developed 
physiques and intellects and 
those 
whose powers have not been liberated for the common good can be free from many 
constraints and impediments and free 
to do many things. ' t6) Freedom, he says, is not something we achieve. 
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Gardner is right to draw attention to the basic 
freedom of not being pushed around, a freedom which all who 
are reasonably aware of what is happening to them may enjoy, 
but mistaken to assume that this is the only, or only 
important, freedom. As was argued in Chapter 2, exercising 
freedom (as opposed to simply not being coerced) implies 
choosing between alternatives, and in order to choose we must 
have an idea of what appears to us to be a good, some 
knowledge of relevant facts, and the ability to reason. 
Without these we do not choose between atlernatives, but 
merely drift or plump for one course of action rather than 
another. However, as has been stressed previously, there are 
many different freedoms. It is mistaken to claim that, as 
rational thought is required for the exercise of free choice, 
we are free only when rationally choosingi and it is 
equally mistaken to deny that the exercise of some freedoms 
requires rationality and knowledge of desired ends and of 
means. Not all of the many different freedoms are compatible, 
and it is possible to be deprived of freedom in one area 
and thereby enjoy it in another. This, I suggest, is what 
Locke claimed happens when parents educate their children to 
become reasonable adults, for what Locke actually said was 
The freedom of Man and Liberty of acting according to his 
own Will is grounded on his having Reason... To turn his 
loose to an unrestrain'd Liberty, before he has Reason to 
guide him, is not allowing him the privilege of his Nature, 
to be free. "I7) 
The fuller quotation shows that Locke contrasts two types of 
freedoms the freedom of acting according to his own will, 
which depends on having reason, and unrestrained liberty which 
does not. Locke, then, does accept that children's liberty is 
restricted in certain ways by their parents, but he believes 
that a less valuable liberty is given up for a more 
valuable one. 
Compulsory education, restricting freedom as it does, 
is vulnerable to criticism on three different countst firstly, 
there is Gardner's criticise that it is a restriction of 
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freedom and all restrictions of freedom are wrongs secondly 
that though compulsion may be justified in order to achieve 
certain valuable ends, the ends of compulsory schooling are 
not valuable) and thirdly, that though the ends may be 
valuable they are not achieved. For those who hold the first 
view, that all restrictions of freedom are wrong, to admit 
that compulsory education restricts freedom is to condemn it. 
Gardner claims that 
'to a libertarian compulsory education is evil in itselfl 
whatever its benefits he will be under a prima facie 
obligation to do away with it. * (8) 
This exemplifies the mistaken view that freedom is one thing, 
always valuable, and that restrictions of freedom are 
necessarily wrong whatever good may come from thee. Gardner 
holds that 
'all restraints are evil in themselves' (9) 
and yet, inconsistently, he criticises Dworkin for being 
prepared to sacrifice justice for freedom. (10) If justice 
should not be sacrified for freedom, and it is not always 
possible to have both, then presumably it is sometimes 
necessary to restrict freedom to promote justice. Gardner does 
not explain how a necessary restriction which promotes a 
valued end such as justice can be evil in itself. Gardner 
is right to say that 
'compulsory education needs justifying precisely because it 
is Compulsory' (11) 
but he needs to explain how something evil in itself which 
restricts something valuable in itself can possibly be 
justified. 
Even if one accepts, as most of us do, that it is 
sometimes right to restrict freedom in order to achieve 
other valued ends, there will be disagreement about which 
ends are sufficiently valuable to warrant restrictions and 
which freedoms are too valuable to be given up. Is the 
capture of criminals valuable enough to allow the police 
greater powers to restrict the freedom of those who may be 
innocent? Is the raising of the living standards of its 
members sufficiently important for Trade Unions to be allowed 
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to introduce a closed shop? Do the benefits of educating all 
our children outweigh the loss of liberty that is involved 
in requiring them to attend school? Such questions of value 
are very important, not simply so that conclusions can be 
reached, but because the working out of problems of value is 
part of life as members of a community. The question of 
whether the freedom to act according to reason as an adult 
is incompatible with unrestrained liberty for children, and, 
if so, which is the more valuable is a particularly 
difficult question because the unrestrained children, if 
irrational, cannot judge the value of the education they have 
not had, while rational adults cannot throw off their 
rationality and recapture their pre-educated selves. The 
discussion will not be helped, however, by the insistance 
that either of these two freedoms is not really a freedom 
at all. However, as it is necessary to have certain skills 
and knowledge in order to take part in the debates about 
which liberties and other goods are more valuable, and these 
discussions are part of our life as social beings, we cannot 
decide in favour of unrestrained liberty for children. 
Education in a democracy should have as one of its aims 
that all should be educated to be able to participate fully 
in their society - to make personal decisions and choices as 
individuals and to play their part in democratic institutions 
and decision-making. As Pat White says 
'However such .., a democratic society values freedom and 
wishes to allow individuals to pursue their own concerns 
without interference... it cannot refrain from 'interfering' 
through its appropriate authorities, to ensure that children 
get an adequate political education. ' (12) 
John White also claims that we are justified in 
restricting children's present freedom for their future 
benefit, but he emphasises the value of freedom to choose a 
way of life as individuals, rather than to participate in 
joint decision-making. He argues that we cannot know what any 
person will want to do, or what his conception of the good 
will be, and so 
The least harmful course we can follow is to equip his as 
far as possible, for the ideal situation - to let hi: 
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determine himself what the Good shall be for him. To do 
this we must ensure (a) that he knows about as many 
activities or ways of 
life 
as possible which he may want to 
choose for their own sake, and (b) that he is able to 
reflect on priorities among them from the point of view not 
only of the present moment but as far as possible of his 
life as a whole. " (13) 
In order to approach this ideal situation, and teach what is 
necessary in the most economical way, White proposes that 
the curriculum be based on two categories of activitiesi 
firstly those which it is necessary to engage in before they 
can be understood, and secondly, those which may be 
understood without being engaged in. The first should be 
taught compulsorarily in school, while children should be 
taught about the second. To put it briefly, in order to be 
able to choose whether we want to be Mathematicians or not 
we must be compelled learn Mathematics, because it is 
impossible to understand what is involved without doing it. 
However, the category two activities, which can be understood, 
so to speak, from the side-lines, should not be part of 
the compulsory curriculum. All that is necessary is that we 
should be taught enough about them to know whether we would 
choose to do them. 
My first criticism of White's rational curriculum is 
concerned with learning about category two activities. White 
rightly says that we can, as adults, understand something of 
many activities without engaging in them. However, I believe 
that for primary school children the distinction between 
categories one and two would not be so clear. White's 
curriculum does not seem to be planned to take into account 
the way young children learn. I could certainly tell my 
Infant class that yellow and red paint will make orange, 
that plants need light, or that the path is twenty metres 
long. But firstly they would not listen, and secondly they 
would not understand. It is in mixing the colours, comparing 
the straggly yellow seedlings from the dark cupboard with the 
healthy green ones from the windowledge, and laying the 
metre sticks along the path that they come to understand 
pieces of information that an older person could assimilate 
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through reading or being told. 
Even though adults can understand category two 
activities without engaging in them, White does not show that 
we can understand enough about them to know why people 
enjoy them so such. I can know what bird-watching, or chess 
or scuba diving are without having any idea of their own 
particular joys and satisfactions, and without that knowledge 
I as singularly ill-equippped to to sit back at the end of 
my schooling and decide which of those activities will fill 
my week-ends. If I take to any of them, it is such more 
likely to be because somebody I know enthuses about them, 
and I have a go, and gain sufficient pleasure, intrinsic or 
extrinsic, to want to continue. (There is no need for the 
pleasure to be intrinsic, or for the activity to be 
worthwhile in its own right'. That it is enjoyed at all is 
surely a sufficiently good reason to choose to do it. ) 
Again, although adults and older children say be able to 
understand a category two activity without practising it, we 
may need many years of practice before we can do it 
properly. If we were to understand an activity first, then 
decide to do it, and then learn to do it, it might be too 
late to do it properly. Taking up skiing at the age of 35 
when I understood what it was about and had decided that I 
would like to try it was very enjoyable, but not nearly 
such a good way of becoming a competent skier as whizzing 
around on the slopes from the age of two, like the Austrian 
children that I met. White's rational curriculum fails to 
ake account of the fact that some skills and activities have 
to be engaged in from an early age - not so that they 
may be understood, but so that they can be done properly. 
However, my main criticism of White's argument is 
that, while agreeing that education should prepare children 
for making choices as adults, and should help them to be 
informed about the substance of those choices, I would argue 
there is something unrealistic about a curriculum planned to 
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achieve that end alone. White acknowledges that what he 
calls the ideal situation, of knowing about as many 
activities and ways of life as possible, and being able to 
reflect on priorities, is unrealizable, but I would question 
its desirability as well as its feasibility. Without wanting 
my life or that of my children to be either irrational or 
non-rational, I would not want it to be quite as pre-planned 
and future-orientated as White seems to suggest it should. 
White's model depicts life in stagest firstly learning 
category one activities, and learning about category two 
activities as a preparation for the future, then choosing 
between them all and choosing a way of life, and then 
living. My criticism is not that this model neglects the 
element of chance in life, and the things over which we 
have no control, (White accepts that we cannot have complete 
autonomy (14)), but that it does not give sufficient value 
to children's present lives, or to the freedom they have and 
the choices that they make while they are still children. 
As was argued in the chapter on paternalism, we cannot keep 
our options open indefinitely for fear of losing opportunities 
later. The choice to do one thing now will inevitably 
preclude the possibility of doing something also, and while 
educationalists and parents must try to ensure that important 
options are not closed early, they would be as wrong to 
concentrate exclusively on the future, as the extreme 
child-centred lobby are to neglect it. Education is 
necessarily forward looking, and should be about broadening 
outlook and presenting new possibilities, but to prefer to 
teach children , about a large number of category two 
activities by showing them files, rather than teach them a 
smaller number by taking part with a committed enthusiast, is 
to neglect the importance of an interesting present. 
White justifies compulsion in education on the 
grounds that we are right to restrict children's freedom now 
in order to increase their autonomy later. (13) There are 
those, however, who believe that the aim of compulsory 
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education is to create uniformity of opinion and life-style, 
rather than to enable people to make reasoned choices as 
individuals and a worthwhile contribution to joint decisions, 
and who criticise it on the grounds that freedom is 
restricted not for a valued end but for something 
undesirable. Rothbard, for example, argues that state schools 
have played a continuing role in suppressing religious dissent 
and creating uniformity. (16) From Martin Luther to the 
anti-Catholic Ku Klux Klan, via various socialists and 
progressives, supporters of state schooling have wanted to 
impose a particular and uniform ideology, he claims. Rothbard 
does not appear to be concerned about the morality of 
individuals or groups forcing their own children to accept 
particular beliefs, nor to consider that children may have 
greater freedom to choose their own values and life-style 
while attending and after attending a state school than if 
they were educated according to the beliefs of their parents. 
It cannot be denied that compulsory schooling has been used 
to promote particular ideologies, but what can be denied is 
that the imposition of ideas and values on children is 
greater in a society with compulsory education than one 
without it. Societies cannot avoid passing on ideas to their 
children, but it is possible to try to see that they treat 
ideas critically, and compulsion may be the only way to 
ensure that all children are taught to do this. Libertarians 
might be more successful in promoting genuine liberty if they 
tried to ensure that state schools teach children to adopt 
a critical attitude to a variety of ideas, rather than risk 
leaving children to learn nothing but their parents' own 
beliefs or to be at the mercy of any and every persuasive 
voice. 
Critics of compulsory schooling (and of compulsory 
education and compulsory state education) can be found amongst 
those who hold widely differing views about children's 
freedom. Some are concerned to liberate children from the 
oppression of school, while the chief or only complaint of 
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of others is that it takes away the freedom of parents to 
decide the content, nature and extent of their children's 
education. As the law compels parents to send their children 
to school (or see that they are educated to an acceptable 
standard elsewhere) and as it is parents who will eventually 
be taken to court if they fail to do this, compulsory 
education is sometimes considered to be a restriction of the 
freedom of parents rather than children. In fact both are 
affected, for if the law compels parents to compel their 
children, then, clearly, children's freedom is restricted, 
albeit indirectly. However, it should be remembered that most 
children would not be given the choice of whether or not to 
go to school even if attendance there were not compulsory, 
for this choice would be made for them and enforced by 
their parents. Shakespeare's unwilling schoolboy creeping to 
his books was no freer to decide whether to go to school 
than his modern counterpart, despite the difference in law, 
and the freedom allowed him during lesson time would have 
been such less. Unless the law making school attendance 
compulsory was replaced by one which protected the wishes of 
children and gave preference to them over those of their 
parents (as Holt tentatively suggests that it should (17)), 
then the effective freedom of most children over the decision 
of whether they should go to school would be no greater 
without compulsory education than with it. 
For some of the most severe critics of compulsory 
education this would not be seen as a problem, either 
because they do not value children's freedom or because they 
do not think about it at all, and both of these attitudes 
can be found in the essays in Rickenbacker's book '12 Year 
Sentence'. (18) On the back of this book are eight examples 
of the problems of 'people caught in the toils of the 
truancy laws' none of which is concerned with the freedom or 
lack of it of children. Five refer to the problem of 
parents who wish their children to be taught to share their 
own religious beliefs, and three are about inferior schools. 
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Children are mentioned only as people that 'you' (the parent) 
want to do something to while 'they' (the state) try to 
stop you. Whether the something that 'you' want to do is 
right or not is not questioned, for it is assumed that if 
you are a parent it is your right to decide, and that this 
is one of the most valuable freedoms that exists, more 
valuable than freedom for children or than the freedom for 
all concerned members of a democratic society to take part 
in the decisions about the sort of education that should be 
provided for the young. 
What is being argued in this book is for greater 
freedom for parents to make decisions about what their 
children shall do, and less freedom for the state, but it 
is argued simply in the name of freedom. Rickenbacker claims 
to be against compulsion, saying 
To many who support compulsory schooling, the use of 
compulsion is necessary to bring up the young to respect and 
practise the virtues and customs of society. To the critics 
of compulsory schooling it is precisely this coercive 
intrusion into the life and mind of the individual that 
represents the most damnable feature of compulsory 
schooling. " (19) 
However, like Rothbard, he ignores the fact that it is not 
only schools that intrude into the lives and minds of 
children, and that children of parents who belong to the 
diverse groups he mentions are also brought up to respect 
and practise the virtues and customs of their particular 
group. If this is coercive then it is suffered by all 
children in every society, and if it is wrong then 
Rickenbacker should be as worried about parental intrusion as 
he is about compulsory schooling. 
There is, in several of the essays in Rickenbacker's 
book, a confusion between freedom and cultural diversity. For 
example, the introduction to one essay says of its writer 
He discovers a heartening - but shaky - trend towards diversity, freedom and the sovereignty of parents, ' (20) 
which suggests, quite wrongly, that freedom and the 
sovereignty of parents go together, along with diversity. 
While the possibility of diversity is necessary for freedom 
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it is not sufficient, for if all the groups in our society 
were to keep to themselves and educate their children to be 
like themselves there would be diversity of life-styles but 
not more freedom. For freedom to exist it is necessary that 
people are able to choose between some of the many different 
beliefs and ways of living that exist. It is a matter of 
argument as to how many alternatives should be 
available for freedom to exist. John White suggests that 
children should learn about as many different activities as 
possible (21) but I would argue that it may be better for 
children to gain a deeper acquaintance with a few activities 
than have a superficial knowledge of many. I do not think 
that the fact that a boy who is brought up in St. Helens 
will be immersed in Rugby League, a Liverpudlian in football, 
a Barbadian in cricket and an American in baseball, 
basketball or American football, rather than all of them 
being able to choose from all of the sports, is an 
important restriction of their liberty. We grow up within a 
community, with its own customs, and it is not necessary for 
our freedom for us to have all the possible activites 
enjoyed by other communities laid before us as if on a 
supermarket shelf. It would be a restriction of liberty, 
however, and an important one, if we were prevented from 
learning about or practising some possible alternative 
activities or ways of life. A girl from any of the above 
communities, for example, who was not allowed to play any of 
the games mentioned, or who could not play any games 
because the available funds had been used exclusively for 
boys' games, would have her freedom restricted. So would 
children who were prevented from learning about the games, 
or, more importantly, the beliefs and ways of life of other 
communities within their society. For many children, schools 
show the possibilities of different ways of life that their 
parents are unable or unwilling to reveal. However, for those 
who oppose compulsory education in the name of the 
sovereignty of the parent it is the chance that children 
will be exposed to other ideas and come to disagree with 
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their parents, that they dislike and wish to avoid. The 
critics who take this view are really critics of state 
education rather than compulsory education, for they support 
the existence of private and religious schools and hold them 
up as an example of freedom. If we consider what goes on 
inside these schools, however, rather than concentrate on the 
fact of their existence, it is far from obvious that they 
increase freedom. 
There is one contributor to this collection of 
essays who says 
it might be a good idea to ask kids what they think' (22) 
but this suggestion is not pursued. Instead the author, 
Baker, returns to the subject of the freedom of parents, 
saying, of the Amish community, 
'What the Amish fear most is that their children, 
particularly teenagers, will be lured away from their 
culture by the temptations abounding in the modern 
consolidated school. ' (231 
It is understandable that they have this fear. I have 
similar fears myself when I see my own children exposed to 
pervasive and persuasive views that I believe to be wrong 
and dangerous. This is understandable parental concern and, as 
I have argued, there is a case to be made for adults 
protecting children from danger. What cannot be done, I 
maintain, is for this case to made in the name of liberty. 
Underlying the concern about the restriction of parents' 
liberty is not a simple love of liberty but the belief that 
parents' freedom is more valuable than any benefits to their 
own children, to other children or to society as a whole 
that might accrue from universal compulsory education, 
including the possible benefit of increased and enhanced 
freedom for their children in the future. 
A more impressive line of criticism comes from those 
who are concerned that schools frequently fail to achieve 
their aim of educating children. Such critics may concede 
that what the educators wish to achieve is valuable, but 
they believe it has not been achieved and, indeed, cannot be 
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achieved by compulsion. As Goodman, one of the foremost 
critics of compulsory education, says 
'since schooling undertakes to be compulsory must it not 
continually review its claim to be useful, ' (24) 
and certainly if children's freedom is restricted on the 
grounds that they need to be taught particular skills and 
knowledge, then for paternalistic intervention to be justified 
it is necessary that they do learn them. Making children 
spend a large part of their time in the classroom is not a 
self-evidently acceptable practice, and if it is to be 
justified on the grounds that it achieves certain results we 
should be ever-watchful to ensure that it does achieve them 
(or achieves them better than possible alternative methods. ) 
The parenthesis is reasonable, for it is not necessary to 
show that schools are perfect and that all children know all 
they need to know for the present system to be justified. 
What is required is that the system achieves or could 
achieve its ends better than the alternatives now on offer 
or possible in the foreseeable future. The claim that this 
is so is rejected by those who hold that compulsion and 
education are incompatible. 
The belief that compulsion gets in the way of good 
education is held both by 'deschoolers' and those who would 
prefer schools to remain but for attendance to be voluntary. 
Reimer, for example, wants to 'deschool' society completely so 
that individuals would be in charge of their own education, 
(25) and would, thereby, become more powerful and less liable 
to exploitation. He believes that everyone should find their 
own 'skill-models' from a directory and then make a contract 
to be taught what they wish to learn. The major criticism 
of this approach is that people need to be skilful already 
in order to use it sucessfully. Using directories and making 
contracts are not innate abilities, and it is not unduly 
pessimistic to assume that the free market Reimer envisages 
would, like other free markets, be one which the more 
powerful and knowledgeable members of society would be able 
to use for their own benefit and in which the less 
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experienced would be taken for a ride. Encyclopaedia salesmen 
have already demonstrated that there is a lucrative trade to 
'be done with parents who desire to help their children but 
are unsure how best to do so. Doubtless there would be many 
more enterprising salesmen eager to exploit concerned but 
unsure parents and their children in a society which saw 
education as a product to be advertised and sold, while the 
more clued-in and affluent parents were ensuring their 
children had an education which would enable them to maintain 
positions of power. (26) 
In addition to the parents who may not know the 
best way to help their children, there are those who are 
unwilling to do so. These are in a minority but the 
consequences of leaving the education of their children 
entirely in their hands should be considered seriously, and 
one needs to ask what would happen to these children if 
they were left to find their own skill-models. Reimer says 
'Perhaps the most important thing that individuals can do is 
to take back their reponsibility for the education of their 
children' (27) 
but the education of children is not simply the 
responsibility of individuals. Reimer does not say what would 
happen to the children of those parents who failed to do 
this) nor does he consider that the consequence of free 
individuals making contracts to teach and learn sight be to 
put more and not less power into the hands of teachers. At 
the moment teachers in state schools cannot choose their 
pupils any more than pupils can choose their teachers, and 
while Reimer considers the possible benefits of getting rid 
of bad teachers because no-one would want to employ thee, he 
does not say what would happen to the less attractive 
pupils. According to the ideology of the free market I 
suppose they would be so keen to enrol with the best and 
most favoured teachers that they would work herd and never 
mess about in class again. What is more likely to happen, I 
suggest, is that they would be stuck with the worst 
teachers. This can be seen to happen at the moment in the 
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private education system, with the most popular private 
schools able to choose their pupils and name their own terms 
while the less able or less amenable children have to go 
elsewhere. Reimer's concern for children whose freedom is 
restricted is one I share, but although the removal of some 
restrictions would necessarily increase some freedoms, I see 
no reason to suppose that these would be valuable and 
important freedoms, or that there would be an overall 
increase in people's freedom from exploitation and freedom to 
direct their own lives. 
The argument that if the education of children 
were left to themselves and their parents some children would 
suffer, and that it is better, therefore, to have compulsory 
education for all to protect those who might be at risk 
has been criticised as snobbish. It is always the other 
parents who would be unable or unwilling to organise their 
children's education, it is said - never the person arguing 
for compulsory education. However, this criticism might be 
levelled equally at those who support any law they have no 
urge to break. For example, as it is not the legal 
prohibition against mugging old ladies that holds on back 
from going on the rampage, is it snobbish to support such a 
law on the grounds that it helps protect those who need it 
and check those who eight otherwise engage in this activity? 
If this is the case then, without snobbishness, we can 
support only those laws which proscribe the particular forms 
of anti-social behaviour which tempt us. More importantly, 
however, the charge of snobbishness or elitism, whether fair 
or not, could be levelled only at those who would agree 
that the education of children is the responsibility of 
individual parents, but fear some might not carry it out. My 
claim is that the education and welfare of the younger 
members of a society is a matter of concern for and the 
responsibility of the whole of that society, and not simply, 
as deschoolers and traditional upholders of the rights of 
parents seem to believe, of individual parents. This 
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responsibility will not be carried out satisfactorily if we 
assume that justice for children lies in treating them either 
as competent individualists in a society of other 
individualists who are all capable of fighting for their own 
interests, or as beings whose upbringing and education is the 
business of no-one but their parents. 
What Kleinig calls the 'protectionist' argument for 
compulsory schooling (28) - that education has to be compulsory 
in order to protect those children whose parents would 
otherwise neglect it - has also been criticised on the 
grounds that as not all children need protection (either from 
their parents' irresponsibility or from themselves and their 
own ignorance and inexperience) it is unfair to restrict the 
freedom of all and make them suffer for the defects of the 
few. Kleinig says 
"It is all very well to intervene in cases of manifest abuse 
and neqlect. But such interventions do not need to take the 
form of compulsory schooling and certainly not compulsory 
schooling for all. Not all children need protection from 
their parents. ' (29) 
Krimersan takes a similar view and considers the possibility 
of having schools that would operate much as our hospitals 
do today. 
'People would be committed into them temporarily, under 
extraordinary circumstances, and for the most part 
voluntarily. ' (30) 
Kleinig appears to have physical neglect in mind, whereas 
Krimerman is considering some failure in rationality which 
needs treatment, but both advocate state intervention only in 
cases of proven need, because this is less of an intrusion 
into the individual's liberty than compulsion for all. There 
are, I believe, several weaknesses in their arguments. 
Firstly, Kricerean's suggestion that schools could 
operate as hospitals do, treating people occasionally, 
voluntarily and for limited periods, does not take account of 
the very real differences between being ill and being in 
need of 'education. Being ill is abnormal, not usually a 
matter of dispute, and generally we know when we are ill 
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and desire to do what is necessary to get better. Being 
ignorant, inexperienced or relatively irrational however, is, 
at a certain stage of our lives, the common human condition, 
but one of which we may not be fully aware at the time, 
nor may we know best how to rectify the matter if we do 
recognise it. Krimerman seems to suggest that if parents do 
not educate their children satisfactorily and their deficiency 
becomes apparent, then the children would be subject to 
compulsory education until the wrong is put right, but the 
administration of what he calls 'sporadic educational 
intervention' would created greater unhappiness, I believe, 
than our present system of universal compulsion, and would 
make the 11 Plus and the taking of children into care seem 
almost trouble free by comparison. 
Neither the diagnosis nor the cure of irrationality 
is as simple as that of chicken pox, and it would be hard 
if not impossible for decisions about children and their 
parents to be free from cultural bias and value judgments. 
It would be impossible, also, to avoid the implication of 
moral condemnation of both parents and children when 
compulsory education was deemed to be necessary, and decisions 
which would have such a detrimental effect on the 
self-images of the people involved would undoubtedly be 
criticised and challenged in courts of appeal. It is hard to 
see whose freedom would be increased or who would benefit 
in any other ways the children whose parents chose to send 
them to school or keep them at home would have as little 
say in the matter as children usually do, those deemed to 
be in need of sporadic educational intervention would be 
subject to for sentenced to) compulsory schooling, and 
presumably all children would be screened in some way to 
discover those in need of schooling. I believe the idea of 
a safety net to catch the children whose parents do not 
educate them would cause even more distress and be more 
unjust than a system which insists on education for all. 
However, this, like the belief that children would learn what 
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they need to know in a non-compulsory or self-directed 
education system, cannot be verified or falsified without 
experiments on the people whose education and welfare is our 
concern. 
Gardner considers a slightly different, stricter 
protectionist argument which is to do with the protection of 
children, not from the consequences of having parents who 
cannot advise on, say, the best way of becoming a 
metallurgist, but on protection from physical harm. (31) This 
argument is based on the distinction between interfering with 
a person to prevent harm to themselves (which even Mill said 
was permissable in certain circumstances) and interfering to 
promote their good. (32) Prevention of harm could be said 
to require that children learn to read, Gardner claims, but 
"it is not an argument for the analysis of poetry or writing 
free verse or for studying Shakespeare. * (33) 
John White uses the argument that prevention from harm 
justifies compulsion, (34) but he interprets 'harm' rather 
loosely, saying 
*If children were left free not to have to speak, study 
mathematics, physics, philosophy or contemplate works of 
art, then this might well harm them, since they might never 
come to know whole areas of possible wants. ' (33) 
For White, to be ignorant of any of the category one 
activities that one might wish to choose to pursue is to be 
harmed, but this is as mistaken, I suggest, as saying that 
to be deprived of any of the foods that a person might 
choose to eat is to go hungry. For White does not claim 
that physics, mathematics, art appreciation etc. are all 
essential to a fully autonomous life. If he could show this, 
then his claim that ignorance of them constitutes harm might 
be upheld, but as it is he is quite happy for children to 
learn maths and philosophy, say, and then drop them 
completely having realised that they do not wish to engage in 
those activities, because the Good for them is music and 
poetry, or rugby and cricket. It is surely stretching the 
meaning of 'harm' to unacceptable lengths to count ignorance 
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of something that a person might have wanted to do, but did 
not, as harm for them. 
White also refers to the possible harm to others if 
children are left ignorant of category one activities, for he 
considers that people who do not know of possible options 
and different ways of life may not be tolerant of those 
who choose differently from themselves. Therefore, he claims, 
it is in everyone's interest that all are taught to 
understand the category one activities and the different 
possible ways of life. I am unconvinced that someone who had 
learned something about an activity or way of life and then 
rejected it would necessarily be more tolerant of those who 
continued to pursue it than someone who knew nothing of it 
at all. However, my main disagreement with White's argument 
is that, having used a very wide interpretation of 'harm' 
with regard to category one activities, he excludes category 
two activities completely. If we are to justify compulsion in 
education on the grounds of preventing harm, then many 
category two activities must surely be included. More obvious 
harm is done both to the individual concerned and to others 
through ignorance of nutrition, or child-care, or first-aid, 
or the highway code, or car maintainance etc. than through 
ignorance of art appreciation. If "the principle of liberty 
may be overridden... to prevent harm both to the pupils 
themselves and to men in general" (36) 
then many of the practical subjects that Make up White's 
category two activities will have to be included in a 
compulsory curriculum. 
I have claimed that our responsibilities towards each 
other go beyond the mere prevention of harm, but even if 
this were not so, and even if it were easy to draw the 
line between preventing harm and promoting good, I do not 
believe schools could restrict themselves to teaching what is 
needed to prevent harm. We cannot teach children to reason, 
think critically or even read without getting this to reason, 
think critically or read about something# and that 
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'something' which is the subject matter will teach lessons of 
its own. We cannot separate the necessary skill from the 
something': we cannot legitimately extend children's language 
for an hour and then illegitimately get them to do leaf 
prints. It is while they pick the leaves, put on their 
aprons,  ix their colours and set to work that their use of 
language can be extended. It would be possible, perhaps to 
have an English syllabus which started with reading the 
instructions on fireworks and the Government Health Warnings 
on cigarettes, went on to the list of additives in orange 
squash and finished with the submissions to a public enquiry 
on the building of a nuclear reactor. Such a syllabus, 
however, would neglect vast areas of human experience which, 
though not necessary to physical survival, children do need 
to understand if they are to be able to participate fully 
in their society. In addition, a curriculum based on 
hare-prevention would contain some of what is in children's 
interest to know, but it would be no more (and probably 
even less) likely to interest them than present curriculum. 
It could be questioned whether it matters if 
children are bored if they are being protected from harm, 
but if they are being bored unnecessarily, and if, being 
bored they 'switch off' and are less likely to learn, and 
if boring schools are perceived as more oppressive than 
interesting ones, then it does matter. If we regretfully 
decide it is necessary to restrict children's freedom by 
capelling attendance at school, then we should compensate for 
that as far as we can by making their time there as 
interesting and pleasant as possible while still achieving the 
purpose. We cannot do either of these if we concentrate 
solely on contraception and the Green Cross Code, important 
though they are, and outlaw major parts of our culture such 
as music and fiction. 
However, even if school is pleasant and interesting, 
if it is compulsory it will restrict children's freedom. The 
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suggestion that if children can choose what they do in 
school their liberty is not restricted (37) is rightly 
criticised by Gardner on the grounds that want-satisfaction is 
not the same as freedom, for if it were we could be free 
simply by not wanting what we could not have. (38) Gardner 
says 
'Even if... pupils have their so-called free days, and their 
elective curriculum and want the options offered, some 
options, such as that of opting out of the whole enterprise 
and the range of alternatives for which this is necessary, 
are not available, hence the system interferes with 
freedom. ' (39) 
This is so, but what Gardner appears to overlook is that we 
are never either completely free or totally enslaved, but 
may be more or less free. Having to go to school is one 
infringement of liberty, but, once there, having to study 
Maths, wear a tie and not talk in the dinner queue are 
additional restrictions. Being allowed to choose betweeen 
activities and pursue one's own interests within a compulsory 
system is not complete freedom, any more than being educated 
by one's parents would be, but each is an example of 
limited freedom. 
The subject of children's freedom within school will 
be considered in more detail in the next chapter. I wish 
now only to make the point that a compulsory system 
inevitably restricts children's freedom, though not necessarily 
more than the available alternatives, but that it need not 
be oppressive and that restrictions should be kept to as few 
as possible. Unless it can be shown that drugging children, 
(38) insisting they are immunised, (39) requiring attendance at 
religious or flag-saluting ceremonies, (40) beating them or 
simply teaching them badly are necessarily connected with 
compulsory education, then these are separate (though 
important) issues which do not effect the principle of 
whether a society is justified in ensuring that all its 
young members are educated. The practices of individual 
schools or education systems in any particular society should 
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not be taken as a criticism of compulsory education as 
such, any more than a defence of compulsion should be 
mistaken for satisfaction with our present system. 
Much of the criticism of compulsory schooling is 
basically criticism of what is done in schools rather than 
of the principle of compulsion, but it is argued sometimes 
that compulsion and education are necessarily incompatible. 
Though it is possible to compel children to attend school, 
it is claimed, it is not possible to compel them to learn, 
for learning is something that we have to do for ourselves 
when we want to. It is true that no-one also can do our 
learning for us. Learning is never a passive process, for 
when we know and understand something - even if it is 
something we have been told or have read - we fit it into 
our existing framework of knowledge and actively make it our 
own. It is also true that when we are motivated and 
interested we learn more avidly. However, what follows from 
that is not that learning and compulsory school attendance 
are incompatible but that if we want children to learn more 
easily we have to motivate and interest them. Whether or not 
children are able to learn in a compulsory education system 
is a fact, and from the empirical evidence that there are 
many original and creative people who are products of such a 
system I conclude that compulsion and education are not 
incompatible. According to deschoolers and some other critics 
of compulsory education, children who are not made to go to 
school will learn what interests them and it seems to be 
assumed that what interests them is what they need to know. 
I question the belief that interest and need will coincide 
so conveniently. Reimer lists many things that people ought 
to know about the way society is organised and power 
distributed, (43) but though I would agree with him that 
these are important, I would argue that he is over-optimistic 
if he believes either that all children will want to learn 
them, or that this information will come their way in the 
free market he advocates. 
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Those who believe that children need only to be 
left alone in order to develop their talents are wrong on 
two counts. Firstly we have no reason to suppose that 
children left alone would blossom in this way. People are 
not like acorns which need only sun, water and space to 
grow into fine oaksi we need interaction with interested and 
interesting people. (44) Secondly children are not and will not 
be left alone. They will learn something from some-one, and 
it is the duty of adults to ensure they learn what is 
worthwhile and what they will need to know rather than what 
they chance upon or what it is some-one else's interest they 
should learn. To argue that children should be left free to 
decide what they want and need to know is to exhibit the 
naive liberal view of free choice which ignores the extent 
to which choices may be shaped, influenced or deliberately 
manipulated. If those who want children to understand their 
society and to be able to make choices both as individuals 
and as participants in a free society stand aside, then 
those who want to exploit or manipulate them will find the 
field free. 
I have argued that the liberal view of human 
beings as individuals who come together only when it is in 
their interest to do so and have only the obligations they 
have chosen is a mistaken one. We are social beings whose 
responsibilities and obligations to our fellows, including 
caring for the young, exist whether we want them or not, 
and while parents undoubtedly do have responsibility for their 
children, they are not the only people who have. Children 
do not just belong to their parents and family, they are 
also young members of a wider community which has both an 
interest in and responsibility for the way they are educated. 
This is not a backdoor way of saying that children belong 
to the state instead of their parents. They do not 'belong' 
to anyone in the sense of being possessions, but they, like 
the rest of us, are social beings as well as individuals, 
and members of a wider community as well as members of a 
-173- 
family. Thus while the community has a responsibility to 
promote and protect children's best interests, the children, 
as members of the community are not just recipients of 
welfare but people with their own part to play, and 
contribution to make. Being educated is a child's current 
contribution to his/her society as well as being preparation 
for future participation. 
I have argued previously that there is no good 
reason to limit the legitimate role of the state to 
repelling external threats and enforcing contracts, but that 
it extends to promoting good in other ways. Therefore it is 
reasonable to suggest that the state should be involved in 
the education of its younger members, both for their benefit 
and for the benefit of the wider community, and that it 
should not be left to chance or to individual parents to 
see that they learn what they need to know. All societies 
have some arrangement for the care and education of their 
young members and in all societies children are expected to 
learn and are not given the opportunity to opt out. Children 
must learn, just as adults must teach and care for them, 
and these are responsibilities that neither can shirk. What 
they learn should, in a free, democratic society be of 
concern to all, and a matter of public debate, as decisions 
about the sort of education we give our children affect the 
sort of society we have. If we value freedom we will want 
to ensure that all children are taught the necessary skills, 
attitudes and knowledge so that they too can make free 
choices, take part in the public decisions that affect all, 
and minimise the power that others are able to exercise over 
them. How their learning is organised should also be 
discussed. It might be that a non-compulsory education system 
could cater succesfully for all children in a society in 
which power was more equally distributed than our own, and 
in which the freedom of parents to mould their children in 
their own image by denying them access to alternatives was 
not valued. Until that is achieved I would argue that, with 
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all the acknowledged faults of our present system, compulsory 
education goes some way towards minimising the difference in 
life chances between children whose parents are themselves 
educated and those who are not. Abolishing schools, or having 
them only for those children whose parents wanted them would 
not improve matters for the most disadvantaged children, nor 
would it make them, or any other children, more free. The 
major gain in freedom would be for parents who wished to be 
in sole control of decisions made on behalf of their own 
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CHAPTER 11 
-FREEDOM IN SCHOOLS 
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Freedom in schools 
'I think it's right that we have to go, but it doesn't have to be such 
a dictatorship when we get there. ' David Chamberlin (12 years) 
I have claimed that although restrictions of 
children's freedom are sometimes justified, this is not 
because children are inherently subject to adults' authority, 
or incapable of freedom or in some way less worthy of 
respect and consideration than adults. Restrictions of 
children's liberty are just as important as restrictions of 
adults' liberty and must be justified on broadly the same 
grounds and according to the same general criteria. I argued 
in the previous chapter that citizens of a democracy need to 
be educated in order to survive in, take part in, contribute 
to and benefit from their society, and a democracy needs 
educated citizens in order to continue to operate as a 
democracy. I concluded that a system of compulsory education 
was justified in principle, although the legitimacy of 
compulsory education does not entail either the right of 
adults to impose their own wishes on children, or justify 
the unlimited restriction of children's freedom. 
In considering children's freedom in relation to 
their education the problem arises, not simply of deciding 
whether a compulsory education system is justifiable, but of 
deciding also to what extent we should restrict the freedom 
of children within the schools which we compel them to 
attend. These are not completely separate problems, for there 
is certainly a connection between what is done with children 
in school and the question of whether compulsory education is 
justified. If compulsion is justified on the grounds that 
it achieves certain results, then it must work towards the 
achievement of those results, and will not be justified if 
it does not go some way towards their achievement. It would 
not be right to keep children in schools, for example, on 
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the grounds that their freedom may justifiably be restricted 
in order that they may be taught what they need to know 
to take their places as members of a free, democratic 
society, if really they were being trained to be merely 
tractable and obedient wage-slaves or consumers. If present 
restriction is justified on the grounds that it will enhance 
future freedom, then the education provided must have this as 
one of its aims, and must work towards its realisation, for 
compulsion is never a good in itself and though it may be 
justified to achieve certain ends, other ends would not count 
as a justification for the restriction of freedom. 
Having argued in the previous chapter that compulsory 
education is Justifiable, I now wish to look more closely 
at the question of liberty within a compulsory education 
system, and to consider how schools might respect children's 
present rights of liberty while continuing to educate their 
pupils and prepare them for future freedom also. The question 
of children's political liberty to participate in the 
organisation of the school and the formulation of school 
rules will be considered in the final chapter on education 
and democracy. In this chapter I will consider two areas of 
freedomi academic freedom - the freedom of children to choose 
what to study (and what not to study), to direct their own 
learning, choose their own teachers and set their own 
academic standardsp and personal freedom in areas such as 
those of dress, behaviour outside the classroom, and freedom 
of movement and expression within school. 
The usual argument for academic freedom is part of 
Mill's argument for other forms of freedom of expression and 
argument - that it is necessary for the advancement of human 
knowledge and the discovery of truth. (1) This would appear 
not to apply to children, for though they may discover much 
at school, the 'discovery learning' they do there is not, 
nor is it meant to be, discovery of something which no-one 
also has ever thought of before, but discovery of knowledge 
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that is new to the child in a form that is more 
comprehensible and less easily forgotten. Until children have 
learned basic skills, standards of rationality and some 
factual knowledge they are most unlikely to advance human 
knowledge. If children are to have academic freedom at 
school, then, it must be on grounds other than those used 
to justify it at a more advanced level - that they are 
human beings with their own lives to lead who have the 
right to pursue their own interests. 
I have argued that our justification for compelling 
children to attend school (or receive an equivalent education 
elsewhere) is that there are certain things they need to 
know in order to survive in our society, to become part of 
the community and play their part in it, and to be able to 
make reasoned choices as individuals. If this is the case 
then clearly it would be inconsistent to allow children 
complete academic or personal freedom when they are at school 
if this meant they did not learn all that had been thought 
important enough to Justify their compulsory attendance. Among 
those who have attempted to extend the liberty of children 
in school, either in progressive schools, free schools or the 
state system, there is a divurgence of opinion about whether 
children should have complete academic freedom, and this 
difference appears to be based on different interpretations of 
the purpose of schools. Almost alone of libertarian teachers 
A. S. Neill maintained the position of allowing children complete 
freedom to choose whether they attend any lessons or none - 
a position which sprang from his views both on the purpose 
of education and on the nature of the child. 
Neill believed that the purpose of a school was to 
enable children to be happy. Unlike many of the other 
pioneers of the new school or progressive education movement 
he did not want simply to find less oppressive ways of 
teaching, or more subtle ways of socialising and controlling 
children, and bringing them to share the values of their 
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society or their teachers. He placed supreme importance on 
children being happy, and thought the way to make them so 
was to give them freedom. If they wanted to learn then they 
would do so, and if they did not then it was better for 
them to be happy as illiterate street sweepers. This view of 
the purpose of schools is inextricably linked to Neill's 
view of the nature of the child - neither of which I 
share. He said 
We set out to make a school in which we should allow 
children freedom to be themselves. In order to do this we 
had to renounce all discipline all direction all 
suggestion, all moral training, all religious 
instruction... All that is required was what we had -a 
complete belief in the child as a qood, not an evil 
being... My view is that a child is innately wise and 
realistic. If left to himself without adult suggestion of 
any kind he will develop as far as he is capable of 
developing. ' (2) 
Briefly, on the subject of happiness, I would 
argue that although it is a good it is not the only good, 
and even if it were, a school that made happiness is sole 
aim would still face a conflict between catering for 
children's present happiness or that of the future. The 
happiness of doing no lessons and learning nothing that is 
not of immediate appeal may preclude later satisfactions, and 
the freedom to stay away from lessons will then seem less 
valuable. We are brought back again and again to the problem 
of the relative value of different freedoms, and the 
conflict between Locke's 'unrestrain'd liberty' (3) or what 
Simone Weil calls 
*an unconditional surrender to caprice'(4), 
and the freedom of being able make one's plans and capable 
of carrying them through. In her theoretical picture of a 
free society (5) Weil contrasts the freedom which little 
children would enjoy if parents did not impose any rules on 
them with the freedom of being able to order one's own 
actions. The former is to do with with desire and its 
satisfaction, whereas the latter is concerned with thought and 
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purpose which can be translated into action. While accepting 
that the free society and the free man are unrealisable 
ideals, she says 
'the absolutely free man would be he whose every action 
proceeded from a preliminary Judgment concerning the end 
which he set himself, and the sequence of means suitable for 
attaining this end. ' (6) 
It would be hard for a child to conceive of that kind of 
freedom without having had some stimulating interaction with 
adults, or to be able to use it without having certain 
skills that are not always learned incidentally. 
As was argued in the previous chapter, children are 
not, as Neill believed, like plants which grow to their own 
particular pre-determined pattern unless their growth is 
stunted in some way. They may manage without adult dictation, 
and perhaps without adult direction, but Neill's assertion 
that they will develop their full potential without adult 
suggestion- of any kind is false. For example, children who 
are trained as gymnasts, tennis players or violinists reach 
levels of competence that far exceed those of the untrained 
enthusiasts. Whether it is right to train children to such 
high levels in this way is debatable, but there can be no 
doubt that training for certain skills leads to greater 
achievement; that what one achieves must be within one's 
potential] and that, therefore, leaving children without adult 
suggestion of any kind will not enable them to go as far 
as they are able. 
Again, as was argued in the previous chapter, 
however hard schools and teachers might try not to suggest 
anything to their pupils, children are surrounded by other 
influences. Even Summerhill children went to the cinema each 
week, home for the holidays, and probably read books and 
comics, and these outside influences would affect the 
inclinations that Neill considered to be innate. Neill 
admitted that the freedom of Summerhill worked best for the 
intelligent children, (7) for when they decided to work for 
external exams they were able to tackle the intensive work 
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required in a short time. It seems highly probable that 
these children had been exposed also to some adult suggestion 
- or at least some adult enthusiasm - perhaps from their 
parents, and that this had stimulated their intelligence as 
well as motivating them to want to pass their exams. For 
Neill, children without academic interests and girls who did 
not attend Maths or Physics lessons were simply expressing 
their own natures, and not only should not be forced to go 
but should not be encouraged either as 
it is an absurd curriculum that makes a prospective 
dressmaker study quadratic equations or Boyle's law. " (8) 
This is a deterministic view of children's potential and 
their future lives, and it does nothing to counteract the 
influence and expectations of the particular section of 
society in which the children grow up. If the interests 
which children are free to pursue as children, (which affect 
the choices they will be able to make as adults) are left 
entirely to them, they will be based on limited knowledge 
and experience and influenced by all the voices of persuasion 
except those of their teachers. As Dewey put it 
'The suggestion upon which pupils act must... come from 
somewhere. It is impossible to understand that a suggestion 
from one who has a larger experience and a wider horizon 
should not be at least as valid as a suggestion arising from 
some more or less accidental source. ' (9) 
I have often noticed that when young children 
without wide experience are given a completely free choice of 
activity at school they copy the first child who has an 
idea of what to do. However, if several suggestions for 
possible activities are sought by the teacher and considered 
by the children before the choice has to be made, then the 
children do not all end up doing the same thing. In such 
circumstances adult suggestion, or adult instigation, which 
might theoretically be thought to narrow the range of choice 
and limit freedom, in fact enlarges it. I would argue that 
an important part of the school curriculum should be geared 
to helping children to determine for themselves what they 
would like to do, what they need to know next and how to 
go about pursuing their individual investigations, but until 
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they are equipped with the necessary skills and knowledge for 
this they should not be allowed complete academic freedom. 
The freedom to choose what line of study to pursue and how 
best to pursue it is inappropriate for children whose 
intellectual skills are relatively underdeveloped and who have 
insufficient experience to know what choices are available. 
In contrast to the philosophy of Neill and 
Summerhill, most private Free Schools, progressive schools and 
free schools within the state system, do not allow pupils 
complete freedom to choose what, if anything, they wish to 
study. In his sympathetically critical study of private free 
schools, Graubard reports that the longer such schools are in 
existence the more likely they are to have some sort of 
arrangement for attendance at lessons. (10) Some have contracts 
arranged between the pupils and teachers for a course of 
lessons. Some insist on attendance at a core of important 
lessons. In the British state system, at Countesthorpe 
College, the pupils are responsible for determining the 
choice and direction of their own courses of study but they 
do this together with the teachers, and in consequence gain 
valuable experience of planning their own work. Two of the 
teachers say 
"The task we set ourselves was to create the conditions in 
which autonomy could thrive. We did not intend meekly to 
submit to each student's passing whims and fancies, for 
unless teachers are ready to be positive, forceful and 
ambitious in their expectations of their students they 
cannot hope to create the conditions for a thriving 
autonomy. ' (11) 
Teachers working with pupils who come from homes or 
communities where there is little expectation of academic 
success should provide the counter-suggestion that academic 
success is a possibility and that careers may be open to 
students other than those which seem most obvious. I am not 
suggesting that teachers should hold up middle class culture 
and jobs as the most worthwhile or desirable, or attempt to 
recruit the most able working class pupils into the middle 
class. However, if children are to choose what they will do 
as adults, they must be aware of the possibilities, and that 
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may include possibilities that had not previously occured to 
the children or their parents. For children at private free 
or progressive schools, whose parents tend to be affluent or 
influential, the teachers' role in extending their academic 
abilities and preparing them for a variety of different 
careers may not be particularly important. Such schools are 
sometimes somewhat disdainful of examination results, of 
success, of science and urban culture, and they place great 
value on rural crafts. Perhaps they can afford this 
attitude, because their ex-pupils will not find it too 
difficult to retake the places in the society they have 
left, should they wish to. State schools and the private 
free schools which cater for working class and black children 
cannot be little islands of rural peace which take no 
account of the realities and politics of modern urban 
society. 
The case for some rigourous teaching in 'hard' 
subjects in such schools is put with particular force by 
Jonothan Kozol, because of his experience with black free 
schools in the United States. He says 
'It is too often the rich white kids who speak three 
languages with native fluency at the price of sixteen years 
of high-cost, rigorous and sequential education, who are the 
most determined that poor kids should make clay vases, weave 
Indian headbands, play with Polaroid cameras, climb over 
geodesic domes' (12) 
and he is also draws attention to the fact that education 
is not simply a matter of benefitting individuals and helping 
them to make a success of their lives, but of providing 
the rest of the community with the skilled practitioners it 
needs. 
"Harlem does not need a new generation of radical 
basket-weavers. It does need radical, strong, subversive, 
steadfast, skeptical, rage-minded and power-wielding 
obstetricans, pediatricians, lab technicians, defense 
attorneys, Building Code examiners, brain surgeons. " (13) 
Kozol's point reminds us that education for free individuals 
and a free society is not simply a matter of individuals 
hearing about the possible opportunities that exist, and 
learning the skills necessary to avail themselves of them. In 
order to be free we must not be subject to the power of 
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those who would exploit us, and keeping this freedom is a 
political matter. 
Teachers who are concerned about extending the 
liberty of children, then, do not have to avoid suggestions 
or even direct instruction. They should not fall into the 
common mistakes made by many teachers in free schools of 
assuming firstly that because some learning is incidental, all 
learning is incidental, and secondly of assuming that any 
learning is as good as any other. (14) There may, indeed 
there will, be occasions when it will be necessary to insist 
that children study subjects they would rather not, for, as 
has been said, if some knowledge is important enough for us 
to insist that children attend school to learn it, it would 
be inconsistent to allow them to choose not to learn it. 
However, this does not mean that children should have no 
academic freedom at all, for they, like most other people, 
learn better when they want to and when they are interested. 
If children are allowed to find out things for themselves 
and pursue their own enquiries, although it is unlikely to 
bring an increase in knowledge and understanding to the whole 
society, it will bring it to the individual, and it will 
also give valuable structured experience of independent study 
and individual choice. As children get older they will be 
able to discuss with their teachers what they need and would 
like to learn, as the pupils did at Countesthorpe College. 
It must be reiterated that though compulsion and 
restriction may be Justified to achieve certain ends, there 
can be no justification for unnecessary or excessive 
restrictions. Therefore, whenever there is the possibility of 
both achieving the end and allowing freedom this should be 
done. If, for example, it is considered important that 
children learn to write, then even if they could learn just 
as readily by writing what did not interest them as what 
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did, there would be no justification for restricting their 
writing to the teacher's interests rather than their own. In 
fact, as most teachers know, it is far more effective to 
use, encourage and build on children's own interests as a 
way of helping them to learn, and so while the teacher 
keeps clear in his/her own mind what needs to be learned 
the child is allowed as much freedom of choice as possible 
within the necessary constraints. Advocates of free schooling 
would criticise this for giving children an illusion of 
freedom rather than the real thing, for the children are 
given to understand they are choosing for themselves whereas 
in reality they are just following the teacher's pre-ordained 
plan. However, if part of the teacher's and our society's 
plan is that children should sometimes be free to follow 
their own interests, the freedom would not be all illusory. 
Nor would it simply be a case of the teacher choosing the 
ends while the children were allowed to choose some of the 
means. Education is much too complex a process for us to 
describe it simply in terms of means and ends and say, for 
example, the end is that children learn to write, and that 
their stories and projects are no more than the means to 
that end, or that the work they choose for themselves and 
do on their own is no more than the means to the end of 
learning to work independently. The importance of the child's 
present as well as of preparation for the future was 
stressed by Dewey, who said 
"When preparation is made the controllinq end, then the 
potentialities of the present are sacrificed to a 
suppositious future. When this happens the actual 
preparation for the future is missed or distorted. The 
ideal of using the present simply to get ready for the 
future contradicts itself ... We only live at the time we live 
and not at some other time and only by extracting at each 
present time the full meaning of each present experience are 
we prepared for doing the same thing in the future. This is 
the only preparation which in the long run amounts to 
anything. ' (15) 
When young children choose to work on a topic that 
interests them, or when older pupils select the school 
subjects they want or need to study, they are not simply 
choosing the means to an end chosen by someone elsei they 
are both exercising freedom at that time and preparing for 
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other exercises of freedom in the future. 
So, on the subject of children's academic freedom 
I would conclude firstly, that children should not be given 
complete academic freedom, but should have as much as 
possible without neglecting what we have deemed they should 
know; secondly, that this has the practical advantage of 
promoting their learning thirdly, that even if this were not 
the case, unnecessary restrictions on their freedom would not 
be justified and finally that amongst the important things 
they need to learn are how to find out information for 
themselves, study independently, pursue interests and undertake 
work for purposes other than that of pleasing their teacher. 
They cannot do this, or develop into people who can use a 
fuller form of academic freedom, without having the 
opportunity to practices nor can they develop fully, 
intellectually or socially, without the stimulation of 
interaction with concerned adults. So, however anxious teachers 
and parents are for their children to be free, they must 
not simply stand aside, fearing that their influence would be 
restrictive, for, as Dewey said 
'All human experience is ultimately social.. -. it involves 
contact and communication. The mature person, to put it in 
moral terms, has no right to withhold from the young on 
given occasions whatever capacity for sympatheitc 
understanding his own experience has given him. ' (16) 
Schools are social institutions as well as 
educational ones, and many of the rules and restrictions of 
children's freedom at school are not directly concerned with 
their studies at all, but with their behaviour. If certain 
restrictions on children's freedom to choose what they will 
and will not study are justified in order that they should 
learn important skills, principles and facts, then on the 
grounds that willing the end involves willing the means, 
restrictions on behaviour which are necessary in order that 
this learning can take place will also be justified. There 
will, of course, be disagreement about which restrictions are 
necessary to maintain, in a community of young people, the 
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conditions necessary for learning. When I was at school my 
teachers appeared to think that the necesary order would be 
destroyed if we ate sweets in school uniform or removed our 
hats on the bus. It was then considered reasonable (though 
not by the pupils! ) for teachers to restrict behaviour 
outside school. More recently, my own children who had been 
educated perfectly adequately in jeans and jerseys all through 
primary school were suddenly, at the age of eleven, thought 
to need the help of a navy blue skirt or a blazer and tie 
if they were to continue learning. There are many such 
restrictions of children's freedom in our schools which are 
neither necessary to promote or facilitate learning, either 
directly or by promoting the good order and co-operative 
behaviour necessary in a community, nor are necessary to keep 
children safe. Such restrictions, I claim, are not justified. 
It is on the subject of discipline and children's 
behaviour that schools which attempt to extend children's 
freedom are most frequently criticised. Having read of the 
criticism by parents, press and governors of state schools 
such as William Tyndale Junior School, (17) Risinghill 
Comprehensive, (18) Countesthorpe College (19) and others, it is 
hard to escape the the cynical conclusion that many of the 
critics would not have minded if the children had learned 
nothing, as long as they had done it quietly and 
unobtrusively. Many of the problems of children's behaviour 
that free private and state schools have appear to arise 
from the fact that they have a disproportionate number of 
particularly difficult or disturbed children. Many parents sent 
their children to Summerhill specifically for help with their 
psychological problems, and then removed them to more 
structured schools when they had improved. Both Risinghill and 
William Tyndale made efforts to retain and help difficult 
pupils instead of merely containing them or moving them 
elsewhere. This concern for difficult children is admirable, 
but it seems probable that because of the numbers of problem 
children in free schools teachers there are liable sometimes 
-190- 
to confuse the freedom that should be given to the normal 
children with the particular licence that a disturbed pupil 
may need in certain circumstances. 
Neill himself clearly differentiated between the roles 
of doctor and fellow citizen, (as I would do between doctor 
or social worker and teacher), saying that the 
self-regulation he wanted children to achieve did not mean 
being free to destroy and upset others, and that 
'The whole freedom movement is marred and despised because 
so many advocates of freedom have not got their feet on the 
ground... It is true that I have spent a good few years of my 
life patiently tolerating the destructive behaviour of 
problem children, but I did this as their psychological 
doctor and not as their fellow citizen. ' (20) 
The rights and liberty that children should have in a school 
that values freedom should, like the rights and liberties we 
would enjoy in a free society, never include the freedom to 
destroy property, (21) disrupt others' opportunities to learn, 
or to terrorise the neighbourhood. The problem for teachers, 
as for all those who are involved in organising democratic 
societies or institutions, is how to respect individual rights 
to liberty and yet prevent infringements of the rights of 
others. In order to do this they will need to consider what 
the school rules should be, and how to make them the kind 
of rules which, it was argued in Chapter 4, can enlarge 
total liberty rather than diminish it. 
First thoughts would suggest that the children in a 
school with few rules would be freer than those in a school 
with many rules, but of course it is the scope of the 
rules rather than their number which affects how restrictive 
they are. The rule that 'children must behave sensibly at 
all times" is far more pervasive, and more difficult to 
keep, than a number of explicit rules stating exactly where 
and when bicycles may be ridden, or chocolate eaten. Again, 
the rule that forbids is less restrictive than the one which 
commands, for if you are, for example, forbidden to wear 
stiletto heeled shoes, then presumably you may wear any other 
type of shoe) whereas if the rule enjoins the wearing of a 
brown flat sandal with aT bar strap, then very little 
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room is left for individual choice. Because of this, it has 
been argued that school rules should forbid rather than 
command (22) and should be explicit rather than all-embracing. 
(23) However, while appreciating the need for children to 
have clear guidelines for certain circumstances, I would argue 
that to rely on this form of rule on the grounds that it 
is less restrictive would be to give too much importance to 
the quantity of freedom that the children could enjoy, and 
not enough to the quality. Schools may feel the need of 
some 'Highway Code' type of rules to avoid large numbers of 
children charging into each other in the corridors, but what 
they really want to establish is a community in which the 
children are aware of the needs of others, and therefore 
move around in a way that does not disturb other people. 
The rule that forbids running in the corridor is explicit, 
easily understood and less restrictive than an expectation of 
careful and considerate movement at all times. However, 
unfortunately, such narrow, clear rules do not help the 
children towards self-discipline, and they may encourage 
attention to the letter of the law rather than its spirit. 
Holt is right to stress the evil of seemingly arbitrary or 
retrospective laws which leave children anxious and unsure of 
whether they may inadvertently commit a crime. (24) However, 
the aim of promoting self-discipline and protecting the rights 
of others, will not be achieved by having narrow, explicit 
rules that forbid. It will be necessary to show how these 
rules fit into broad principles of behaviour, and it is the 
quality of the relationships between teachers and pupils, 
rather than school rules, which will play the major part in 
regulating behaviour in a free and co-operative educational 
community. 
A recurring theme in the comments made by children 
who have attended free schools, state or private, is their 
appreciation of being respected by their teachers as equals 
in importance, if not in knowledge and experience -a respect 
which they believe is not shown in more authoritarian 
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schools. (25) Perhaps, as adults, if we are fortunate enough 
to have become accustomed to respect, we may undervalue its 
importance to children, and will expect to find something 
more startling than equal respect as the basis for free 
schools and education for freedom. It may be necessary, then, 
to remember how many actions, not wrong in themselves, 
outrage some adults when done by children. Wearing short 
skirts, long skirts, bright shirts, black shirts, long hair, 
short hair and any sort of hat will upset some teachers, 
parents and governors, as will talking with hands in pockets, 
neglecting to say 'Sir' or expressing any opinion unasked. 
It would be salutary for any adult who thinks equal respect 
is not tough enough a concept to be fundamental to a free 
atmosphere in a school to spend a week in any modern, 
bright and not obviously repressive school, and discover how 
frequently it is lacking. Respect is shown, or not shown, of 
course, not only in what teachers say to pupils, and how 
they say it, but in the importance that is placed on what 
the pupils say themselves, and the spirit in which their 
contributions, in social or educational situations, are 
received. If children are respected as people with important 
ideas of their own, then what they say on the subject of 
restriction and freedom in school must be listened to, and 
the extent to which they should be free to share in the 
organising and running of their school will be discussed in 
the next chapter. 
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Liberty. democracy and education 
In Chapter 10 it was argued that citizens of a 
democracy need to be educated in order to survive in, take 
part in, contribute to and benefit from their society, and 
that a democracy needs educated citizens in order to continue 
to operate as a democracy. I concluded that therefore a 
system of compulsory education was justified in a democracy, 
despite the fact that this restricts freedom. As democracy 
requires compulsory education, and compulsory education 
restricts freedom it was accepted that in this respect 
democracy has a negative effect on the liberty of children. 
However, that is only one aspect of the complex 
inter-relationship between liberty, education and democracy. In 
this, the final chapter, I will attempt to draw together my 
previous arguments on the positive relationship between 
democracy and liberty and relate them to the education of 
children in a democratic society, for a democratic society, 
and within a compulsory education system. In the previous 
chapter I discussed children's academic and personal liberty 
at school, leaving the question of their political education 
and freedom to participate in the democratic organisation of 
their schools until this chapter. First, however, it will be 
necessary to recapitulate earlier ideas on the relationship 
between liberty and democracy. 
Despite the admitted restriction of freedom involved 
in compulsory education which, it was argued, is necessary 
for an informed and active democratic society, it was 
claimed in Chapter S that democracy also makes a positive 
contribution to freedom. Contrary to Hayek's claim, (1) that 
liberty and democracy are unrelated, it was argued at that 
stage that they are connected if for no other reasons than 
that a democracy allows people the opportunity to be involved 
in the making of political decisions if they so wish, and 
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that, because of the opportunity it affords to remove any 
elected leaders who show dictatorial tendencies, it reduces 
the risk that they will be deprived of other important 
freedoms. In Chapter 5 the relationship between freedom and 
democracy was considered further and it was claimed that as 
discussion and the opportunity for dissent are essential 
elements of democracy, certain basic freedoms must be 
guaranteed to individuals and minorities as well as to the 
majority if democracy is to continue. Thus, it has been 
shown that there is a positive relationship between democracy 
and libertyt firstly because having the opportunity to take 
part in government is a freedom in itself secondly, because 
there is a contingent relationship between freedom and 
democracy due to the fact that other valued freedoms are 
less likely to be taken from those who have some control 
over the making of political decisions and the distributions 
of power than from those who have note and thirdly, because 
without the basic freedoms we require in order to participate 
in political life democracy could not continue. Thus, though 
democracy may require some restrictions of freedom it is also 
a form of freedom in itself, provides some safeguard for 
other freedoms, and could not survive without them. 
The relationship between democracy and education is 
similarly complex, but can usefully be considered in three 
waysi education within a democratic society, education for a 
democratic society and democracy in schools. However, as will 
be seen, these three subjects overlap considerably. It will 
not be possible, or even desirable, to prevent discussion of 
one of these topics from flowing over into the others, for 
democracy in schools is part of education for democracy and 
both are essential elements of education within a democratic 
society. Schools and other educational institutions exist 
within a wider society, and because decisions about education, 
its distribution and content are political decisions, these 
will be made, in a democracy, with some degree of reference 
to or involvement by the citizens. I should emphasise at 
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this point that when I say, for example, that 'we' consider 
certain knowledge important or decide that children should 
learn such-and-such, the 'we' refers to the whole community 
and not just to teachers, school governors or the D. E. S. In 
a society more fully democratic than our own the content of 
the school curriculum would be a subject of discussion -a 
discussion which, like those on other important subjects, 
children would be educated to participate when they were 
able. It is because schools are part of a wider society 
with a legitimate interest in its life that they cannot exist 
as little, isolated democratic states which pay no regard to 
the views or interests of the wider community. (2) 
However, at the same time as existing within a 
democratic society (which should treat education as a matter 
of interest and a crucial concern) schools are organisations 
with power structures of their own and their own internal 
decisions to be made. If they are to be democratic 
institutions then the people who work in them - staff and 
pupils - will be involved in the making of those decisions, 
and this participation will be educative as well as 
intrinsically worthwhile. Thus, members of democratic society 
have an interest in and responsibility for educationj 
education prepares children to play their part in the 
democratic society an important part of education for 
democratic participation involves practical experience of 
democracy in school; and that practical experience of 
democracy is valuable in its own right, and not simply as a 
preparation for the future. Clearly, education in a 
democratic society, education for participation in a democratic 
society and democracy in schools are interconnected, but in 
as far as they can be separated I will begin with the 
first strand - education in a democratic society. 
As was stressed in Chapter 5, citizen participation 
and involvement - and not simply the election of leaders - 
are the essence of democracy, and it was argued in Chapter 
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10 that it is necessary to have certain skills, knowledge 
and attitudes in order to play one's part in a democratic 
society. It was also argued that as children are not the 
property of their parents but young members of their society, 
that society has a legitimate interest in seeing that they 
are taught what they need to know to co-operate in the life 
of their community as well as to be able to make choices 
as individuals. A democratic society will place high value on 
educating the young as individuals with their own lives to 
lead and as participants in joint democratic decisions. High 
priority would be given to educational matters and there 
would be wide discussion of the curriculum and organisation 
of schools. If this were not the case, and democracy were 
only what Schumpeter claims it is (3), then it must be 
acknowledged that it would have little to do with education. 
With citizen involvement at a low level there would be no 
public discussion about the sort of schools and education 
required, or where in the list of priorities for government 
spending education should come. Prospective leaders might pick 
an education policy if they thought it would be popular and 
help in their search for votes, but this would only be 
part of their self-advertisement and not chosen to serve the 
interests of the children or of their society. 
In a Schumpeterian democracy there would be little 
scope for democracy within the school either, for although 
theoretically there would be the possibility of the only 
democratic practices Schumpeter acknowledges - open competition 
for positions of power and elections - in practice it is 
unlikely that a society which places high value on leadership 
and efficiency and low value on the contribution of the 
mass of people would be one in which pupils elected their 
teachers, or teachers their Head. Decisions would be taken by 
the Head and senior staff, then, who would be appointed and 
not elected, and they would not have to devote much time 
to educating children to take part in a democratic society. 
The participation demanded in Schumpeter's democracy is so 
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minimal that no-one would need to be educated for it. As 
all anyone, except the prospective leaders, would have to do 
is plump f or one leader rather than another for no 
discernable reason except that s/ he appeared to be a good 
leader, no knowledge would be necessary, no skill, no 
practice, and therefore no education for democracy. 
However, for greater public involvement in a 
democratic society, education is necessary and schools have an 
important part to play in preparing people for that 
involvement. Those who consider that educating people for 
democratic participation is Utopian should note that members 
of the middle class are more likely to be involved in 
political movements than members of the working class, and, 
unless it is believed that this is part of their genetic 
inheritance, we must assume that their enthusiasm for 
involvement has been learned. As was suggested in Chapter 5, 
people are more likely to be involved and active if they 
believe they have a realistic chance of influencing events, 
if the issue is important to them, and if they have been 
socialised or educated to participate. For a long time 
English public schools claimed to educate boys to be leaders, 
and, as so many of our leaders are products of those 
schools it may be assumed that their political education was 
successful in achieving its ends. Until we have tried as 
hard to educate all children to participate in our democratic 
institutions and co-operate in the running of our society we 
should not dismiss the majority of the population as 
incapable of participation. 
Democratic participation at the micro level, in areas 
close to the individual, is always educational, but at work 
or in political or social organisations the education will be 
incidental, perhaps not even noticed by those whose object 
is to manufacture articles for sale, campaign for a community 
centre or organise a Mothers' and Toddlers' Club. In schools, 
however, where the purpose is to educate, the balance between 
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participatory democracy in its own right, as a way of 
running an organisation, and the educative aspect of 
participation would be different. Both aspects should still be 
presents participation in the school (or class) organisation 
in order to learn how to take part in other and larger 
organisations, and participation for the same reasons that it 
is ever desirable - basically because it is right that people 
should join together to help make the decisions that will 
affect their lives, and to control the extent to which 
others have power over them. Nevertheless, we would expect 
that in school, more than in any other institution, the 
educative function would predominate, and not be incidental, 
and so special efforts would need to be made to teach 
children the knowledge, skills and attitudes that will enable 
them to play their part in the democratic organisation of 
society. 
The need for more and better political education has 
been argued convincingly and often. The Politics Association 
was founded in order to develop 'political literacy' in 
secondary school pupils, and in the mid-sixties the Newsom 
Report said 
"A man who is ignorant of the society in which he lives, who 
knows nothing of its place in the world and who has not 
thought about his place in it, is not a free man even though 
he has a vote. He is easy game for 'hidden persuaders" (4) 
(amongst whom, I would argue, we would find Schumpeter's 
would-be leaders competing for power. ) Yet even so, because 
of fear of bias and indoctrination, and perhaps because we 
do not value democratic participation highly enough, political 
education is all too often restricted to the learning of 
facts about the constitution and parliamentary procedure rather 
than being a preparation for participating in a democratic 
society. Our children's political education suffers from the 
fact that though, as a society, we claim to value democracy, 
we are extremely suspicious of politics! 
There are, I suggest, three strands to the sort of 
political education young people need in a democracy. Firstly, 
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they will need a broad education which will teach them the 
skills and knowledge of our society and develop their 
intellect and understanding. Democracy cannot be practised in 
the abstract and all the experience in the world of debates, 
votes and elections will be useless without some 
understanding of the subjects being debated about which 
decisions will be made. Secondly, they will need more 
specific knowledge about political issues and institutions and 
the distribution of power in our societyl and thirdly there 
will have to be practical education within the school of the 
workings of a democratic organisation, for, as Mill said 
We do not learn to read or write, to ride or swim by being 
merely told how to do it, but by doing its so it 
Is 
only by 
practising popular government on a limited scale that the 
people will ever learn how to exercise it on a larger" 
(S)However, the purpose of organising a school democratically 
is not simply to prepare children for future involvement in 
democracies, though this is an important part. Children are 
not simply embryonic citizens, trainee democrats or even 
future individualists. They are people with current feelings 
and wants who feel oppressed or undervalued if their own 
views are silenced or ignored, or their own wants dismissed 
as unimportant or irrelevant, and so whenever possible they 
should be involved in the making of decisions that effect 
them, just as adults should. The relationship between 
education and democracy is not simply one of a preparation 
for future participation in a democratic society, with 
democratic participation in schools existing only for educative 
purposes. Democracy in schools is required in its own right. 
It is not easy to combine democratic activity for its own 
sake and education for democracy, but just as, for example, 
English or Music teachers try to provide opportunities for 
children to do work that is intrinsically worthwhile as well 
as being a good preparation for future work, so political 
education should provide opportunity for political activities 
that are valid in themselves as well as being educational. 
I have claimed that compulsory education is Justified 
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because there are certain things children need to know in 
order to survive in our society, to become part of the 
community and play their part in it, and to be able to 
make reasoned choices as individuals, and for these reasons I 
argued that children cannot be allowed academic or social 
freedoms that will defeat those purposes. Similarly, I would 
argue that they cannot be allowed the political freedom to 
decide democratically that their school will become an 
institution with a different purpose. It was argued in 
Chapter 4, that consent is not necessary to justify all 
obligations and restrictions of liberty, and if this is true 
of adults there is no reason for it not to be true of 
children also. If, in a free and democratic society, there 
may be just restrictions of adults' liberty, and 
non-contractual obligations to other members of society, then 
these may exist in a free and democratic school also. I 
claim that they do, and that children are no more free from 
the obligation to make some contribution to their society -a 
contribution which cannot be made from ignorance - than 
adults are. However, despite that, there is room for a great 
increase in participation by pupils in the running of their 
schools, and many more areas of common concern over which 
they can exercise democratic control. This will not be a 
simple matter, as any attempts to introduce greater democracy 
into a school will face all the problems common to any 
democratic institution, plus the particular problems associated 
with young people whose experience is relatively limited and 
whose rationality may not be fully developed. However, the 
discussion and resolution of common problems is an essential 
feature of democracy, and discussing and attempting to resolve 
problems in school is an essential part of education for 
and in a democratic society. 
One of the problems that all democratic organisations 
share is that of ensuring that those who take the decisions 
are responsible for the consequences, for it is clearly 
unfair if everyone votes to pursue one course of action and 
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then responsibility for its failure is shouldered by one or 
two individuals. Seeing this problem as a barrier to the 
introduction of greater democracy in schools Musgrove says 
"Responsibility is properly linked with power. Pupils are 
members of a school in a different sense and on different 
terms from their teachers. To be responsible is to be 
liable for punishment if things go wrongs pupils cannot be 
punished like their teachers for the failure of school 
policies even if they had a hand in shaping them. Their 
claim to a share in power is weak. "(6) 
However, Musgrove's conclusion results from his viewing the 
problem the wrong way round. Instead of saying that as 
pupils do not share responsibility they should not share 
power, we should say that as pupils are deeply affected in 
important ways by decisions made in schools they should, if 
possible, share power, and therefore ways should be devised 
to enable them to share responsibility. Wrong decisions might 
damage a school's reputation or spoil a teacher's chance of 
promotion, but the most serious consequences fall on the 
pupils. And so, if they are thought to be capable of 
participation, and of enjoying or suffering the results of 
that participation, their claim to a share of power is 
strong, (even though, as I argued in Chapter 8, adults will 
be sometimes be right to protect children from the 
consequences of their own actions. ) The problem of correctly 
assigning responsibility for decisions and blame for mistakes 
is a real one, but it is a problem for -all democratic 
organisations. (7) 
One way round the problem of sharing power and 
responsibility in our present education system is suggested by 
Scrimshaw who says that greater democracy could be introduced 
in only those schools in which the head was willing to take 
the risk of allowing others to take decisions for which s/he 
would still be legally responsible. (8) He imagines that 
democratic and conventional schools would co-exist and that 
people would choose the sort of organisation they liked best 
- eventually being won over to the democratic schools. 
Unfortunately, with the decline in the number of school-age 
children and the cost, in time and money, of travel, I do 
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not feel this is a practical suggestion in most areas of 
the country, for though the picture of people choosing 
between different schools has some attractions, the fact is 
that for most people there is no real choice. In a society 
which gave a higher priority to education, democracy and 
education for democracy than does our own, Scrimshaw's 
suggestion might be feasible, but in such a society it would 
hardly be necesary. 
However Scrimshaw is right to say that heads who 
are willing to, give up some power even though they will 
still be held legally responsible can introduce greater 
democratic participation in their schools. In some schools 
great efforts have been made to make themselves more 
democratic, and much may be learned from their successes and 
failures. Perhaps there has been too much emphasis on the 
outward forms of democracy such as electing representatives to 
a School Council which has little real power and often 
presents a facade of democracy which children mistrust. School 
Councils do have a useful part to play, but seem to have 
been most successful in small private free schools where 
direct democracy could operate. At Summerhill, for example, 
Neill, all teachers, and the pupils over seven had one vote 
each in the school council which met every week. Rules were 
made, complaints raised, and malefactors punished or 
arrangements made for reparation. Even at Summerhill, however, 
not all matters were settled by the council. Sleeping 
arrangements, food, payment of bills and the appointment of 
teachers were organised by Neill and his wife. (9) Clearly, 
weekly meetings and discussions take time, but if they are 
considered important time will be found, and if one result 
is that children accept the decisions that are made, then 
some of the time that would otherwise be spent on rule 
enforcement will be saved as well. One of the arguments 
against children being allowed to make important decisions for 
themselves is that they lack the capacity to look far 
ahead. In so far as this is true it will result in 
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decisions being made, changed and made again, but although 
this may be wearying for the adults involved it is part of 
the educative process. Rules will be made when the need for 
them is apparent, (10) and it may be necessary for each new 
generation of children to discover the need for themselves. 
Beacon Rise, the school founded by Bertram and Dora 
Russell was also small enough for democratic decisions to be 
made through discussion of all the pupils. Dora Russell said 
'This was a democracy in which people had to learn by 
experience and discussion how to live amicably with one 
another. To bring up a child under a rigid system of 
authority, enforcing implicit obedience... seemed to us a 
poor preparation for life in a democratic society. The 
likely result of such treatment would be either timid 
conformers or refractory rebels. But living day by day in 
discussion with those who were virtually your equals in aqe 
and attainments could lead you to acquire, both emotion ally 
and rationally, the democratic qualities of mutual 
understanding and tolerance. ' (11) 
The debate about the best size for a school is always with 
us, with claims for the advantages of large schools on the 
grounds of cost effectiveness and availability of specialist 
staff being argued against the family atmosphere and intimate 
knowledge of pupils which may be found in small schools. 
This is not the place to pursue these arguments. However, I 
would claim that small scale direct democracy is better 
suited to the needs of children than is representative 
democracy, both as a way of making day-to-day decisions which 
can be seen to be fair, and of introducing the concept of 
democracy in a clear way. If larger schools are thought to 
have other advantages which outweigh this, then ways must be 
sought to overcome the problems of size. (12) 
The head of one state secondary school who had 
attempted to encourage democracy in his school claims that, 
rather than have a school council with no real power, it is 
better to let the pupils elect ad hoc committees with 
certain clearly defined powers and responsibilities for certain 
specific purposes. He writes 
'We have gone through swings and shifts and these I 
recognise as educational processes in themselves. Thus our 
seniors have voted out, in, out and in the prefect system 
they have tried and rejected the School Council as suche 
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they have veered from no uniform for 7th formers and glide 
time to uniform and strict hours" (13) 
If this sounds like a recipe for chaos, it should be 
remembered that this headteacher is not trying to find a 
correct decision on whether it is right to have either 
prefects or uniforms. He wants the pupils to decide for 
themselves, and recognises that what suits one year group may 
not suit another and that sometimes the only thing that 
makes one course of action better than another is that the 
people involved are happy with it. What is important in this 
instance is the educational value of debate and 
decision-making which must, like all other school work, be 
done afresh by each new class. It will not be easy for 
teachers to listen to arguments on the same subjects year 
after year and sit by while arrangements are changed and 
then changed back again, but if they are convinced that it 
is important and educative for pupils to be involved in the 
making of decisions then they will do it. 
The first head of Countesthorpe College also wanted 
to involve the pupils in decision making, but first he took 
the step that I consider crucial to the success of a 
democratic schools he involved the staff. Brian Simon explains 
that a decision was made 
'that the school was to be run by the staff as a whole, 
through discussion and joint decisions arrived at by 
consensus. The head would participate in the discussion but 
would carry out decisions so reached... This step.. was seen 
as a means of ensuring that each and every member of the 
school's staff could feel a genuine and equal responsibility 
for running the school, so that participation and 
involvement could be maximised. ' (14) 
The participation of the staff was considered important in 
order that the school should continue to be innovative and 
flexible. So often a new head will initiate change, but then 
the school becomes static. As the impetus for change often 
comes from younger staff, who are usually newer and more 
junior, a democratic structure is necessary if they are to 
make their contribution. However, equally or even more 
important reasons for having a democratic staffroom as well 
as pupil representation are that it helps to ensure that the 
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staff are united in their attempts to increase the 
democratic participation and the liberty of the pupils, and 
it provides the children with an example of equals sharing 
responsibility, discussing, arguing, disagreeing and coming to 
a decision which binds them all. 
If we compare various schools which have tried to 
increase children's liberty and democratic participation, it 
would appear that having a staff that is united and 
enthusiastic about the venture is of critical importance. Most 
free schools will attract some measure of antagonism from 
outside. Private free schools have sometimes to face the 
wrath of the neighbourhood and local press, but at least 
they should have the support of parents and teachers who 
have chosen the school, knowing its philosophy. State schools 
do not have this advantage and have to win local support, 
and any dissent among the staff about their aims makes this 
much more difficult. As John Watts, the second head of 
Countesthorpe College said 
An authoritarian progressive will usually come unstuck when 
outside agencies can exploit the division he has created 
among his staff. When this happens the reform aimed for by 
the head is thwarted, the power passes out of the school 
even to the point of its closing down and, more to the 
point, the children suffer. ' (13) 
Both Risinghill Comprehensive and William Tyndale Junior 
School, which were closed by the local education authorities, 
had heads who did not have the full support of all their 
staff, and who were accused also of not supporting the 
staff. (16) Gretton and Jackson tell of a deep division 
amongst the staff at William Tyndale which was exploited by 
unsympathetic governors and parents. (17) Nearby John Milton 
School managed to weather some of the same problems, largely 
because the head and the teachers were united in their aims, 
and the school secretary and dinner ladies, all of whom 
shared a staff room, were also included by being invited to 
staff meetings, and helped to feel part of the school. As 
these ancillary workers were mostly parents as well, they 
were on the side of the staff, knowing what they were 
trying to do and why. At Risinghill, many of the staff 
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felt that the head did not support them or understand their 
problems, and imposed a system on them that they did not 
believe in or could not make work. (18) 
At Countesthorpe, on the other hand, the staff 
worked together with the head, and managed to survive the 
adverse publicity and criticism which seems to be inevitable 
in the first few years. John Watts said that in a 
participatory system such as they had at Countesthorpe the 
role of the head is different. 
"Instead of experiencing the gratification of seeing my own 
will take on flesh.. 1 now feel I have made possible and 
participated in a for of school in which teachers and school 
students have been able to enjoy an increase in dignity 
which results from their sense of determining to a large 
extent the conditions under which they work and grow. ` (19) 
The inevitable compromises that will come in such a school 
might dismay a head who was determined to extend children's 
liberty and democratic participation, and feared the 
conservatism of the staff. However, it is not only for 
prudential reasons that teachers and other school staff ought 
to be involved in the running of the school. If a head 
genuinely believes that it is right for pupils to be 
involved in the making of decisions that affect them in 
their place of work, then s/he cannot, with any consistency, 
deny this to the teachers and other staff who also work 
there, and who should provide an example of democratic 
co-operation. 
There will be disagreements amongst the staff, of 
course, and sometimes, as we would expect, the decisions that 
are made by the pupils will be unwise, but so will some of 
their spellings be wrong, some writing illegible and some 
ideas ill-expressed. (20) Children are at school to learn and, 
so, if we want them to learn about democracy,. we should not 
regard petitions, deputations etc. as a nuisance or 
'trouble', but as signs that they are interested in 
participation. School is the place to improve, and teachers 
should welcome the first clumsy attempts at participation just 
as they welcome the first pictures of a bright green circle 
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that is meant to be Mum. An important difference, however, 
between exercises in books and exercises in democracy is that 
mistakes in the former do not affect anyone but the pupil 
who makes theme mistaken democratic decisions effect others. 
Any democracy should be concerned to prevent the tyranny of 
the majority and to protect the rights and welfare of 
minorities and dissenting individuals, but this is particularly 
important in schools as the pupils are still learning 
democratic attitudes. 
Musgrove voices concern about the danger to pupils 
if teachers give up their right to determine acceptable 
conduct and allow children to be self-governing , 
in this 
respect. He says 
'When schoolmasters do not control schoolboys, schoolboys 
do- but usually more repressively" (21) 
and he cites the example of nineteenth century public 
schools when the boys' activities outside lessons were 
governed largely by their own rules and bullying was rife. 
However this situation of which Musgrove writes was not one 
in which co-operation and democracy were fostered. The boys 
may have been self-governing, but they were not democratic, 
just as a country which achieves independence can be 
self-governing and still have a despotic government. Teachers 
should always be an guard to see that bullying does not 
flourish, but I see no reason to suppose, as Musgrove does, 
that this is more likely to happen when pupils share power, 
or to equate the despotic rule of a self-appointed group 
with democracy in schools. Indeed, democracy is usually taken 
to be some defence against tyranny, and no teacher who 
valued it would, like the 19th century head of Winchester 
cited by Musgrove, refuse 
"to be informed of schoolboy bullying out of a sensitive reqand 
for traditions of schoolboy autonomy. " (22) Neill says that the 
Summerhill General School Meeting often has to tackle the 
problem of bullying (23) but that this is a problem the 
children take very seriously. I do not accept all his claims 
for his school, but the one that bullying is less common 
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than in strict schools seems reasonable. If children have a 
relaxed relationship with their teachers which enables them to 
speak of their worries, and if teachers know their pupils 
in a wider context than that of the classroom, there will 
be less scope for bullies to operate, and possibly they will 
feel less urge to work off their own frustrations and 
inadequacies on those who are smaller or weaker. 
I have already stressed that participatory democracy 
involves more than electing leaders and more even than voting 
on a particular issue. There must be discussion - talking and 
listening - so that everyone's point of view is aired and, 
it is to be hoped, understood and whenever possible 
accomodated. This- is a feature of democracy in small 
organisations which should be particularly stressed in schools 
and drawn to pupils' attention in the more formal political 
education which they receive. It tends to be overlooked if 
we look to Westminster for our model of democracy and think 
that the point of a debate is to muster as many 
like-minded voters as we can, or, at a slightly higher 
level, persuade others to think as we do and vote with us. 
This may be necessary in a parliament of representatives, 
elected to carry out a party programme, but when everyone is 
his or her own representative, and no one is let down by 
a change of mind or policy, then, it should be remembered 
that listening is as important as talking, and understanding 
the opposition is as important as defeating it. If this is 
the democratic style which characterises democracies in school 
there will be fewer occasions when a minority is left unhappy 
about the decisions reached, and it is even less likely that 
there will be a permanent minority that is consistently 
overruled and excluded from power. 
Disaffected minorities, though less likely to be 
found in a small community like a school than in the 
country as a whole, may still occur. Perhaps one group of 
pupils in an Animal Rights Group might want to stop meat 
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being served for school dinners, while a group of Muslim 
children want to have Halal meat provided. It is unlikely 
that either group would be satisfied by the result of a 
vote, and the problem might be complicated by the presence 
of a majority of children who do not have strong feelings 
either way. 'One person one vote' is thought to epitomise 
democratic justice, and the idea that anyone affected by a 
decision should have the opportunity to influence that 
decision seems simple enough in principle, though not always 
easy to organise. However, sometimes justice seems to demand 
that we should distinguish between those who are very much 
affected by a decision and those who are less so, or 
between the small group with strong feelings and those in 
the rest of the community who do not really mind. (24) 
Even if there were answers to these problems and I 
knew them, this would not be the place to reveal them. My 
purpose here is to show that the problems of democracy in 
school are very similar to the problems of democracy in any 
other organisation. Is Xa decision which should be taken by 
the whole community or the group most affected by it? Is Y 
a decision that is of no concern to the whole group, and 
should properly be made by an individual? Is 2a decision 
that the group is not competent to decide, and which should 
be taken by an expert? These questions arise in our society 
every day. (24) We argue about the answers to them, and it 
is right that we should. Our freedom to do so is highly 
valued, and greater freedom to be more directly involved in 
such discussion would reduce the power that others have over 
the important decisions of our lives. If the presence of 
problems and difficulties in our democracy are not thought to 
provide an adequate reason for abandoning it in society as 
a whole, then their presence in schools is not an adequate 
reason for arguing that we should not have democracy there. 
We should be careful of demanding perfection in school 
democracy when we do not expect it in other democratic 
institutions. The presumption, in schools as elsewhere, should 
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be in favour of direct democratic participation whenever 
possible, with the onus on those who believe it is not 
appropriate in particular circumstances to demonstrate why. 
Simone Weil said that 
'The least evil society is that in which the general run of 
men are most often obliged to think while acting, have the 
most opportunities for exercising control over collective 
life as a whole, and enjoy the greatest amount of 
independence. " (25) 
I would agree, and claim that the same should be said about 
schools with the additional requirement, of course, that they 
educate their pupils. Children will not be able to 
participate as fully in the running of their society as most 
adults would, but a sincere valuation of democracy will 
involve maximising opportunities for them to practise democracy 
as well as to learn about it. It is to be hoped that 
they will learn that there are problems to be faced in any 
democratic organisation, but that these will not be solved by 
abdicating our responsibilities and leaving what should be 
joint decisions to leaders. By participating in the exercise 
of power they will not find freedom, if by that we mean the 
freedom to do what they wish and make all the decisions 
that affect them as if no one else mattered. Sometimes their 
wishes will' be overruled. However they will gain important 
freedoms, and, in having some control over the power that 
other people can exercise over them, will safeguard others. 
Democracy is not freedom; it does not guarantee freedoml 
but if we value the freedoms it does offer, then we should 
allow our children to share them as soon 'as they are able, 
and should educate them to join with others in the running 
of our society. They are part of that societyi it should be 
organised to cater for their needs and also to enable them 
to participate in it as fully as they are able, sharing the 
responsibilities and benefits of membership, its obligations 
and its liberties. 
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